Army soldiers training with laser sights and night vision devices.

Army soldiers training with laser sights and night vision devices.

ARMY WAR COLLEGE: A massive wargame held here this week to explore the “Deep Future” of warfare in the 2030s demonstrated a stark truth — one that Clausewitz enumerated in his famous work, On War — there’s no substitute for sheer numbers, no matter how much high technology the Army buys.

That’s an unsettling answer at a time when the deep, decade-long spending cuts called sequestration threaten to slash both the Army’s numbers and the research and development money that ultimately gives birth to the most useful technology.

It takes a decade or two to take new technology from the laboratory to the battlefield or to grow a young second lieutenant into a commander. So Army leaders are painfully aware that if they want to get ready for the 2030s, they need to make some key investments now. To do that they need to sell them to skeptical civilians at the very moment when the rush to cut the budget makes it all too tempting to slash programs that only pay off in the longer term.

It’s especially difficult for the Army, which has poured more money into cancelled acquisition programs than any other service over the past two decades. With Iraq over and Afghanistan winding down, the Marines are returning to their seaborne roots; the Air Force and Navy have a high-tech concept known as AirSea Battle. The Army is having an identity crisis.

Precisely because the Army is the largest service, precisely because it is the most diverse, it spends the most time and effort getting all its internal factions to agree. By the time that anything like a vision has made the stations of the cross to get approval and input from all the requisite generals, it’s usually watered down and bloated up into cluttered, incoherent PowerPoint slides (“my instructions were to put all the ideas up there,” one briefer said) that are unintelligible to outsiders – including the people who sign the Army’s checks.

When I said this, in blunter terms, to a room full of generals, colonels, and senior Army civilians here, I was surprised by the response: a lot of rueful laughter, nodding heads, and — most surprising — a fist-bump from a two-star general.

It’s true, another two-star said. “Because we are the most complex and dysfunctional of the organizations in the Department of Defense, we have meandered all over the place,” the major-general sighed. One civilian official, he said, had even warned him that “one thing you’ve got to do is decide what you’re going to do: You can’t change your minds every year-and-a-half.”

This week’s wargames and the associated conference of senior officers – involving more than a hundred people from the Army, other services, civilian agencies, foreign allies, and even an advisory body to the UN – are part of an Army program called “Unified Quest,” an ongoing effort to figure out the future of the service. The Army organizer, the Training And Doctrine Command (TRADOC), has given the other armed services, civilian agencies, and even me, a journalist, extraordinarily open access to some brutally honest discussions.

“I feel like I’m leading a root canal,” said one general moderating Thursday’s discussion.

“The Army is almost unique in its ability to have a self-critical discussion like this and be a true learning organization,” the Stimson Center’s Lincoln Bloomfield told me after we both participated in a previous conference at Fort Belvoir. “If you had a similar gathering at a civilian agency the culture would tend to produce talk of inputs rather than outputs, efforts made rather than results achieved. As the September 19 House hearing on Benghazi made clear, the State Department has no institutionalized process for lessons learned.” The Army has an entire organization devoted to dissecting what went wrong or right.

 

Facing An Ugly Future

The most striking case of the Army’s capacity for self-criticism that I saw came on Thursday afternoon, when a colonel and his staff briefed senior officers on how the wargames were going downstairs. (The fictional scenario was deemed too sensitive for me to sit in on the turn-by-turn planning, unlike the previous game, but I was allowed to attend the conference on the condition that I not identify any participant by name).

As in the past, TRADOC was actually running two wargames side-by-side, each fighting the same enemies in the same scenario but with significantly different assets on the American side. The “evolution force” assumed the Army sticks with its current 30-year modernization plan (although funding for it is in real danger): The only new systems in its arsenal would be ones whose key components have at least proven they can function in the lab. (The government calls this “Technological Readiness Level four” (TRL 4). The “innovation force,” however, assumed the Army had the funding – and enough luck – to get more radical technology ready in time, ranging from robotics to rapid deployment to “potential game changer technology in directed energy” (such as lasers to shoot down enemy missiles, microwave blasts to fry enemy electronics, and artillery railguns).

The high-tech option certainly got there faster: It deployed an “operationally significant” force to the crisis zone within 16 days, compared to 45 days for the less advanced alternative. True, the Army can already drop a battalion of paratroopers from the 82 Airborne Division’s “Global Response Force” anywhere on the planet overnight and deploy a full airborne brigade in 96 hours, but those are relatively lightly armed foot troops. It takes weeks or months to move in heavy artillery and armored vehicles. When airborne troops deployed to Saudi Arabia to deter Saddam Hussein’s armored legions from invading In 1990’s Operation Desert Shield they were described by an authoritative Pentagon study as “the speed bump.” Even if every single missile the 82nd carried destroyed an Iraqi tank, one veteran of the operation told the conference, “we were still short.” So closing that gap between the rapid-deploying light brigades and the slower-moving heavy hitters is crucial to the Army’s crisis response. Simply put, said one participant, “there’s less time for bad things to happen.”

Where things went sour was when the simulated US force actually closed for battle, even in the high-tech version. “When the innovative force met the enemy and got in, it just didn’t seem that technology gave you the advantage that you wanted,” said the colonel leading the briefing. Though he didn’t characterize what happened as a “defeat,” he acknowledged that progress stalled, calling it an “operational pause.”

Why? “I don’t know,” the colonel said, pointing out that the final turn of the game was still in progress and analysis had barely begun. “I just know it’s worth doing an [analysis] to break apart why the units had to stop. Were they overwhelmed?”

 

Diagnosing The Dangers

Institutions, like scientists, learn more from failure than from success, and the point of playing wargames is to push your force to the limit and see where it breaks so you can fix problems before they occur in real life. The Army is just beginning in-depth analysis of this week’s wargame, but first impressions suggest three major fault lines:

Part of the problem may be with the Army’s evolving concept for future warfare, “Integrated Distributed Operations.” IDO calls for fast-moving units to strike at multiple points, each moving independently rather forming a single battle front (hence “distributed”) but coordinating maneuvers and concentrating their fire (hence “integrated”) through secure communications networks. In part, the idea is to make up for smaller forces with superior speed and flexibility. But in the wargames, the enemy fought on doggedly against the more agile Americans and kept US units from joining forces.

“You didn’t get the shock [effect] you were looking for,” said the colonel, “and they couldn’t make [US-controlled areas] contiguous, even when they were reinforced over and over again.”

Part of the problem may be technology: Adversaries around the world are catching up. By the 2030s some countries – or well-connected non-state forces such as Hezbollah – may challenge or even exceed American capabilities in a few key areas.  “When you get to near tech parity,” said the colonel, “the engagements are intensive, they’re longer than what we were expecting to see, and… the way we’ve chosen to go in doesn’t allow the commander to have options.”

In a study of more than a dozen militarily relevant technologies, from armor protection to bioscience to robotics, the Army analysts predicted the US would stay on top throughout the 2030s in just two: the “Internet of things” and “synthetic biology.” Barring additional investment, the study said, armor, robotics, and electromagnetic rail guns would remain solid areas of American advantage until about 2030, while computing, night vision, and drones (unmanned air vehicles) would stay in the US column only until sometime in the 2020s. Cyberwarfare, chemical weapons, and artillery of all kinds – from ballistic missiles to rockets to conventional howitzers – were all areas where some adversaries might well have the edge on the United States already.

Overall, said one general, “we believe [that] our advantage is sustainable through the next two decades or so, but as you get into the 2030-2040 period [and] if we stay on this path, we very likely will put our soldiers in the future at risk. They will lose the competitive advantage that we’ve come to know and love.”

Even in the alternative future where the Army was able to make additional investments in breakthrough technologies, however, the high-tech force still ran into trouble. A crucial problem was that we were sometimes just so badly outnumbered that no amount of technology could make up for it.

“We’re finding the mass, in certain situations, isn’t there,” said the colonel running the briefing.

The general was blunter: “We started running out of numbers,” he said. “At some point those numbers still matter.”

Three recent wargames and a RAND study all agreed the Army would need to field 20 combat brigades against a threat on the scale of North Korea, the general continued. But the Army is currently shrinking to 32 brigade combat teams, which would leave very little margin for error or other simultaneous contingencies.

The mandatory 10-year budget cuts known as sequestration will make all this much worse.

So far, although the Army is in the process of shedding 80,000 soldiers – from 570,000 at the height of the Iraq war to a planned 490,000 in 2017 – it is mostly giving back its post-9/11 buildup and streamlining support functions such as headquarters and supply. In the current reorganization, “we just eliminated overhead,” the general said. But that plan predates sequestration.

As sequestration bite deeper, “we’re going to start seeing further reductions,” the general said. “It’s not just going to be brigade headquarters or a sustainment battalion, [but] the core fighting capability of the Army.”

Comments

  • Don Bacon

    What kind of force was this war-game against, does anyone know? Unified Quest? Got that right.

    The simple reason why they are floundering, why they don’t know what to do, is because there is no need for a standing army. Cut away the wrong-headed elective US wars of the last fifty years, the ones everybody recognizes were complete expensive failures, most notably Vietnam Iraq and Afghanistan, and there’s nothing left. Certainly nothing that the reserves & Guard couldn’t handle.

    In other words, what you don’t see in these high-level grab-ass exercises is any recognition that there is an actual military enemy out there which threatens the United States. There is none. Hezbollah? Give me a break.

  • geek

    The last 12 are proof that the Army has not planned much except WW2. The extended use of reserves, reliance on contractors, with the excuse these are unconventional engagements. It is not technology that is lacking, it is having the doctrine and personnel. 2 Wars in 3rd world countries for 12 years?

  • ask2wice

    The Army and the other services will say or do anything to avoid getting less money. Face it – the days of large-scale wars between opposing armies are over. The great equalizer, nuclear weapons, has assured that. Could an adversary win a regional war (example: China comes to dominate Asia)? Yes. Can the U.S. mainland every be threatened with invasion? No! Can the U.S. fall due to an economic collapse? Yes. So tell me – which is the greater (or should I say greatest) danger?

  • TerryTee

    The Germans in WWII thought they could win over a numerically superior force by using “Hi Tech” weapons ( Tiger & Panther tanks , ME 262 jet fighters etc etc ) but were beaten by large numbers of less expensive ” Pretty Good Weapons ” ( P-51 Mustangs, Sherman Tanks, T-34 Russian tanks etc etc ). Like the US Air force ( their Junk Strike Fighter Dreams ) the Army is FAILING TO READ THEIR OWN HISTORY, and why they Won in WWII. Stalin said it best ” Quantity has a Quality of it’s Own “.

    • M&S

      One of Stalin’s top Generals (Zhukov) had an aide, who spoke thusly on war at Stalingrad: “It’s not how many I can kill before I lose. It’s how many I can lose and still win.”

      Such highway to victory paved in blood is an answer that is unacceptable to us because we want to maintain sufficient edge in our core population numbers that we can exploit the victory unto improved social conditions for ourselves. That is the real purpose of war: to gain, not to lose.

      For Western cultures where the value placed on indvidualism is so high, this may have _very real_, psycho-social as demographic and economic consequences as Russia lost far more than what is commonly stated and indeed Russia _lost WWII_, three different times, outside Kiev in the Pinsk/Pripyet marshes, outside Vyazma/Bryansk in the approaches to Moscow and in the Donets Basin at Kharkov when, for the /third/ time, the way lay open to Moscow as the Russians had nothing left.

      Hitler had the forces at each of these points to strike decisively and chose to either disperse them into aiding other units or to reinforce/delay the attack until he had ‘sufficient numbers’. Had he acted decisively, the mass-defense = mass-casualty illusion of numeric superiority would have been shattered.

      Each time, Hitler’s hidden loser’s psychology as lack of killer instinct failed to finish the fight, Stalin demanded a hold-in-place bloodyminded defense tactics while calling up more reserves. This had it’s own consequences as, by the middle of the war, we were no longer fighting Russians but Asians.

      The Germans, who had no prewar intel of the Asian USSR, had to go waaaay back to pre-1921 maps and guides and extrapolate from there. Using this, they finally figured out that they were not facing a nation of 100-120 million but of 180-200 million. And this was when the panic and war-depression set in. This according to no less than Himmler in his famous Posen speech.

      Keep in mind that the Soviet population in 1991 when the USSR imploded into the CIS was only about 148 million.

      They did not lose 25 million people to the Germans. They lost probably double and maybe more.

      Such is the destructive consequences of unconditional war upon society. It creates a leaching effect upon society that combines the worst of apathy and malaise, even amongst the survivors.

      And yet, if you lack the balls to inflict it upon /someone else/ as snap-attrition (see the attack on Hamburg and the utter shock it placed German citizenry in as Speer warned: ‘Six more cities per week of this and we’re done.’) what happens is that they bounce back and fight harder and the ability to impose a victory through intimidation as social dominance patterning ends.

      In this, there are gradations of force threshold which must also be applied as braking inertias when the threat is deemed external to race or ethnic group as nationality. And so you get the ‘alien outsider’ effect.

      Altogether, fighting the clean, elite, war has the effect of making the enemy impossible to impress or importune on a level which makes them seek a submission condition rather than a ‘final victory’ one. This is also important to consider because humanity has a hardwired, instinctive, accommodation threshold behavior beyond which it seeks to sustain genetic pathways by yielding or allowing mergence with stronger ones. It’s beneficial to the living culture base to allow the rape but not the death without forcing total overwrite of either sides’ base genetic algorithm as survival mode.

      Mass helps an awful lot here because it makes that ‘first impression’ an overwhelming one of inability to avoid or ignore outcomes that are already defacto obvious from the sum of conquered territory.

      In this, the human operant evolutionary psychology is very wise because where Maneuver Doctrine as Auftragstaktik is based on perceptions of objectives as asset-COGs whose ‘securing’ (destructively or occupationally) can force a conclusion based on NCA interdict or logistics, like Chess; the population understanding is always based on more of a Go attitude where total space owned dictates the ability to move around or inbetween hostile gene threats.

      You can even perceive this in recent conflicts where Desert Storm created more impression of ‘sieze to hold, hold to win’ with the liberation of tiny Kuwait than the imbeds did in OIF with ‘a drive through the desert’. _Even Though_ the second victory was the harder one with fewer forces, single axis linearized tactics and a perception that we were there, not to free but to punish, what counted was the perception of occupation rather than ‘permissive entry’.

      This is not to say that hitting choke points and destroying key national assets as enablers to both wartime and domestic, internal, societal functioning are not still valuable.

      But what it does mean is that the ‘Big Me!’ vision of a major force to contend with is at least as important to give -the impression of- as the articles of faith inherent to surfaces and gaps maneuver doctrine.

      Look at Khafji to see what happens when an inferior force makes a surprise run in penny packets that bypass the main-force tripwires to reach and sieze an object which they subsequently hold unto annihilation. The Marines reprised this scenario, several different ways, in exercises throughout the 90s, and always managed to defeat the threat (air) inter-sortie regeneration window, just enough, in obliterating the small forces that physically disparate secondary units could exploit the time window of the (unknowingly) sacrificed units to break through.

      What they did when they achieved their goal points as final phaselines however is the what matters: as soon as their strategy became transparent by contact reports of location, those forces which had tried to ant-stomp all the approaching units switched from hunting to fixed-target orientations and defeated the Marines on-site.

      The same logic would apply to China where denying an asset (a bridge or a railway junction as food and services delivery for instance) means _sitting on it_. And we cannot do that with microforces that are fit to rapidly deploy.

      Hit and run then becomes indecisive, even as it is cruel (hitting the power plant to deny outside influence through dead electricals) and again you have the population seeing you as feral animals rather than _conquerors_.

      • justin bristow

        Where do you get your interpretation of 1941 in Russia? It’s not based on 70 years of analysis conducted by the historians of the combatants, at least not the Russian combatants. It seems to be a contemporary accounting by German apologists, probably only considered accurate as long as the entire other side story (the Russians) could be dismissed out of hand as propaganda. That is no longer the case.

        Russia was aware that it had lost 26 million in WW2. To say they lost double that number is based on nothing but fiction. I could make a similarly ridiculous argument and say the US actually lost twice as much in WW2. My supposition is based on nothing more than an assumption of American combat power as weak (contrary to the proof).

        The weakness of the Soviet army was due to the inexperience of its professional cadre, the majority of whicj had less than 2 years of army experience in 1939 due to the rapid expansion of the force in the late 30′s. With such a force, maneuvers larger than a platoon in size were always going to be a hopeless mess, especially under fire. The veteran wehrmacht was basically fighting an army led by cadets and lieutenants. Thegood news for the Soviets was their incredible industrial capacity and a state that would not allow surrender or defeatism of any kind. The Germans had to swallow up too many Soviet formations, the decisive one being Kiev, after which the mud arrived and time ran out. Had Hitler just pushed on Moscow he would have left his force wide open to the south and Ploesti in range of Soviet bombers. A tenuous position. There wereno better options. The Russians had too large a force that would not give up.

        • Araya

          @justin bristow
          “Where do you get your interpretation of 1941 in Russia? It’s not based on 70 years of analysis conducted by the historians of the combatants, at least not the Russian combatants. It seems to be a contemporary accounting by German apologists, probably only considered accurate as long as the entire other side story (the Russians) could be dismissed out of hand as propaganda. That is no longer the case.”

          This is not true, so for example Stalin alone killed during is terror reign around 20 to 30 Million people and Lenin for him around 7 to 9 Million people. The truth is what now one can really say how many Soldiers and Civilians the Soviet Union really lose against Germany about 25 to 35 Million is likely. But even the loss of 25 Million People there for a Civilized Country an instant kill so don’t forget what the USA was with only 418,500 deaths already demoralized. And Nazi Germany loses around 7 to 9 Million people and was totally destroyed as consequence of this. Only Bloodthirsty and brutal dictatorships like the Soviet Union under Stalin can endure loses like 30 Million people by a Population of estimated 170 Million. With other Words the Soviet tactic has just worked because of the special Situation in the Soviet Union and epic mistakes of the Nazi Germans. So those the Germans have simply invaded the UDSSR with the Slogan to kill the communist and to put an end to Stalin you can be sure what the Soviet-Union had collapsed like a house of cards but they invaded Russia with Slogan to exterminate a large part of the Russian Population and to slave the rest in order of “Lebensraum” so they give the Russian People no alternative as to fight to the death.

          Today this bloodthirsty “Stalinist” tactics have lose their importance because of a wonderful weapon called the Nuclear Bomb how can kill Millions at love cost in Minutes. So only to have a much bigger Population them the enemy didn’t guaranteed victory like it was in the pre nuclear era. So for example the even a small Country like Israel with 5,5 Million People can hypothetically destroy Russia the largest Country one Erath simply because of is 400 Nuclear Bombs. So large Land Wars will be likely decided by the since of the standing force and there equipment, training, moral, strategy and environment how they fight. So it is unthinkable what the US Army will invade Red China in a War but likely what the US Army will have to fight Nord Korean and Chinese force one the Korean Peninsula or even one Taiwan or smaller Japanese islands them a War started. But to meet this challenges the Army didn’t must reinvent the wheel again they simply need to get the Skills back what they lose during the FCS, COIN Mania because why the USMC will have to face the enemy in the early days of an hypothetical but not unlikely War in the Pacific against Red China so the Army must simply be the Rescuers in distress for the USMC and Allied force them the War didn’t end fast. And what means other environments like Europe how the Neo-Imperial Russia still despite of political comments a real treat the Army will also need just the Fighting Skill what they have during the Cold War. Only COIN or Operation like Iraq or Afghanistan are Scenario’s what the Army should not prepare for and this simply why it is hard to see environments how will be comparable to Afghanistan or Iraq in the next 20 or 30 Years. And this simply why environments how you can operate in uncontested Air-Space are hard to find since nearly any African-dictator buys state of art Weapon Systems from there Dictator Friends like red China and Russia. So forget unstealthy Drones like the MQ1 and MQ9 or other COIN Toys like the MARP how can survive a rod-side bomb but not an RPG7 never mind a RPG29 hit.

          • justin bristow

            Araya, please see the following:

            http://lib.ru/MEMUARY/1939-1945/KRIWOSHEEW/poteri.txt#w04.htm-415

            Go ahead and use google translate. The losses are all there. The real ones that were duly accounted for by the same Communist statisticians that planned every other aspect of Soviet life. The “no one knows” line is just not true, and hasn’t been since the 1990′s. The only historians who use that line are basing their study on pre-1990′s data or are just German army apologists trying to justify their ultimately poor performance in WWII. In fact, the Soviet state did know, or at least had a good faith accounting that was of course secret until the fall of Communism.
            You are right that the Soviet Union was in a class of its own, withstanding this level of casualties and still fighting on. Nevertheless, it’s hard to know the will power of a nation until it’s measured. We know from the Syrian debacle, for example, that the US has no will to intervene in Syria, but all of Washington would have insisted we did just 2 weeks ago.
            Nuclear weapons do not negate the need to withstand huge losses in order to win wars, in fact they increase it. In a competition between two nuclear powers with Mutually Assured Destruction in play, both must make it clear they are entirely willing to sacrifice the entire world for their objectives if their deterrence is to be believed.
            Also, Israel cannot destroy the entire Soviet Union. They don’t have 400 ballistic missiles for those warheads. The Russians would observe Israeli preparations (through surveillance and/or espionage) and strike first, annihilating Israel’s nuclear arsenal and the country itself. These are some of the considerations that go into nuclear warfare, they are just as complicated and technical as all other methods of warfare. A few hundred nukes means nothing out of wider military context.
            A US land war with any nation is unthinkable without local air/space supremacy. The nations capable of fighting us on land with a conventional force have effective air defenses. But we would never choose to fight them on the ground unless we got through their air defense. So we assume air force supremacy over a conventional opponent. If we also do not have the ground force numbers to occupy a conventional opponent (all of which have large populations and/or territory) then there is no reason to go beyond the air campaign in the first place. If the Army isn’t ready to take and hold territory (including with the use of COIN) against US opponents then it has just talked itself out of a job. The Air Force has demonstrated that it can blow things up for much cheaper than the Army can, with far less risk, if that is all that is going to be required.
            This is exactly where the Army is talking itself to with the inane attempt to return to high-tech conventional warfare. Irrelevance. If it forswears invasions and stability operations against numerically large opponents it is useless. We can use allied armies to defend our airbases and strike our opponents from afar.

          • Araya

            I have lived in a Communist State and believe me, I know how it works and how many you can give one Communist Statistic (exactly nothing). The point is what the Russian lose about 25 to 30 Million people against Nazi Germany, like the truth what Stalin himself killed during is dictatorship around 20 to 30 Million people the large discrepancy is simply the result of how you count the deaths. One example for this Historic wrangle is the death of nearly 7 Million Ukrainian People how dies in the so called “Holodomor” or “Голодомор” hear the numbers vary between 3, 5 Million death (official Numbers) and nearly 14, 5 Million deaths estimate by Robert Conquest the most other Numbers lay among this both Numbers but one thing is clear is was the most effective mass-killing in History because why the Communist had just taken a year to do this crime and this simply by using hunger instead of Bullets, Gas or other violence. Now some Russian Historics and statistics didn’t count this people as direct victims of Stalin’s terror because why they died because of hunger. So it is with the causalities during the World War II there Military loses there counted correctly them possible in the chaos of the War but what means the Civilian deaths you can quarrel about it. You should also not forget what also Millions of Soviet prisoners died one hunger after they was taken by the million’s by the German Wehrmacht. But let’s speak a bit about you claim what the high Number of loses extiamted by German Historics is the consequences of a German attempt to find an excuse for there “poor” performance of there Wehrmacht. Sorry as I read this I just had to laugh about it. Nazi Germany is death and the most German Historics do their best to make the German Nazis more worse than they were in the reality and simple because why them they not do this they can be branded as Neo-Nazis.The truth is what the German Wehrmacht was most effective military killing-machine of is time and they performance against the much larger Red Army was extremely good.

            Hear for example the Numbers of Combat loses by the Wehrmacht, Luftwaffe, Waffen SS and Navy one the Ost-Front. You must use Google translator because why it is in German but the Numbers are easy to read.

            http://www.dokst.de/main/sites/default/files/dateien/texte/Overmans.pdf

            So the Germans loses around 2,743 Million Soldiers in Russia (Ost-Front) and 104.000 one the Balkan another 1,230 Million (some of them Volkssturm) lose their life’s in the last fights one German Territory against all Allied forces not only against the Communist’s. For every death German araund 10 Russians died and you call it a “poor” performance?

            The point is what the Red Army was from the beginning to the end of the War Numeric on all areas far superior to the German Wehrmacht and it is also fact what some Russian weapons there also superior to their German counterpart’s (for example the T34 to the Panzer III and IV) and despite of all this, the Wehrmacht has nearly destroyed the Soviet Union. The Soviet-Union was saved by Luck, is tremendous expansion, massive Allied Military help, the Russian Winter and the Incompetence of Hitler and is Nazi Regime.This was the factors how has saved the Soviet Communists form extinction, so it is really amusing what you call the German performance “bad” In face of this facts.

            Let’s speak also a bit about my fictive Israel vs. Russia example based one Nuclear Weapons. First you are right them you say what the Israelis didn’t have enough ICBMs to destroy all Russian Cities but the rest of your comments are more vain hubris about the skills of the Russian Military. Those the Israelis fire first, the Russian can only took a second strike and even them the Russian fires first and destroy Israel’s land based Nuclear weapons the chances are good what the Israelis will be able to make a second strike from there Submarine’s. The Russian have much better chances to make a successful second strike against France or Great Britain them against Israel.Because why Israel has the world best intelligence, a more dislocated Nuclear Arsenal and a better geographical position them France or Great Brittan. What they know is what Israel has 50 confirmed ICBMs Jericho II/ Jericho III how can reach Russia and they didn’t know them there missiles are MIRVs ore them they carry only a single massive warhead. So them the Israelis fire only this 50 missiles first the Russian has nothing what can stop them and them just a few of them hit for example Moscow, so Russian will be toast as a World Power. But the Sense of this example was just to demonstrate how nuclear weapons have changed the parameters in contrast to the parameters of the World War II not more. The real think what i meant to say is what even tem Red Chian has 1,5 Bilion Inhabitants and as consequence a infinite reservoir of Soldiers the existence of Nuclear weaponds has extinguished this advantage how was durign the World War II decisive for the outcome of the war especially for the fight among Nazi Germany and the USSR.

            “A US land war with any nation is unthinkable without local air/space supremacy. The nations capable of fighting us on land with a conventional force have effective air defenses. But we would never choose to fight them on the ground unless we got through their air defense. So we assume air force supremacy over a conventional opponent. If we also do not have the ground force numbers to occupy a conventional opponent (all of which have large populations and/or territory) then there is no reason to go beyond the air campaign in the first place. If the Army isn’t ready to take and hold territory (including with the use of COIN) against US opponents then it has just talked itself out of a job. The Air Force has demonstrated that it can blow things up for much cheaper than the Army can, with far less risk, if that is all that is going to be required.”

            In an ideal World yes, but a large War in the Pacific will not only be a fight between Air force and Navy Units it is likely what them the Chinese decided to invade Japanese Islands or Taiwan there Nord Korean friends there not stand still one the Korean Peninsula. So you will likely had from the beginning Army Units involved in the conflict. And them the Chinese landing one Taiwan succeed so the USA must be prepared to use Ground Forces in order to hold the island even them the Air-Space is contested and the Air Space will be contested and exactly because of this I call for a new approach. The US Military and specially the Army has become too dependent on the Air force, they cannot fight without the Air Force and this problem must be fixed in the same way like other Armed Force around the World had already fix it. With other Words the Army needs to focus one Air Defense and more fire-power one the Ground so what they become more independent from Close Air Support from the Air force. Them you take a look one the actual Army Air defense weapons in compare to the Defense systems what the Russian and Chinese have you see what the Army has nearly lose any ability for Air Defense. The Army need a replace for is AN/TWQ-1 Avenger and this replace should be comparable to the Russian TOR M2 System and to reach this performance with less investment you can simply use the AIM9X for close air defense and the AIM120 as Medium Range SAM.

          • justin bristow

            I have always been fortunate enough to live in a democratic state, and I know how much a large statistic from Congress is worth. Exactly nothing. Keeping exact track of 26 million anything is near impossible. Nonetheless, that is the proof we have, those are the numbers that anyone on the planet is tracking or was ever tracking. If you want to say there are millions more simply unaccounted for that is an idea you have invented in your mind, not proof. Keep in mind, I’ve been discussing WWII Soviet deaths, not victims of Stalin. For some reason you’ve been angling the conversation back to a discussion of Stalinism. You won’t see me defend Stalin’s murders, but that’s not what we’re talking about.

            As far as casualties on the Eastern Front, those numbers do not include the Hungarians, Romanians, Italians, Bulgarians etc. etc. who fought on the Eastern Front.

            Here’s a total accounting:

            http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eastern_Front_%28World_War_II%29#Casualties

            Those numbers don’t include civilian deaths, which are estimated at some 15.7 million for the Soviets. The Axis killed Soviet soldiers at a rate of 2-1. There is no question the Germans had a better tactical mastery of the battlefield. However, in the end they were crushed, that is the point. The Third Reich was not only crushed on the battlefield, but extinguished for all time. German nationalism was strangled in its bed by the allies so that now the only thing German’s care about is their copious amounts of leisure time and the price of sausage at a Kaufland’s grocery store.

            In 1962 the US had such an advantage over the Soviet Union in nukes President Kennedy was told there was a high probability, though not 100%, that the Soviet Union could be disarmed in a nuclear first strike and the US would win the nuclear war. This was due to all the military factors involved, including the number of Soviet ICBMs in existence (only a small number at the time). Now if you don’t think Russia today has all the same advantages of the US vs. USSR in 1962 in a nuclear fight vs. Israel you’re crazy. Small countries/militaries are still small, even when nukes are involved.

            Except on/through the Korean peninsula, the US Army will never face the Chinese Army without total air superiority. This is due to the nature of amphibious operations. No amphibious invasion since the invention of bombers that I’m aware of was ever possible without air supremacy. So if we assume air supremacy we assume we can rely on the air force. If we assume we can rely on the air force the job of the Army is to take and hold territory, not to destroy the enemy. Destroying the enemy can be done far easier with bombing strikes in the enemy’s support zone anyway. If the US Army does not have the mass and training to take and hold territory it is again irrelevant and not worthy of equivalent funding to the Navy and Air Force.

          • Araya

            Yes I know the Congress is bad and all Politician’s lie but the big difference is what at last you can seek and find the truth beyond their Numbers in a Democracy without to become an enemy of the state.^^

            The problem with the Russian Statistic what they sway one huge margins because why some statistic count for example loses how there not accountable directly by direct combat. Many died one hunger, tiredness, executions and the continuing Stalinist Terror et cetera. The examples linked to the Stalinist Terror I give in the intent to show how far official and different estimation are apart. But you’re right let’s stay by War of the Soviets causalities alone so I have researched about the background of the different estimation so it is interesting to say what the lowest Number of loses came from a German Historic named Christian Hartmann he estimates the total Soviet loses by 26, 6 Million (11,4 Million Soldiers and 15,2 Civilians) the Numbers from former Defense Minister of Russian Dmitri Jasow are in compare much higher with 27 Million Civilian deaths alone and just 8,644 Million death Soldiers. The highest Number of loses came not from German Historics or official Russian sources but by the Russian Historic Boris Wadimowitsch Sokolow how estimate the total loses by nearly 39-40 Million People (The book “Death in Wars and Conflicts in the 20th Century”). Your Numbers based one the estimation of Rűdiger Overman also a German Historic how has counted the casualties of the Wehrmacht 1, 3 Million higher them all other Historics including “Boris Wadimowitsch Sokolow” and “Christian Hartmann”.

            @ Justin Bristow

            “In 1962 the US had such an advantage over the Soviet Union in nukes President Kennedy was told there was a high probability, though not 100%, that the Soviet Union could be disarmed in a nuclear first strike and the US would win the nuclear war.”

            Not really the soviets were able to make a second strike even in 1962, so a successfully US first strike was theoretically possible but extreme risky and after the Cuban missile crisis the US-Military had to learn what the Soviet Missiles one Cuba there in contrast to their estimation Ready to Fire and also the Soviet early SSBNs. With other Words a Nuclear War in 1962 would be a bitter victory for the United States with Millions of Death then not more.

            “Now if you don’t think Russia today has all the
            same advantages of the US vs. USSR in 1962 in a nuclear fight vs. Israel you’re crazy.”

            No you misunderstood me, the Russians are hypothetical capable to make successfully first strike against Israel but this is not guaranteed and this even despite of the fact what Israel is so a small Country how also didn’t have built is Nuclear Arsenal to be secure against a Russian Nuclear Attack. As I say it was my intention with the Israel (the smallest Nuclear Country) vs. Russia (the largest and best armed Nuclear Power) to demonstrate how Nuclear weapons has negate the importance of population Numbers and Country size alone.

            But why in see the Israel vs. Russia scenario so interesting why I will continue shortly why the Russian didn’t have good chances for a successful first strike. Israel has just 50 ICBMs and 2-4 Submarines how can took a second strike and they all know what Israel has never planned to face the Russians alone or fight a nuclear War with Russia. The point is what them Israel fires first (because why they know what Russian plans a First strike because of their superior Intelligent and massive Russians preparation how must occur before a first strike.) so first there strike will destroy Russia as a World Power because why Russian has nothing to stop 50 ICBMs them they are fired. One this example they can see how important it is for the United States to get a Missile Defense System how can stop already fired missiles (from Nord Korea or Iran) how is a realistic Scenario.

            @ Justin Bristow

            “Except on/through the Korean peninsula, the US Army will never face the Chinese Army without total air superiority. This is due to the nature of amphibious operations. No amphibious invasion since the invention of bombers that I’m aware of was ever possible without air supremacy.”

            The Korean Peninsula is one of the most apocalyptic battlefield what I can imagine and the Army is already present in South Korea. And what means an amphibious invasion so you right but in a desperate situation you must take even amphibious landing them you didn’t have the Air Superiority. For example the a Taiwan Scenario in what Red China has already decimate the US 7 Fleet, destroyed the most Air Fields in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Guam and landed Forces one Taiwan. In this situation you can risk in order to didn’t lose the War a USMC/Army Operation one Taiwan because why how long the Communists didn’t conquer the Island completely you have a chance to throw them back into the Sea with the use of Ground forces.

          • justin bristow

            As to the estimation of military casualties, he consensus remains around 26 million. The outlier estimate of 40 million is still an outlier, and probably the most extreme count possible. Further, the estimate of combat losses is still around 8-10 million, meaning they lost people at 2 to 1 relative to the Axis and still decisively won. Mass matters.

            All of Russia’s navy can certainly find Israel’s 3 submarines and ensure they do not position themselves for a Harpoon launch prior to hostilities. After that point you just hit the country with a solid fuel SSBM strike from the Mediterranean. No preparations except locating Israel’s submarines and parking one ballistic sub in the Mediterranean are necessary, and that alone would not indicate a nuclear strike is imminent. This is never going to happen, and if it were likely the Israelis would invest money in other systems, the point of this conversation is that just because a nation has a small number of nukes does not mean smooth sailing for them, they have to continually invest in many different systems and have a certain critical mass of warheads, be prepared to counter adversaries, adapt etc. etc. Mere possession of the weapon system is not enough.

            As far as the 1962 crisis, all I know is how US strategists interpreted their advantage at the time. Whether they were right or not I do not know, but they thought they could likely beat the Soviets in a nuclear war and live to tell the tale. That alone wipes out the civilian conception of nuclear deterrent, which is that as long as you have a nuke you have instant deterrence. Size still mattered.

            If the Chinese had the capability to defeat a surge fleet of 3-4 carrier groups the US would build bases in the Philippines and expand Okinawa to make an unsinkable air capability. Conventional land fighting would not be as decisive as a coastal/naval defeat of China would be sufficient to initiate a blockade and destroy the nation economically.

          • Araya

            Hi justin

            “”As to the estimation of military casualties, he consensus remains around 26 million. The outlier estimate of 40 million is still an outlier, and probably the most extreme count possible. Further, the estimate of combat losses is still around 8-10 million, meaning they lost people at 2 to 1 relative to the Axis and still decisively won. Mass matters.””

            I saw what M&S has also give you a replay about the combat loses so I will not repeat some of the Arguments what M&S already has written and only respond on the “at 2 to 1″ loses. The official Wehrmacht Report gives only 2,7 Million death in combat with the Russians on, what sure not counted around 280.000 Rumanian Soldiers (how there so poor armed and trained what they are simply not to compare to the Wehrmacht and the Communist Soviet Force). With other Word’s even based one the lover estimate loses the Red Army the real count is more 1 to 4 them 1 to 2. What the Axis was at last decisively beaten is History this is clear but this was not the triumph of the Red Army because why without US Help the USSR has lose the War. The point is what German has not just fight against
            Great Brittan and the USSR alone they have also to fight against the USA how was able to produce more Equipment in one Year them the German in the entire war. Without the massive help from the USA the USSR and the Russian Winter has lost the War this is something what the Russian nationalist head but it is the reality.

            Now to the Israel
            vs. Russia Scenario:

            “”All of
            Russia’s navy can certainly find Israel’s 3 submarines and ensure they do not
            position themselves for a Harpoon launch prior to hostilities.””

            The Russian Navy has not the skills to locate the 3 to 6 Israeli submarines because why this SSKs are even more silence them classic SSBNs and it will be really hard for the Russians to move a large number of Submarines and large ASW Ships in the Mediterranean Area without attract attention form Israeli intelligence or attention from the close allies of Israel. Israel is harder to eliminate by a first strike them France or Brittan how put all their Eggs in one Basket. I can only repeat a successful Russian first Strike is possible and I not denied but it is not a certain or an easy think for the Russian because why them they miss just a handful of Israeli ICBMs or just One SSK they will face a counterattack and they have nothing what can stop such a counterattack after is lunched. And the Israeli SSKs also didn’t use Harpoon missiles as delivery vehicle for their See-based Nuclear Weapon’s they use a SLCM variant of the Popeye how has a recorded range of 1500 km and this was just a Test how was recorded by the US-Navy in 2002 in the Indian Ocean and is likely what the 650mm torpedo tubes of the Dolphin Class can carry a larger variant of this likely 533mm since Popeye how was recorded 2002 by the US Navy. And Russia is also a centralized state how can simply not afford to lose is Capital comparable to France so the Israelis just has to care what they can multiple hit Moscow to transform a Russian victory in a historical catastrophe.

            “””If the Chinese had the capability to defeat a surge fleet of 3-4 carrier groups the US would build bases in the Philippines and expand Okinawa to make an unsinkable air capability. Conventional land fighting would not be as decisive as a coastal/naval defeat of China would be sufficient to initiate a blockade and destroy the nation economically.”””

            Provided what Taiwan can withstand the Communist Invasion long enough, the problem is what the Chinese will be able to land one Taiwan and they will control the Taiwan Street the rest will be contested Air and See Space´. So it is likely what the US Military will have to do something before Taiwan is captured by the Communist troops the USMC and so the Army can for example bring Troops one Taiwan from the South in order to enforce the Taiwanese Ground-Troops. Because why them Red China can conquer Taiwan before the US Force can recover from there loses in the first hours and days of War the USA will not be longer able to take the Island back.The ideal Scenario is to stop the Communist in the Taiwan Street but them this fail you must have an alternative Plan to draw the Chinese Force back. And so to fight the Chinese Force on the Ground is the best way to buy time to cutting there Supply lines in the Taiwan Street. The US Navy and Air Force has already lose the skills to stop the Red Chinese from a landing operation In the Taiwan Street so they must prepare to fight a longer War including a War on the Taiwanes and Korean Ground. Fact is what the Chinese Navy has around 600 Surface and underwater ships of all classes and there land based Costal Air Defense already covers a large part of the Taiwanese Air Space. And it is also likely what them the Chinese attack Taiwan they will also simultaneous launch a conventional first strike against Japan , South Koreas and Guam in collaboration with their Nord Korean Friends.

          • justin bristow

            Yes, M&S revealed the neo-Nazi’s have some interesting evidence with regard to Soviet combat losses, I’ll have to look into the evidence, perhaps it makes some strong points. However, you can’t discount other Axis losses incurred by the Soviets, they contributed to the ability of Germans to kill Soviets after all.

            An SLCM is not going to get through to Moscow. S-400s will defeat it. Even Jericho strikes there are questionablr thanks to that system plus the A-135. Again, my whole point that just being in possession of weapons is not enough regardless of the weapon. Opponent capabilities and correct execution matter big time. Numbers are still important.

            We are constantly monitoring Chinesr power. When our war games start to show a surge carrier force losing the Taiwan straits we’ll fork over the money to build Philippine bases. It does not have to be done in the middlr of the war. Its necessity will be anticipated. If we do not havr air supremacy it will be impossible to bring ground troops into Taiwan. If we lose air sea we’re just going to give up. Thankfully we’ll probably not have to contemplate that for decades.

          • justin bristow

            Well, I should’ve known that Nazi sympathizers are prone to distorting evidence. Found the book, which is a collection of different analyses of the statistics in question (soviet losses). The very first essay by I.V. Pikhalov absolutely destroys the argument that Soviet losses were on the order of 40 million and not 26 million with 8.6 million combat losses.

            Those that argue for the 40 million figure make key errors-
            -They reference the Personalni Ushyoti Poteri (PUP), that’s the by name listing of Soviet soldiers lost in WWII. Problem is, probably due to poor staff performance and inexperience, the Soviets pushed accounting of the PUP to the NCO level (the PUP was a system for accounting for conscripts NOT professionals, i.e. officers, another key to understanding the data). If a soldier was not located within 5 days he was listed, name and all, in the PUP as “Missing without a Trace”. There was little attempt by higher to locate soldiers or to reconcile inconsistencies after they had been proven to be false (ie, when the soldier was found to be alive but dislocated). And of course the system was biased the other way as well, with NCOs in the heat of battle disregarding the reporting in general. The general consensus is the PUP is completely unreliable. After all, there was a war on. Pikhalov’s own uncle is still officially listed as “Missing without a Trace” although he died at the age of 70 safe in his home. Pikhalov points out, however, that Krivoshev’s work, on the other hand, is NOT based on the PUP reports but based on the reports of subordinate Soviet staffs to the general staff, which had to be resumed immediately after the war began as the peace time PUP system broke down.

            Pikhalov points out that one of the proponents of the 40 million killed theory deliberately misquotes contemporary Soviet generals, who said the PUP counts were only 1/3 of the losses as tabulated by subordinate unit staff reports, to say that General Staff estimates in general are 1/3 of the actual amount.

            Other arguments (higher numbers of people seeking medical help) are a result of the same people seeking medical help twice and being double counted.

            The demographic analysis reveals 37 million deaths from 1941 to 1945, which, based on the civilian death rate and child mortality, comes out to around 11 million from natural causes and 26 million as a direct result of the war. Only by retroactively arguing the Soviet census documents are also forgeries can you reach a higher number than the ball park 26 million number.

            The professional officers were accounted for much better because they did not use the PUP system but had to be removed from service by name. There were 1.4 million officers removed as having been killed, considering officers were 14-15% of Soviet forces, this would put total losses at 9.3 million, in the ball park of the 8.6 million figure accounted for by Krivoshev.

            Ivlev, in his work, is not concerned with Krivoshev’s data, because Krivoshev’s data is based on staff statistics that _do not track names_. Rather, Ivlev is concerned with the PUP because it lists dead or missing _by name_ and therefore _can be used to justify a 21st century state pension for the family_. All of his arguments are that the PUP underestimates losses, a given, but the PUP is NOT the basis of Krivoshev’s work.

            Ivlev also cites a data base that has been compiled since the end of the Soviet Union citing names of all different kinds of agencies. The problem is that he does not know how many of the 23 million names offered by different agencies for different reasons are duplicates. He estimates 15.4 million are not duplicates, and this must be Soviet losses. However, 6 million of these names are just people that were inquired about after the war. In the chaos of war and with the difficulty of moving inside the Soviet Union in a totalitarian society, many of these individuals probably chose to stay where fate left them at the end of the war. Also, many listed as “missing without a trace,” people like Pikhalov’s uncle, never bothered to correct their official standing as essentially dead. This data is not powerful enough to overrule Krivoshev’s analysis based on the Soviet General Staff’s numbers or the analysis based on the census. Krivoshev’s account is still likely the most accurate.

        • M&S

          >>
          Where do you get your interpretation of 1941 in Russia?
          >>

          http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3ipdjgP0y9g

          This will do for a start. Though it should be noted that the third battle of Kharkov occured in 1943 as Hitler’s real ‘last chance’ for total victory in the East. Also note that for a country that ‘would not give up’ the Soviets sure did yield a lot of POWs…

          >>
          It’s not based on 70 years of analysis conducted by the historians of the combatants, at least not the Russian combatants. It seems to be a contemporary accounting by German apologists, probably only considered accurate as long as the entire other side story (the Russians) could be dismissed out of hand as propaganda. That is no longer the case.
          >>

          Snicker. Spoken like someone drenched in propagandized western historical revisionment.

          >
          Washed in Blood Russian historians Igor Pykhalov; L. N. Lopukhovskiĭ; Viktor Zemskov; Igor Ivlev and Boris Kavalerchik have written an study of Soviet casualties Umylis krovu, Washed in Blood[45] they maintain the actual losses 2 — 2.5 times more than of Krivosheev’s 8.7 million. They base their analysis on documents from the Soviet era. Russian historian Igor Ivlev, director of Archangelsk-city State Social Memorial Center “Poisk”, based on his analysis of documentation from the Soviet era puts total Soviet losses in the war at 38.5 million persons including military dead of 20.58 million and 18 million civilians. Ivlev’s calculations are presented on the internet site which he hosts http://www.soldat.ru. In 2012 this research was published Russia.[45] He maintains that documents from the Soviet era indicate that official figures are understated and that the Russian government should conduct new investigations on losses suffered in the war. The data was obtained from different sources, files that were verified; including death or missed in action notifications, unclaimed personal bank deposits, front and rear hospital reports, Communist Party and Young Communist League membership files, electorate base population and the gap between men and women prior and after the War. These sources reveal military losses exceeding those of Krivosheev’s report by 2 — 2.5 times. The main points of Igor Ivlev’s analysis are as follows:.[45] The total demographic losses of the Soviet male population capable for military service is 20,580,000. A reconciliation of men drafted indicates 19.4 to 19.7 million dead and missing military personnel. The card files in the Russian Archives contains the names of 16.7 million dead and missing, in addition Ivlev maintains that 1.75 million missing and 1.0 to 1.2 million who died of wounds in rear area hospitals are not included in the Russian archives card files. The list of Soviet electorate voters for February 10, 1946 indicates a gap of 22.7 million males compared to the 1939 figures not including the inflow of population with the territories acquired in 1939-1940. According to Ivlev the personal records of those soldiers drafted before and during the war were reportedly destroyed under a secret order of the Soviet Defense Ministry soon after Stalin’s death in 1953 and most war draft related documents are still classified.

          And in the most crucial period of 1941-1942 no surrounded or defeated units sent any reports on their casualties. They simply disappeared with their servicemen, arms, documents and the banner. Krivosheev’s analysis also ignored reinforcements that often outnumbered the initial personnel of a unit. As a result the real irrecoverable casualties of the North-Western Front in 1941, for example, are 2.8 times bigger, than in Krivisheev’s book (507,703 : 182,264).[48][unreliable source?] Krivosheev adds only 1,162,600 dead to compensate for “no reports” situation of 1941 and his irrecoverable losses for 1941 diminish the official Soviet figures for that year by 2.16 million:[49] from 5,300,000 to 3.137.673 (but he maintains 6.3 million firearms were lost). In Moscow winter offensive his irrecoverable Soviet casualties and lost firearms stand at 1 : 7.9.[50][unreliable source?] There are official Soviet figures of military casualties in 1941, i.e. 5,3 million dead, captured and missing.[51] Later general Krivosheev diminished them by more than two million to 3,137,673, he maintains that they were civilians taken as POW by the Germans .[52] The Extraordinary State Commission has revealed 3,912,283 Soviet POWs killed by the Germans in the USSR alone,[53] Obviously conflicting with Krivpsheev’s calculations which reveal 1.1 milion POWs dead.[54]

          Boris Sokolov -In 1996 Boris Sokolov a Russian academic published a study that estimated total war dead at 43.3 million including 26.4 million in the military. Sokolov’s own calculations show that the official figures for population in 1941 to be understated by 12.7 million and the population in 1946 to be overstated by 4.0 million, thus resulting in 16.7 million additional war dead bringing the total to 43.3 million.[55] Sokolov’s analysis of Soviet war losses has been published in the Journal of Slavic Military Studies.[7]HYPERLINK l “cite_note-56″[56] The Russian demographer Dr. L. L. Rybakovsky dismissed these hypothetical calculations and believes they are not based on sound judgment.[57]
          >

          http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_War_II_casualties_of_the_Soviet_Union

          >
          The human potential of the Russians

          Here I would like to say a few words on evaluating the total strength of the Russians. An element basic to an overall evaluation is the question of Russian population figures. That is the great riddle. Population estimates for that country, which has been hermetically sealed off for decades, range from 170 to 250 million. I have taken a lot of trouble with this question, and have had studies prepared starting with the first Czarist censuses, that is, the first censuses ever carried out in Russia. At that time, the Bolshevik tendency to conceal everything from Europe and the world — from the building of a street which is not indicated on any map, to the concealment of large industries manufacturing tanks and airplanes, and which are shown to the European Info-tourist as “tractor factories”, while tanks are built in the next hall — did not yet exist. I had census figures brought to me which were not gathered under this law of camouflage and concealment, decades before the Bolshevik administration. These figures enable one to perceive a certain increase, a gradual growth. We came to the conclusion through our calculations that Russia must have two hundred people, maybe two hundred twenty million at the very most. To describe the calculations in detail at this time would take too long and might also be too boring. I came to the conclusion that the Russians, in addition to the divisions on their Western front, that is, the divisions standing directly opposite us today, have squeezed an additional 4 million soldiers out of the body of their people early this year and over the course of the year. That means 400 times 10,000 men, or 400 new divisions. I calculate this in approximately the following manner: the Russians have already drafted all men born in 1926, and some of the men born in 1927. It is a tragedy according to the laws of nature that Russian men born in 1925 to 1927 amount to 1.5 and 1.8 men respectively, while our men born in the same years amount to only 500,000 to 600,000 , that is, a third of the Russian number.
          >

          http://codoh.com/library/document/891

          >
          According to an official estimate for 1 August 2013, the population of Russia is 143,500,000.[5] The population hit a historic peak at 148,689,000 in 1991, just before the breakup of the Soviet Union, but then began a decade-long decline, falling at a rate of about 0.5% per year due to declining birth rates, rising death rates and emigration.[6]
          >

          http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics_of_Russia

          >>
          Russia was aware that it had lost 26 million in WW2. To say they lost double that number is based on nothing but fiction. I could make a similarly ridiculous argument and say the US actually lost twice as much in WW2. My supposition is based on nothing more than an assumption of American combat power as weak (contrary to the proof).
          >>

          Straw men.

          I make no correlation with U.S. Combat Power, you do.

          Instead, I will simply allow that the U.S. intended to let the Soviets be their blood dawgs and let them bleed Germany white while prolonging the war as long as possible for the sake of destroying Europe as a colonial industrialist power and for profiteerism.

          The proof, for those with eyes to see it, lies in the awful choices we made.

          Everyone knew ‘from the war before’, that the Italians were lousy fighters but on their home ground, backed and then supplanted by German troops, we ended up fighting north through one the spine of one mountain chain only to be stopped cold at another, even higher one.

          Derp.

          Especially given that the taking of Rome was followed in days by the landings at Omaha and Utah.

          If you want to stop a war, blow up the enemy’s electrical generation capacity. No lights, no industry, no 3GW. These facilities were pathetically easy to find and with 20 ton copper or silver windings in their turbodynes, utterly irreplaceable.

          If you want to stop the war, stop sending oil, machine parts and ball bearings to Germany through the Banco De Allemagne contacts in South America and Sweden. Indeed, close up the BIS and deny the RM any value, internationally, at all.

          If you want to stop the war, invade the Balkans, not Italy and force Germany to pull out of Russia entirely, in fear of having her supply lines cut while you bomb her oil to nothing.

          If you want to stop the war, invade, cross-channel while the Atlantik Wall is still non-existent and Germany has stripped what formations she has in The West for the Zitadelle. Do not head for North Africa.

          If you want to stop the war, blow up a city every three days using combined firebombing and gas main destruction as was done in Hamberg. Six weeks later the war will be kaput because the ‘dehousing’ effort will have actually made sense in the bigger picture.

          American combat -contributions- were weak because she failed to see the readily available picture in terms of ending the war. Because the war was not designed to be ended but to bleed Europe pale while obliterating.

          >>
          The weakness of the Soviet army was due to the inexperience of its professional cadre, the majority of which had less than 2 years of army experience in 1939 due to the rapid expansion of the force in the late 30′s.
          >>

          The weakness of the Soviet Army lay in Stalin’s ‘forward defense’ theory which was likely the basis for an invasion or at least the political machinations to make Hitler think it was. Stalin didn’t care about the Soviet People. If he did, he would not have shot half his officer corps.

          >>
          With such a force, maneuvers larger than a platoon in size were always going to be a hopeless mess, especially under fire. The veteran wehrmacht was basically fighting an army led by cadets and lieutenants.
          >>

          Across 1,500nm of open steppe with minimal roads, against an enemy that outnumbered them 6:1 and would continue to do so until the last of the Donets basin fight.

          An enemy that could have easily withdrawn and cut back through using operational maneuver group tactics to gut the hyperextended German logistics lines with little more than ‘platoon sized’ elements.

          Instead, they were told to stand and fight, without guns or weapons or strategic planning. And so were captured in the hundreds of thousands by motorized troops.

          >>
          The good news for the Soviets was their incredible industrial capacity and a state that would not allow surrender or defeatism of any kind.
          >>

          Rubbish. Soviet Industry didn’t begin to evacuate Moscow until German forces were in the outskirts and refusal to allow defeatism translated into murderous losses whose ethnic deficit effects have been felt to this day as more and more of the Russian functional bureacracy across the Urals is taken up by Asiatic peoples whose loyalty to a country that looks down upon them is questionable at best.

          Defeatism is would have allowed Stalin to mass his forces along key AAs to prevent the encirclement of Moscow and form solid lines while Siberian troops were moved up, early and Leningrad used as a staked bait goat.

          Better to trade a hollow force in the East than be overrun in the West.

          >>
          The Germans had to swallow up too many Soviet formations, the decisive one being Kiev, after which the mud arrived and time ran out.
          >>

          Also garbage. Had Hitler not split army group center to help the Donets campaign and the Leningrad/Archangelsk efforts, Moscow would have fallen.

          Having decided to aid these secondary fronts, had he allowed Von Bock and Guderian to set up a reasonable defensive line, the Soviet attacks would not have made half the headway they did. Had he bombed the rail lines, it’s likely the Far Eastern TVD units would not have made it to the debus point.

          All of these were not ‘had tos’ but _don’t be a fool_ political choices.

          There were fifty operational tanks at the gates of Moscow out of 600 that the campaign began with. This was not a function of ‘gottas’ but ‘wannas’ as Hitler foolishly dictated objectives rather than missions.

          In Auftragstaktik mission-driven warfare as in chess, you win by killing the COG, all the other pieces as assets are secondary.

          >>
          Had Hitler just pushed on Moscow he would have left his force wide open to the south and Ploesti in range of Soviet bombers. A tenuous position. There were no better options. The Russians had too large a force that would not give up.
          >>

          Time sir. You are not accounting for the variable of time. The Russians had nothing after Kiev. There was an opportunity for Hitler to push thru so that he could indeed kick down the house of straw.

          A proper strategy would have followed the Clausewitz maxim: ‘forget about your flanks, make the enemy worry about his rear’ and kept mission-focussed upon those threats which were directly enroute to the Soviet Capital with Aufrollen outriders and wheels to destroy an utterly demoralized and _out of communication_ Red Army while smashing through to the COG.

          As was, Hitler lost 174,00 men outside Moscow, all because he would not listen to men like Guderian who knew how to fight and hold territory.

          Do not tell me that 17 divisions is meaningless to the outcome of the war, particularly at that point.

          ARGUMENT:
          You have been brought up in an age in which the Western demonization of it’s enemy is deemed trite if not hypocritical as the pendulum swings back and we start to realize how stupid it was to abandon nationalist identity just because the German model for it didn’t succeed. As our ‘post national’ (post racial, post ethnic pride) condition is shaping up to a be mix of Animal Farm and Les Camp de Saints.

          However; while we in our militarist-adventurist condition cannot afford to be shown as being just like Germany ourselves, nor is it permitted to illustrate Germany as a -successful- opponent.

          By the Russians to save embarrassment as a defrocked nation state who don’t want their ‘victory’ in WWII to seem any more costly than it clearly has to have been. Dignity trumps outrage as the years go by and weakness sets in.

          By the Western Allies and the U.S. especially, as a function of having to admit that if Hitler -could- have won, then the notion that he lost because ‘evil was always doomed’ (and thus anyone labeled as being The Next Hitler is equally certain to be defeated) is no longer tenable.

          While Germany itself looks to scuttle out from under the label of war-starter as much as fighter as she moves to rule EU-rope anyway.

          The truth of the matter is far different. Germany was no different in her actions against the Jews and the Slavs than we were to the Indians. Just far more efficient. As the typical 12-15:1 exchange ratios on the Eastern Front routinely illustrate.

          We would be better off, as a planet, had we left Europe to disestablish itself as a feudalist city state ruled class-ocracy and be reborn as a democracy after Hitler left this world. Not least because being oceans-apart would have still separated us from nuclear immediacy while competing against excellence rather than attempting a race to the bottom as better socialists than the communists would have save America from the disintegration of democratic rule that it is now undergoing. Until we reached mutual detente` as the gravitasse of nation states that had too much to lose to be enemies.

          And Hitler himself would not exist as an overused stereotype but rather as a typical politician who did not belong in military affairs and his ‘chief evil’ as the loss of millions of Jews to forced labor and incarceration would never have occured because the shortwar outcome would have led directly to their forced deportation to Madagascar, Moskva RK or Palestine.

          CONCLUSION:
          The reality of the 20th century should have been that of a rite of passage to nation statehood for Europe, much as the 19th was for America. And we interfered in that. Wrongly, for profit.

          How wrongly is being made ever more clear, demographically. In 1950 we numbered some 27.9% of the planetary population. In 2010, we were at 16%. In 2060, we will be at 9.8%. In 2100, we will be at 4% or nothing. Because history shows that societal as racial groups who fall below 10% of the local population lose everything and are blended out or annihilated, without exception.

          We will not stand up for ourselves because of a mistaken belief that if Hitler did it, it must be wrong to do it too. Hitler wasn’t wrong in his motives. He was stupid in his execution. The world is indeed a struggle between races and we have lost the will as the right to survive it.

          The essence of the war for the Soviet Union was the control over lines of communication, not COGs. The vast distances involved made holding every burg and vil impossible, even at a regional center level. But if the Germans had instead -controlled- those cities by interdicting the rail-only LOCs between them, Stalin could not have held.

          And the world would be a better place for want of competing for 50 years with a German ‘designated enemy’ than it would be today, where we have made so many promises to so many nations, trying to contain the spread of Communism as the empowerment of mediocrity that we have no hope for a future of excellence for our own nation. Where Nation derives from Nascere. To be born.

          • justin bristow

            I will check out the washed in blood book. If accurate and not an outlier I will have learned something, thanks for that.

            I have never been accused of western propagandized revisionism before. Actually, if you must know, all of my western education insisted there was nothing more to war than the causes and the results. What I learned I learned by my own research.

            As to the rest of your rant, it is indeed bizarre to me, perhaps because I do not have “eyes to see it.” While Britain pushed an invasion of the Balkans (wisely rejected in the end, considering how well the British Balkan adventure went in the first world war) the Americans wanted an invasion in France in 1942, before the wall was built, as you recommend. The estimation was that that was beyond the capabilities of the allied armies at the time. Do you have an article or a concise argument that in fact the Brits/Americans could have probably overrun France in 1942 and that the allies knew this and still decided to prolong the invasion? Even so, an invasion of Italy DID draw away significant German forces from the Eastern Front and DID contribute to Soviet success there. I don’t know what geniuses you think run our country, but the ability to precisely time and predict the first, second, and third order effect of government action is well beyond the capability of any federal employee I’ve ever worked with, whether military or civilian. Perhaps we’re just dumber these days with all that racial mixing you obviously so detest.

            The Soviet problem wasn’t stand and fight. The Soviet problem was “go over to a counterattack and destroy the enemy!” The commanders in Stalin’s army had the habit of taking too many risks, not just staying and dying. There are countless examples of this. I remember one case of an infantry unit charging German tanks in transport trucks. Utterly insane, poorly coordinated, and yet still offensive operations. The mark of an army that had (cruelty induced) zeal but no experience, which is exactly what the Soviet Army was. As far as operating in disruption zones behind German lines, the Soviets went further in that direction than any other army in the industrial era with coordination with partisan units. Partisan units can cause problems for the enemy, they can even draw units off the front, but they aren’t decisive, not in the industrial era. Please point me to one example where they were and perhaps I’ll learn something.

            Hitler had reason to split army group center, that’s what I was addressing. The key reason was the Kiev encirclement. You say it’s a timing issue, that somewhere between 26 September and October there was a German army sitting on its hands in front of Moscow. That’s not the case, you had large German formations shifting across the battle field after racking up ever more impressive lists of Soviet units destroyed in Kiev. The mud arrived in late October. There’s just no window there. If Hitler drives straight for Moscow he maybe gets the city after a hard fight, but it’s an isolated outpost. He suffers from the same issue as Napoleon did. Instead he chose breadth as well as depth of advance and in the process wiped out a large concentration of the enemy in Ukraine. Against a country with less of an ability to generate renewed combat power he probably would have won on the basis of inflicting such high attrition.

            wikipedia had this argument to cite:

            “By virtue of Guderian’s southward turn, the Wehrmacht destroyed the
            entire Southwestern Front east of Kiev during September, inflicting
            600,000 losses on the Red Army, while Soviet forces west of Moscow
            conducted a futile and costly offensive against German forces around
            Smolensk. After this Kiev diversion, Hitler launched Operation Typhoon
            in October, only to see his offensive falter at the gates of Moscow in
            early December. Some claim that had Hitler launched Operation Typhoon in
            September rather than October, the Wehrmacht would have avoided the terrible weather conditions and reached and captured Moscow before the onset of winter.[19]
            This is not clearly the case. Historian Glantz argues that had Hitler
            launched Operation Typhoon in September, Army Group Centre would have
            had to penetrate deep Soviet defenses manned by a force that had not
            squandered its strength in fruitless offensives against German positions
            east of Smolensk. Furthermore, Army Group Centre would have launched
            its offensive with an ever-extending and vulnerable right flank, and in
            the best reckoning, would have reached the gates of Moscow after
            mid-October just as the fall rainy season was beginning.[19]
            Eventually, Stavka saved Moscow by raising and fielding 10 reserve
            armies that took part in the final defense of the city, the December
            1941 counterstrokes, and the January 1942 counteroffensive. These armies
            would have gone into action regardless of when Hitler launched
            Operation Typhoon. While they effectively halted and drove back the
            German offensive short of Moscow as the operation actually developed,
            they would also have been available to do so had the Germans attacked
            Moscow a month earlier. Furthermore, if the latter were the case, they
            would have been able to operate in conjunction with the 600,000 plus
            force on Army Group Centre’s overextended right flank”

            Hitler doesn’t have good options by September 1941.

            As to your bizarre ideological summation of me, I am speechless. You have no idea what I believe about the West or everybody else on the planet. You have no idea as to what morals I aspire to. If there is any world view I do hold to with my perception of war, it’s that human beings are genetically similar enough to make similar rational calculations based on the information and resources available to them at the time. Juvenile estimations of opponents as incompetent based solely on high self esteem (or ethnic pride, whatever you prefer) and recognition of other humans as looking physically dissimilar aren’t just frowned upon in modern society, but outright stupid on the merits.

            Germany today is a dying country, with a much lower birthrate even than Russia. I’ve lived there. There is exactly zero will to power in Germany today. It is a dying culture that never recovered from the humiliation of having its self conception of racial superiority so completely annihilated by the untermensch victory in 1945.

            How dare you equate the industrial, centralized, and violent extermination of 10 million people with the internment of the American Indians by the United States. Not only is there so much more evil intent in systematic approach of the former, but there is an order of magnitude of difference in numbers.

            And I don’t know what you’re talking about “we” are 9%. I presume you mean those of predominantly European ancestry. I’d rather have an African-American or an Asian American counted with me than a Nazi apologist such as yourself, regardless of your ancestry. Thankfully, people like me are in the vast majority of your self ascribed racial grouping and those that think like you have been driven from power forever, not by inferior races but by your own supposed blood brothers.

          • 2cents

            OUTSTANDING AND WELL EXPLAINED.

      • patb2009

        Napoleon seized moscow, didn’t do him any good, all it did was leave his army stuck in russia as winter fell

        • M&S

          PatB,

          Time Index: 38:42 to 38:52
          http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3ipdjgP0y9g
          Napoleon died because Moscow was left a ghost town from which all food and much of the population had been removed.
          This was not possible in a much increased, 20th century, city and _even if it had been_ the symbolic loss would have been worth the 100K dead as Stalin’s right to rule would have immediately been challenged.
          In any case, for the soldiers, winter quarters are better than sleeping outdoors for the simple reason that mechanized transport, overland from the Baltic, could have allowed for some resupply to come forward and at a base, total calories per day, level more Germans would have survived.
          OTOH, the Russians, now fighting outdoors themselves and with No Access At All to the stocks of winter gear that gave them the edge in the counter offensive (as Zhukov pointed out: “Warm Clothes and Food are Weapons Too.”) because German was not sitting atop the railheads that would have made their delivery simple, have to face up to the reality of a war to retake the capital which the Germans _will burn to the ground_ rather than lose to them.
          And again, you have the condition whereby the Germans can lose the battle of Moscow so long as the Soviets lose Moscow and it’s still a strategic victory.
          The truth being that, had Hitler not divided his spearheads between the Smolensk, Leningrad/Archangelsk and Moscow campaigns, he would have won WWII because nobody would have wanted to mess with him over such strategic depths.
          OTOH, if he had played conservatively and created a good defensive line into which emergency winterization gear could have been reliably sent, he would not have lost some 100,000 men in Op Typhoon. And again, he would have had 10 German divisions (WWII strengths were lower than modern ones) with which to FINISH THE FIGHT in the spring.
          Blitzkrieg did not fail in Russia. Hitler did. And all the myths of how evil the Nazis were derive directly from our fearful certainty that excellence nearly won. And in a atheistic age, we reinforce our shaken confidence, not with the notion that ‘good cannot lose’. But rather the mistaken belief that evil was logistically beyond it’s full stretch.
          Whatever you think of the Nazis, the German Army had victory within it’s grasp, until Hitler pulled their fingers from around the prize.
          IMO, the world would be a better place with a unified Europe to the Urals. Certainly our people would not be teetering on the edge of self-invited genocide.

      • 2cents

        What about the doctrine of total war,the extermination of all the population in the targeted country,kind of like Genghis khan did in China?Then numbers don’t really matter or do they?Will appreciate your thoughts on that one.

    • SS BdM Fuhress ‘Savannah

      If those jets had been used just as fighters they would have had a better chance. Attrition is hard to beat. You don’t fly a damaged jet running on one engine back to an airfield with 40 P-51′s on your tail and win usually. A few Erich Hartmann’s ( Luftwaffe ace, 352 kills, in the air, we counted ground kills ) in those jets though, that would have been a tough one for even the numbers. I don’t think he liked the jets though or did not want to put up with Adolph Galland another German ace. And of course 3 German Tigers shot up 54 Russian tanks but the Russians still had more coming.

    • Araya

      The Soviet Union won because why the German has to face not only Russia alone but also the United Kingdom and far more important the United States of America and also not to forget it had also the Russian Winter on his side and in Hitler an enemy how was as Military Leader incompetent. What the most people don’t understand or don’t know is what the weapons how has given the Wehrmacht the edge over all is enemy’s and the ability to face the entire world for 5 Years was not the mighty Panther, Tiger and Tiger II or revolutionary weapons like the M262 how there called “Wunderwaffen” or “Vergeltugnswaffen” like the V1 and V2 because why all this weapons came too late in the War (for example the ME262) or in to small numbers (Panther, Tiger I and Tiger II) to be relevant but don’t forget how effective some of them was despite of the fact what there was outnumbered by 10 or more to 1. The fact is what the Wehrmacht was largely equipment with inferior weapons and I much lesser Numbers even as they attack France (there best tank was the Panzer III and the Panzer IV with the short Gun) but even this tank there only in small numbers available around 400 and the rest there Panzer I and II this time and nearly the entire Wehrmacht was horse drawn and not better equipped them there predecessor how fought in the first World War. And as the Wehrmacht invaded Russia they invented it with a Force how was not form the beginning outnumbered by 1 to 4 what means the Soldiers and by 1 to 5 what means the tanks and even one this time the most German Tanks there Panzer II and III how there not able to penetrate the Armor of the KV1 and the never T34 Tanks only the 8, 8-cm-FlaK 18/36/37 saved the Wehrmacht for the superior Russian KV1 and T34. And as the Tiger I and Panther saw is first fight in the battle of Kursk 1943 the War was already lost.

      The key to the success of the Wehrmacht was as I said not this Weapons it was at first a well-trained and professional Army leaded by some of the best Generals and Officers what the World has saw how use new tactics most of them Infantry based to beat there poorly leaded opponents like the French and the British and the Soviet’s in the first Year of the War. The truth is what the real “Wunderwaffe” of the Wehrmacht was not the Tiger or the ME262 it was the Machinegun MG42 and the tactic based around this weapon how has decided more battles for the Germans and kill far more enemy’s them all other German Weapons including the Tiger or other heavy Weapon Systems.

      But let’s speak about the actual Situation of the US Army. The US-Army lose is edge one the battlefield since the Ned of the Cold-War and the peace-dividend fallowing by the bullshit years of FCS and later the COIN Obsession. Superiority one the Battlefield need at first superior Firepower, Training and a Force how is not too small. The Army didn’t need 19 Ton unarmored Vehicles ore useless Drones remember to the FCS bullshit what the Army really need is more Firepower for every Soldier and better legacy Systems. With other Words improve the M1A2, buy more AH64, M777, continuing the PIM Program for the Paladin and buy also an existing replace like the German Puma as Bradly’s replace and do it in larger Numbers and give the Infantry more firepower for example you can start to field the XM25 and replace the outdated M16 and M4 with the SCAR Weapon family and field also better Anti-Tank and Infantry based Air Defense Systems and don’t cut the Army deeper them 490.000 Man and you will still superior. With other Words forget bullshit like FCS and stay by the thinks how work in the reality! The problem of the US Military is the mania to reinvent itself and to fixate on Missions. For example the US-Army has become a COIN-force how can fight low-intensity battles but one the price of losing is real fighting skills how are needed to fight real Wars and this is something of a stupidity what you will only find in the US Military.

      One example about how the Stupid US-Army thinks, they see what an active protection system like Trophy is theoretically possible and as consequence they simply abandoned any real armor in favor of the unproved promise of active-protection systems. The Russian, the Chinese, the Israelis or everybody else one the World see also what an active protection system is possible but they don’t abandoned because of this there armored force they simply improve their exiting armored force with this technology and make them so even more deadlier. As consequence the Us Army went to the next War party with an unarmored active protected Car as all other comes with their Main Battle Tanks, this is just a simplified example but the bitter reality is what the canceled FCS Plan of the Army had means exactly this.

    • http://john101b.ipage.com/globalwarming/climatechange.html Jack Everett —– Mato

      Great comment but unfortunately American leaders never allow historical fact get in the way of their war profiteering.

  • ask2wice

    “They will lose the competitive advantage that we’ve come to know and love.” That’s the problem – we seem to love going to war. Ever since 1945. When have we stopped? Korea, Vietnam, Iraq 1, Iraq 2, Afghanistan – countless smaller skirmishes in between. Why even Russia and China have had fewer wars. We never get a break (Ike warned us)! Love. There’s no room for that word where war is concerned … unless of course you’re the one (Pentagon brass, hawk politicians, defense contractors) who isn’t doing the actual fighting!

    I’m all for a strong America. That said, I am wondering why we are always at war!!!

  • M&S

    Family member of mine was sitting on a brandnew Eisenhower highway down in Kansas one fine day when ‘all of a sudden’ every engine and _all the radios_ of cars in all lanes for about a mile in each direction, stopped dead.

    A few moments later, they all came back up again, after an OD helicopter,’with wheels’, had passed overhead. Given this was the fifties, it probably wasn’t a Blackhawk.

    If you can do that to engine electrical systems, and there is suggestion that this capability came out of WWII Germany where it was employed against recce aircraft and B-17s flying over sensitive areas of the inner Reich, then you can do it to humans.

    Literally generating a penetrative longwave EM device whose carrier frequency was harmonicized to the functional gain control of a nociceptor so that you hijack their functional gate controls.

    In this it must be understood that while neurons function biochemically based on bond phosphorylization factors between neurotransmitters, they do so at an incredible rate (15,000 complete chemical activation/neutralization cycles per second) and that the control system for this telephone exchange is electrical. Or at least electrically initiated.

    If you can tickle that electrical system with a body penetrating signal, you can cause the nociceptor to send signals equating to great pain or great euphoria or unbending fatigue. No matter what the actual body condition.

    You can model these effects based on known response to things like Cannibinoids and ECT, using animal tissues to get your desired analgesic or hyperalgesic (Sleep or Pain) induction signal.

    All based on the gain thresholds as dialup codes for the telephone exchange which is setting off the nociceptor.

    With this in mind, you generate an environment where X force is walking around in insulated, bio-monitored (drugged with pain suppressors as backup to suit penetration) exo-suits like these-

    Army RDECOM Talos

    http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bPjatYDHJKo

    Future Tech

    http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_4mqHau4hNM

    Except that where the Talos wearer is facing an aware threat, the infantry commander in a 2030 Outer Mongolia campaign would not. Because ahead of him you have ‘swept the compound’ with a stun beam or a death ray and what the enemy doesn’t know is present, kills them _as they set up for him_.

    This is how you use technology to beat the 2.3:1 threshold limiter on how much hi-tech can do to leverage numeric disparities: You create conditions where the threat isn’t fought at all.

    It is the inverse of stealth tech in many ways because it seeks the mass and forces them to protect ALL of themselves. Whereas the small unit force only has to be suit-equipped to handle it’s own security.

    It is similar to the effects of chemical warfare over the trenches in WWI but not as participatory in that the smaller force with the higher tech will always be easier to outfit and equip while the numeric superior force cannot fight back to the same standard because they haven’t the time, the tech or the money to pay for it and so must ‘settle’ for equipping a similar small-unit capability of their own. Small unit vs. Small unit is where competency counts and if the presence of a large backing force is of no avail (may even set up poor psychological vulnerabilities as assumed combined arms aid) the small unit team has the edge.

    In this, it’s also important, particularly given the kind of ‘mass brief’ (what, no secrets?) with international participants shown in this exercise, that the full capability be binary.

    The suit carries the anti-EM weave or even active nullification circuitry capabilities within it, passively, at all times. But ONLY when the High Intensity or Full Force condition is encountered, do you issue the Magic Box which activates the circuitry and makes the system functional. Even for SpecWar, this kind of withheld knowledge is important because you have no secrets beyond the Inverse Square Rule.

    Which brings me to my final point. Getting Started is important. As the second video shows, it provides you a sounding board as tipping point beyond which a given operator community can say: “Nope, not a hope.” Vs. “Damn, do we have to go back to the old way?”

    Particularly where you are using small components to lever up larger ones _by masking their own effects within the overall total force_ it helps a great deal to have an accelerant capacity by which you start making generational leaps ‘in the interim’ of the main organizational body.

    To explain: If specwar needs to be able to operate mounted, underarmor, to leverage up a new VTOL fan-in-wing insertion system so that the former is not exposed to direct detection near the objective (see: Stealth Hawk), then that is going to set your ability to enter a target area quietly and/or engage it from range where the flash and whoosh of a Spike-ER going up isn’t noticed. If that capability is eventually adoped by the main force as price comes down, then the specwar elite unit needs to have jumped beyond that level of capability on a half-generational interval _timeline_ basis of introduction.

    Because in a near-pear technological parity world, having a new system capability come online every five years instead of every ten is crucial to staying in the game so that both your total force levels remain near equivalency. And -even if- the enemy leaps the main force, your specwar are never far (funding wise for unit size) from their next leapahead decision which both acts as a pathfinder exploration/confirmation capability (is this the right route or not?) and provides push-to-pull on the body of the beast coming behind.

    Using own-capability leveraging rather than waiting on threat catchup.

    The main force must always be able to operate in a supporting condition to the elite troops. And the mainforce must always protect the secrets of the specwar units. But equipping the main force must never be done on such an all-consuming, ‘Big Army’ rationale that you lose the technology treeing necessary to keep the slinky from push-to-pulling.

    Which implies that the the idea of force tiering is a good one with units in turn switching between second and third tier, as they get whatever supporting function backs up the Special Warfare units lead. State Of The Art then redunds back to tier three. And tier three gets sold off to foreign users or retired.

    An Army which is always making small purchases is an army which can divide their budget up between reequipping the elite teams, the secondary teams and the tertiary teams with lot purchases adequate for high technology leveraging, support of the high tech with early-entry theater forces. And total force which may be divided up between several theaters based on existing vs. new missions in less lethal regions.

    As an example: Industrial base concerns can be satisfied with a last-call notification of upgrade to existing M4/M16 receivers with HK416/417 uppers which go to third tier. One or two years beyond which, a scheduled new purchase will be made for G-36K or SCAR-H type weapons. Meanwhile the SpecWar are getting the first issuance of just a few hundred, PIKL type, weapons which have onboard kill systems to ensure anti-tamper/techint exploitation if the weapon is outside controlled hands for more than a few minutes or hours. These weapons provide zero recoil abilities to either stun a target or drill a quarter sized hole in him from 2 miles away. Or, at close range, achieve explosive thermal coupling effects which completely shred modern body armor. All with a weapon that carries 200 onboard shots and has four power packs of 2lbs each with 200 more. Dwarfing the ability of existing slug throwers. All for a gun which costs 10,000 dollars each and is issued in the low hundreds not high thousands.

    The public world ‘at last!’ sees USAr leaving 60s tech behind for the G-36K or SCAR and -thinks- that this must be the new level of USAr capability leveling (because Specwar is off the scopes) and that Colt has gotten a contract for one last home produced stockup on existing weapons as a logical means to retain home-station training for ‘Guard and Reserve’ components.

    They _NEVER SEE_ the PIKL.

    And so that whole technology tree is free to develop as seen fit for many more years without competition than would otherwise be the envy-emulates case.

    Apply these ideas across the board and watch how your capabilities as doctrine shift to support what YOU can do rather than awaiting what you know of what your enemy does. Even as you keep budgets and tech base collectively healthy by fractionalizing your forces.

    • Don Bacon

      One of my “web-hoobbies” is learning as much as I can about EMP.
      Non-nuclear electromagnetic pulse (NNEMP) is an electromagnetic pulse generated without use of nuclear weapons. NNEMP generators can be carried as a payload of bombs, cruise missiles and drones, allowing construction of electromagnetic bombs with diminished mechanical, thermal and ionizing radiation effects and without the political consequences of deploying nuclear weapons.

      Particularly I am interested in the large number of breakdowns on Carnival cruise ships. They include the recent so-called “cruise from hell” that left Carnival Triumph passengers stranded for five days without working toilets. There have been many more, including:
      Costa (Carnival) Concordia (recently uprighted)
      “Experts have said the captain may have been correct in his belief that his ship met its fate because of a power failure. Passengers rescued from the stricken liner reported there had been a power blackout and a large booming noise, which indicated the vessel may have suffered an engine room explosion. Last night Malcolm Latarche, editor of the global shipping magazine IHS Fairplay Solutions, said the problem may have been caused by a phenomenon known as ‘harmonic interference’.

      Carnival Splendor
      Dec 11, 2010 — Carnival Splendor stranding baffles marine experts — Marine experts are questioning whether there was a design flaw in the Carnival Splendor cruise ship, which lost power after an engine fire and was towed to San Diego on Thursday with nearly 4,500 people aboard.– Clark Dodge, former chief engineer for Washington State Ferries, said large passenger vessels are designed to ensure that such a fire doesn’t cause a loss of all power. . .”What happened makes no sense to me,” said Dodge, a consultant. “If things were designed properly, all the power shouldn’t have gone out.” . .Dodge said he’s confident that Coast Guard and NTSB investigators will pinpoint what went wrong.[They didn't. There were reports of a missile launched by a Chinese submarine.]

      • Mike

        Don,
        If you want to know more about EMP, figure out a way to cozy up with our Israeli friends…. I think they are already there, which just might be one of the reasons that Iran is now lowering the volume….

      • M&S

        My own view is that of EMP/HPM is driven by power generation.
        It is very hard to shield IC driven power systems and if you can get into the transformation/rectification/delivery system, you have miles and miles of ‘open circuit’ access with very few trip points, any or all of which can be hit with SCADA attacks or simple cascade overloads.

        And, unfortunately, that’s where I think the U.S. military has oriented themselves.

        You can see it in the outcomes of Desert Storm where, specifically instructed to hit transmission lines, Coalition pilots bombed turbine halls instead (bigger target). Next war we dropped CFW warheads but it was found that the length of the fibres was too easy to sweep up. Next war we dropped miniature CFW ‘sprinkles’ and now the stuff is all over the place, unclearable, and gets into things like intakes/vents for key control mechanisms which we would really prefer it didn’t while also posing a significant biohazard.

        So we shift to HPM. Too Dangerous to be delivered by manned platforms, and too weak to be used from range, CMs are again the preferred method, using a system similar to the implosive accelerator approach of Shiva Star with EFP technology to shape the copper slug and a neutron generator straight out of the nuclear program for the ‘flux capacitor’ EM generator element.

        It’s Omni rather than targeted but it’s precise by application. Whether we actually have used this or not, I don’t know.

        Here’s why I don’t think it’s important:

        1. I -want- the little buggers to use radio and electronics. So that I

        can find them.

        2. I -want- them to be think that they are in a position where enough

        of their network survives that the ‘big picture effect’ can drive them

        to mass for the area-of-effect kill shot.

        3. I can shield a black box with electronic fenestration, FO

        connectors, and a Faraday Cage. A human is more problematic

        and certainly numerous.

        4. When I kill a human, I kill not just the operator expertise in use of

        the system but the integration of the data from it.

        5. At the point of contact, a threat which is denied all electronic

        means of support is still dangerous so long as he has a working

        trigger finger.

        HTEMP or Human Tuned EMP is something that works using softkill technology similar to what is already under active research as ‘pain laser’ systems exploiting the nociceptor response.

        But the way the laser works is by Bremsstrahlung FFR from both target vaporized plasma and induced (air) losses due to ionization.
        And the way the nociceptor response is gained is by -tuning- that EM wiggler effect to the exact operating resonance of the gain control Dalstrom Horn (sp.) which is operating at the 15KHz threshold I mentioned.
        It is _not_ a thermal based response.
        If you can get a massive pain response through simple elicitation of FFR from target blast or propogational plasma arcing, you can get it by putting a resonant carrier into a sufficiently low bandwidth to get good area coverage and structural penetration via simple monopole antenna coverage (i.e. HF/VHF/UHF) and rotating a harmonic through the 15KHz range whereupon you hit each individual’s gate controller response.
        It is literally possible to induce the human nervous system to kill or incapacitate itself with simple electrical impedance loading at the correct frequency and the human frame is -much- less well insulated against long wave penetrating signals at high impulse thresholds.
        We live in an age where ethno-nationalist containment warfare has destroyed the 20th century and we stand on the threshold of fighting an even more bloody 21st, just on the basis of diminishing resources and Malthusian Population Bombs.
        Nukes didn’t work because those countries that had them simply built enough to incinerate each other’s civilian populations as infrastructure enablement and then continued the knight-on-knight fight in peripheral theaters as if nothing had really happened.
        But if we had a way to deny the warrior themselves the necessary means to mass and effect group synergies. What then?
        Would we honestly trust the outcome of wars to representative fights by factional militias whose death as goals we didn’t care about? Or small special warfare unit engagements where the expression of national will was so limited?
        HTEMP is something that could so radically depopulate the battlefield that all which would be left would be robots whose gain/release/risk gaming psychology rewards, in human terms as psychological justifications for war, would be zero.

    • justin bristow

      After one or more uses anywhere on the globe the capability is detected, if it isn’t already by espionage alone. Bad things happen. Edward Snowdens defect, lazy techs put the wrong flash drive in the wrong computer. etc. etc. Countermeasures are developed, secrets are shared with allies. The easiest one would be jamming devices that jam the whole spectrum at which these new WMDs operate. Other answers are symmetric, get the tech yourself. If all else fails, reveal the capability to the world, call it a WMD and threaten to retaliate on a mass scale if it’s ever used with nerve agents or nukes. Activate the 5th columns in the US to the task of banning the weapon. If a tiny tiny group of people ever became decisive to war those people would simply be tracked down and killed where they slept. Polonium in the cheerios and all that. The world is not a thrilling novel. Every super empowered individual on our side has a counter in the enemy camp. They neutralize one another. We’re back to where we started from. We need to impose our will with mass, not precision.

      • M&S

        JB,

        >>

        After one or more uses anywhere on the globe the capability is detected, if it isn’t already by espionage alone.

        >>

        Doubt it. Media control is very tight and the Internet is likely headed that way. Even if it remains open-channeled via the likes of YT, you will find 90% of a ‘death ray’ exposition piece defacto laughed at by sensible readers looking at what the Conspiracy Theorists say.

        This is an element of psyops by which you poison the perception to distract or disinterest from the truth.

        You will also be unlikely to see it used in conditions like Syria but withheld for near-pear threats where victory is otherwise deemed unlikely.

        If it is used in a condition like Chechnya III where a U.S. intervention to spank Russia for ethnic genocide in a rebel province must be accompanied by total plausible deniability of our presence there, the capability is being misused compared to the simpler technique of hires from the blackworld of unacknowledged special warfare operators who have the language, looks and regional skills to be more survivable anyway.

        Even so, what will be seen? A body that simply died without obvious causes? Or a man who wakes up with a headach from a deep sleep to find his command post destroyed? That’s not proof of anything. You would need to microscopically inspect key neurotransmitter junctions and run detailed biochemistry analysis to find out what had caused the man to stroke out or have a heart attack or or or.

        >>
        Bad things happen. Edward Snowdens defect, lazy techs put the wrong flash drive in the wrong computer. etc. etc. Countermeasures are developed, secrets are shared with allies.
        >>

        The essence of the microforce with ‘Gen+2′ leading capabilities over the SOA is the ability of the armed services or more likely the intelligence branch to field a capability which can be both buried and divided in a manner that doesn’t require co-training or ackowledgment because it is used exclusively as an enabler to preclear the battlefield.

        The essence of controlling knowledge in an electronic world is signature lists and paper-only briefs as restricted accountability for use. The money goes into a black account with a single authorized spending agent and the capability is briefed only through the signature list ‘to be activated when’ specific, high threat, use conditions require exceed a doctrinal ceiling limit.’

        If all program material is generated from within the unit and all associated -protective- system activators held and distributed for use by that unit, then the nature of the offensive tool itself need never be revealed. Because the EEG monitor, Syrette Dispenser, Impulse Wave Receiver and Electronic Counterpulse as active loading signal generator are all held within the organization itself.

        The exosuit to which they attach is simply a variant of a service wide capability whose functional purpose (enhanced loadbearing and armor mount) is well known.

        Whatever UAV, missile or equivalent delivery system is involved is _never seen_ because it’s use is restricted to a community so small that you can afford to be stringent in running polygraph and other vetting checks on a monthly basis.
        >>
        The easiest one would be jamming devices that jam the whole spectrum at which these new WMDs operate.
        >>

        Rubbish. If the system is directional, you can’t ‘jam’ it, in air, because the signal polarization, and multifrequent spreading code is such that just the lobe-scan would change the signal alignments sufficiently that your jammer would not be able to cancel the signal.

        This is not a sensor system we’re talking about where you can use deceptive techniques to modify the pulse trains on-target (too late) or blast the receiver with noise. This is a weaponized system where raw power generation rules the day and the farther the jammer is from the to-be-protected target, the less it’s own strobe condition matters.

        The only reason our own troops would be safe from a lethal impulse would be standoff. The only reason they would be able to withstand a stun-effect would be through a _sealed suit_ whose circuitry mesh acted as a total-body suppressant.

        Why do you think nerve agents are so deadly?

        It’s not because the chemicals themselves are toxic because, compared to the total body mass, they are a molecular rain drop in a dust storm. What nerve agents do is send a cholinesterase activator which says: “don’t stop sending the signal, ever!” and that always-on control over the signal gains which jumps to key areas of respiratory and heart complex to usurp lymbic controls and cause the body _to kill itself_. You stop this process by using a high potency counter toxin to essentially suppress the nervous system like a massive dose of tranquilizers (atropine) before causing the neuromuscular system to slowly reset it’s chemical balances irrespective of the _electric_ gateway enablers.

        A lethal human-EMP system would work much the same way in that a single millimeter of exposed skin not protecetd by the ‘jammer’ would effectively catch that resonant harmonic dialing up and down the human response scale. And it would signal the exact same kind of neruotransmitter ‘always on!’ flood of the ANS parasympathetics that act as the body’s autopilot housekeeper.

        >>
        Other answers are symmetric, get the tech yourself. If all else fails, reveal the capability to the world, call it a WMD and threaten to retaliate on a mass scale if it’s ever used with nerve agents or nukes.
        >>

        Which is to say “WAAAAAH!” Because the race isn’t over until the first man crosses the finish line and if you are in a war with the PRC, you are presumably in a life or death struggle to be risking armed conflict with a nuclear state.

        Except, guess what? We’re nuclear too.

        Which means that if you want to keep your position (not rule over an irradiate wasteland) you will fight the war you brung.

        If the Chinese steal the system, fine. We will deal with that, ‘conventionally’, the same way we would deal with them inventing the offensive naval forces to deliver it directly or the close Central American State ties to basein a force of irregulars to cross-border it.

        There is no need to closely compare the capability with CBR however because you are not creating persistent effects which would necessarily hazard China’s future to the extent that they were ‘dead anyway’ in a kill-your-murderer scenario.

        Human EMP function would be that of sterilizing or incapacitating an area target without having to directly know where each and every threat was. Or without having to have a LOS-on-bullet ammunition condition to service them.

        It is designed to force the threat to fight in equivalent penny packet sized force constructs by which superior total-force and particularly netcentric force doctrines can lead the U.S. to win using distributed micro-combat units.

        “Mass and we’ll slaughter your combined arms. Stay small-signatured as flexible and fast and we’ll kill you the old fashioned way.”

        >>
        Activate the 5th columns in the US to the task of banning the weapon. If a tiny tiny group of people ever became decisive to war those people would simply be tracked down and killed where they slept.
        >>

        You assume to know all there is to know about our defense establishment. Even if Wiki Leaks and Mr. Snowden are real and not fabricated exposures, the truth is that compartmentalization works because nobody knows everything. And the paper-only system works by keeping data off of networks which can be exposed and exploited by mass traffic sampling.

        >>
        Polonium in the cheerios and all that.
        >>

        Whose cheerios? SOCOM is now the equivalent of THREE DIVISIONS of people as 60,000 souls. In a game whackamole, you first have to know which gopher is the important rodent.

        Cheyenne Mountain was redundant for decades before we ‘officially’ abandoned the site.

        Instead, we erected closed-building distributed command and control centers in various urban and rural settings whose clustered antenna farm out back, under a dielectric awning, might have meant something or it might not. Because it was no different from a million other warehouses and office spaces unused.

        Yet that was the essence of a distributed, survivable, strategic defense network because it did not blind the sum of the system by singular nucflash events in any one part of the nation but rather gave redundant notification by corporatizing the sum of the BADS/DSP alert notifications that would provide real warning of particularly a covert attack.

        This system would be much the same except that it’s purpose would be singular and intended to provide dominant leverage in the condition of Expeditionary Warfare Escalation With A Major Power. And nothing else.

        >>
        The world is not a thrilling novel. Every super empowered individual on our side has a counter in the enemy camp. They neutralize one another. We’re back to where we started from. We need to impose our will with mass, not precision.
        >>

        The first time you endeavor to force Americans to relive The Somme will be the last day you are President. In this, political advocacy drives the search for technical competence as much as anything and here is where the USAr can get on the stick by pushing for a capability that makes it possible to separate the threat levels as funding lines between urgent, ‘global emergency’ max-force capability; secondary, conventional, MTW/MRC where ‘weight of forces’ can win without the leveraging option and tertiary, OOTW/LIC/HDR mission sets.

        The Army doesn’t need every infantryman to be using a single-shot, hit to kill, 6.5 or 6.8 weapon with modern ergonomics and reliability. They can get by with licensing Colt to make H&K uppers for the M4/M16 that provide robust armory reliability for another decade. And giving the Marines and SpecWar a new gun that can be OTS purchased. As M4/M16 date out, you replace them with the new weapon on a much more gradual buy basis.

        Similarly, these elite forces don’t all need 2 mile ranging, 200 shots onboard, laser weapons. But a much smaller segment of them can have at least trained ‘awareness’ of the system for both lethal and non-lethal missioning.

        Finally, if there isn’t time or ‘access’ to bring in a MAGTF or Ranger Batallion because the threat has DF-21 and DH-10 which can threaten the whole task force or airbase up to 1,000nm out, and the President says: “Not only no but hell no until you _know_ for certain!” that you can survivably insert that force, you upgrade the SpecWar force to a degree which allows them to go in to whatever ROTHR is targeting those missiles, cause a heap of trouble which forces the threat to respond (in their own backyard, it will be a matter of pride) and then runs off into the bushes.

        Come on, chase us. We /wantcha/ to…

        And to enable both the ‘overwhelming odds’ insertion and the running fight after, you use The Death Ray. Drawing the enemy into a fight where the very nature of their overwhelming numeric superiority drives them towards a CA force model which we can:

        A. No longer afford.

        B. Never deliver in numbers sufficient to mass effectively.

        C. Do. Not. Need.

        In another post, I mentioned how important it is to have a ‘Big Me’ effect with ‘Little Me’ footprint so that the threat is both unable to hold key terrain objectives and unwilling to go into the field to chase you down, granting you the -apparency- of holding terrain as dominant will.

        The search for wiggle room is an evolutionary psychology by which the human mind judges it’s subconscious threat state based on the perception of losing control over options as places to go that are not under threat. It is the traditional reaction of peoples suffering hostile outside invasion as the means to conserve tribal as genetic algorithm survival modes.

        If you can tap that instinct, you can win.

        The Mongols did it by throwing diseased bodys of animals and men over the walls or setting them up on poles which they then lit. “Here is your future if you don’t let us in, _right now_.” And many a perfectly walled up enclave gave up, rather than face the consequences of what happened when the water and food ran out and The Horde was ‘not so forgiving’.

        We can do the exact same thing. On a faster timescale and with real (which is to say targetable to military threats) vs. unuseable hostaging force. If we simply accept that ground maneuver is not always about finding surfaces and gaps to run through. So much as it is forcing the threat to employ those visible SAGs and then butchering him when he does.

        Weaponeering is advanced when the equivalency of economic as technology base is such that no other credible means are available to tilt the balance decisively.

        We won WWII because we were rich enough to invent the technology which would defeat the threat (P-51s) and had the /time/ (as Oceans) to reconfigure our civil industrial base to wartime production.

        Neither of those conditions will apply in a 2030 world where wars are decided in days, the threat lives among us, jailing enemy nationals based on their ethnic appearance is ‘immoral’ and we are flat broke.

        Which is not to say that all advantaces are anything but fleeting but a weaponized ‘human EMP’ effect which literally scrambled the electro regulatory function of the nervous system has several advantages:

        1. Cycle Negation.

        It less removes than preempts the validity of asset-on-asset fires as driving either the Lanchestrian or Salvo theory model. By essentially removing the time increment at LOS exposure which a moving to contact or assault model dictates allows a threat to mass and mob an elite force. If you sweep an objective with penetrating HF/ELF that incapacitates people in

        bunkers or armored vehicles, the detect-maneuver-engage-disengage sequence is aborted because the threat isn’t alive or conscious to hit you on ingress and there is no contested withdrawal phase, hit from both sides.

        2. Whole Force Negation.

        The noted Chinese bloody-minded willingness to sacrifice sheer numbers for gain because

        the casualty counts from a Death Ray or Stun Field are as completely overwhelming as they are controlled. There is no excuse for strategic force release because the first nuke or chem hit will get them one in turn. But we can sweep the battlefield _wherever we care to declare one_, without hurting civilians via temporary area-effect. If you cannot guarantee force component structures, either by separation or by massing or by hiding amongst collaterals, you cannot use that force to generate combined arms effects. Which usualy means that there is a way out for friendlies that don’t want the forced fight.

        3. It Denies Parity-By-Mimicry.

        Whether through explicit technology matching or by doctrinal counter force methods which exploit our Combined Arms logic of ‘can’t engage one without getting hit by the other’ along with the emerging ideas of netcentrism which basically seek to extend the range as node awareness by which any given exponent -can- contribute to the battle.

        If we can deny in-fight spatial coordination as massing while maintaining the broad area view which lets us choose where and when we can -expect- the threat to come after us, they cannot explicitly use their own system of systems against us. Indirectly, they may not know that they are in jeopardy because we don’t have to integrate this new capability (publically) within our own fielded forces.

        4. It Grants Parity By Speed Of Reaction.
        If you cannot put more than a Battalion into battle within 36hrs then that is the window by which the enemy has to go-nogo determinatively create circumstances where the fight is so far gone that you don’t commit even a TF Smith or USS Panay level force because they would not be able to make a fight of it.

        This is not a fixed but rather a sliding scale of timeliness in decision point reaching however. Because if you can deny, directly, key force enablers (targeting for ASBM, TELs firing SSM threatening civilian infrastructure or military staging, airbases providing high threat VLO BARCAP to assault lanes etc.) then you can open the gateways for other-service entry to slow the tempo down while reaction forces muster and deploy.

        CONCLUSION:
        The Key is to realize that, for a very brief time, you have to act as a Very Big Multiplier. Either through direct disruption to the threat force. Or via incremental entry enablement to outside forces.

        And to get that kind of capability means investing, not in Army-wide capabilities but very small ones. Instead of 20 Stealth Hawks, we might have to pay for a dozen stealthy, ESTOL,

        C-130 or better lift capability, airlifters for entry.

        And perhaps 20-50 light vehicles with a range of ‘looks like everyone else’ volkswagen’ to million dollar miltronics tankettes that can fight against MBT and -win-, for at least a little while.

        Along with an in-theater delivery system that can put targetable, area-effect, fires into play without the ground forces having to hump them over hill and dale.

        Be that missile (ATACMS++) or HALE VLO UAV with the HEMP system.

        Once you’ve got that key enabler development pathway configured, you can cascade down with the ‘Okay, how much will be left when the rest of us get there?’, public domain, secondary forces whose size and configuration will be based on the -residual- threat to be dealt with as the best means to do so.

        • justin bristow

          The technology had to come from somewhere. For it to exist it had to be openly discussed. For example, you’re discussing it now, and it’s someone’s job to monitor forums like this in adversary countries. If someone uses such a weapon it will be recognized. If it was developed or deemed feasible by government bureaucracy you can bet adversaries are already tracking it. We live in a world where Stalin knew about the atom bomb before Truman did. Do you have evidence of another wonder weapon that was developed by a democratic society in complete secrecy and then used consistently without the adversary finding out? Because if not the secrecy you are requiring is unprecedented. So unprecedented that I would imagine impossible.

          In order for enablers to enable they need to be synced into the plan. You propose an operation which is so secret those enabled have no idea of its existence. Their ability to exploit it under those circumstances will be extremely poor.

          I have no doubt American presidents would want a completely secret, cheap super weapon with no accountability to anyone, totally invincible and carrying no risk. It’s the perfect tool. That’s what you have imagined, the easy out for a decision maker that doesn’t want to make any tough decisions. The problem is the premise of your weapon is unrealistic, not on the physics of the weapon (which I don’t have the scientific background to judge) but on the dismissal of the adversary’s ability to mitigate and counter it. Adversaries aren’t docile objects to be manipulated by a novel’s main character, they are just as smart, capable and complex as the protagonists. No nation has ever developed and employed such a super weapon with no adversary finding out about it. If I am wrong, please give me an example.

          Instead of using what seems to be deliberately complex language to make your ideas sound more advanced (I mean, look at this sentence: “This is not a fixed but rather a sliding scale of timeliness in decision point reaching however.” Is this really the best way to convey this information?) just give me a play by play how you see China or Russia failing before, during, and after conflict with a tiny US force using these weapons.

  • ELP

    And the Stryker is a death-trap, the Bradley and M-1 not all that great. All a logistical nightmare. The GCV program a joke (too heavy). And the only thing that we have that can swim is the … M-113. Other than that. No problems with the Army vehicle roadmap.

  • SS BdM Fuhress ‘Savannah

    Only hi-tech way to beat attrition would be if your hi-tech is Nukes and they have none. Believe if a World War with China or Russia it will go Nuke! So let’s just shake hands with out 2 buddies there and conquer the rest of the World, divide it up in 3 sections. Well have the center of the World, China on top and Russia on the bottom with us able to visit top or bottom if we want. Our buddies stay put or else.

  • brownie

    We’ve got a former community organizer leading our armed forces into Hollow Force 2 oblivion. This is the fate of all democracies.

    • Don Bacon

      1. Senators Obama and Clinton led the move to increase the number of ground forces a few years ago.
      2. While Obama initiated the sequestration idea, it was as a club, a threat that he didn’t expect would be used. But the congress failed to pass a spending bill The Pentagon still hasn’t fully accepted it, but they’re coming to it.
      3. The 2011 budget control act was forced upon Obama as a part of raising the debt ceiling.
      4. Raising the debt ceiling and reducing spending are necessary because even now the government spends over two billion dollars PER DAY that it doesn’t have, except by borrowing.

      • justin bristow

        The disproportionately high defense cuts was always a Democratic Party (therefore Obama) idea. It was designed to threaten Republicans as much as cutting everything else hurt the Democrats. Now, the Republicans have certainly shown they don’t care about defense as much as cutting spending, that much is true.

        • Don Bacon

          The US is forced to borrow hundreds of billions of dollars annually, mostly to fund wasteful Pentagon spending. The nation still spends more on its military than the next 10 nations combined. It continues to spend at Cold War levels. The Pentagon is wasting money on ships it doesn’t know how to use (LCS) and on airplanes that don’t perform to spec, are untested and are unreliable (F-35). It also wastes money on personnel, especially ground forces, when there is no threat to the US from any other military force.

          So of course the Pentagon budget must be cut because most of it isn’t used for “defense” at all.

          • george

            “The next 10 nations combined’ That is still true if America spends 10 dollars, China 9, and the rest 1c each. This is a wimp and misleading statistic.

          • Timmeehh

            Most of the federal budget is spent on social welfare programs that by law are not affected by sequestration. There’s your problem, not the military budget which pales in comparison.

    • Eric W

      Its nice to have a simple, “he’s the problem” answer, but as is so often the case, its not that simple. By the way, the following US presidents didn’t service in the military:

      Barack Obama, Bill Clinton, Franklin Roosevelt, Herbert
      Hoover, Calvin Coolidge, Warren Harding, Woodrow Wilson, William Taft, Grover
      Cleveland, Martin Van Buren, John Q. Adams and John Adams

  • Piers Morgan

    Thank the demo-craps like the Gore tick, the Clinton leach the Biedon bug and the Obama vireos. Socialist agenda. The plan is to over burden the nation with debt till it fails. The take over. Who will be on food stamps then? Who will be on government assistance then? Who will sit on the front porch day in day out waiting for SSI check then? NO ONE! Will everyone work when that happens? You bet your ass they will. That will work for the state. By assignment. What will happen to those who refuse to work or unable to work? BANG! BANG! Has the world seen this before? Thousands of times. Look around at what the Democrats are doing.

  • Piers Morgan

    High tech food stamp cards for everyone that votes for the democrats. free food and healthcare for the Mexican wetbacks as long as they vote democratic. Free gas, free housing, free utilities, free clothing, free cars, and free transportation. utopia under the democratic future in the UDSA

  • Piers Morgan

    Vote for Hilary Clinton the next shit house president 2016. Drive the last nail in the coffin of American freedom.

  • http://john101b.ipage.com/globalwarming/climatechange.html Jack Everett —– Mato

    Our troops are trained very well but the past two decades that have become to reliant on technology that has never been proven against any country except the countries that can’t afford to build technical weapons. We have been brainwashed just like the Nazis that had a few easy victories over weak countries and thought they were infallible and we know what the cost of that is. The technology developed by our corporate military industrial complex is outdated before it leaves the factory and the corporate scam starts all over again. Our combat troops go unpaid so these corporas fools we call generals can sit back in their padded chair and smoke $100 cigars. Our troops deserve much better than this. Does anyone really believe China cares if we took out a few million of their troops or civilians especially when they would be replaced with the billion in reserve. As soon as America creates a major war with countries that can defend them self the technology will be the first thing to be taken out. You think when Russia tells us not to attack Syria they are worried about Obama and his hissy fits? America is going to become the shortest lived empire in history all because we do not have the ability to learn from past mistakes and have decided to hand our constitution over to corporate pigs and war mongers.

    • ted

      Jack Everett I just want to say you’re dead wrong. We have and/or always had
      the technology to whip any enemy on the planet. It’s the leadership that lacks the guts to use it when needed. Viet Nam was a good example. It was not any fault of our soldiers or lack of equipment to win. It was a chicken ship leadership that worried about their future political gain. And the inside masses
      of disdain distraught young people led by our enemy’s inside our country at the time. I also might add. It has not changed they are still here. Now these same people want to help take away our gun’s,corrupt our children with movie’s, In short. Brainwash them into thinking education,church,family ideals,love other than sex is not needed. WAKE UP AMERICAN’s Before they influence another generation to turn against the true American value’s. We the people still have a chance to change it. IF we work together as a team and quit arguing amongst ourselves like they want us to.Because that is never productive in any cause.
      Our future depends on it. P.S. JACK: Those corporate pigs as you call them Fed and continue to feed thousands of Americans as well as provide safety for our troops and people. As for the Warmongers?. Depending whom you’re referring to.We use to celebrate back in the day when our leaders chose to go to war. BIG FUN CAN’T WAIT TO GET OVER THERE AND KILL OUR ENEMY!!WHOOPEE!! You are right about one thing though we are letting them take away OUR Constitution little by little. The question is WHAT ARE WE THE PEOPLE WILLING TO DO ABOUT IT BESIDES LIP SERVICE?.

      • http://john101b.ipage.com/globalwarming/climatechange.html Jack Everett —– Mato

        Nothing was gained by the corporate Vietnam war just like the loss with Iraq and Afghanistan. Americans are made of jelly today and can’t control their government any longer. Technology will not win any major war with countries that have the ability to fight back against our fascist leadership. America has not won a war since WWII and that was an allied venture. America is the one country in the world that continues to support endless war for corporate profits.

  • Piers Morgan

    Bloody Yanks ya going to hell in a hand baskit

    • Don Bacon

      At least we’ll know that Brits have reconned it first.

  • Piers Morgan

    What is the democratic fixation with the homosexual people? Is that their power base , perverts and everything filthy

  • Piers Morgan

    What does that idiot Al Sharpton have over MSNBC? Does the minority control the majority? Apparently it does here in the good old USA. Bonkers. The NAACP BS get a load of that poppy cock! How in hell did this place ever become a super power is beyond me. Kiss my bum CBS, ABC NBC MSNBC and FOX. The BBC IS MY OYSTER

    • Don Bacon

      The sun has set on the Empire, and Americans gave up BBC oysters in 1776 because we didn’t fire until we saw the whites of their eyes. That’s how the USA became a super-power — shooting Brits.

  • george

    The best position to take against China is stop buying their products.There are plenty of alternatives. In addition, keep our weapons designs and know how safe. The Chinese have had a free banquet at our expense and must be rolling in laughter for firstly for making them rich and secondly allowing them to hack most of our defense systems. Even commercial hacking is estimated to profit them by 250billion, year on year. In this sense there is little to chose between military and commercial hacking, both feed their military monster.
    So what is more effective, investing $100 billion in F35s and so on or denying them 250 billion in hacking and $500 billion in trade. Better still, do both. We need a vast change in our thinking and leadership.

  • Don Bacon

    The Pentagon writes a fanciful “strategic guidance” about how it wants to control the world and then complains that it can’t afford to do it. A general complains that budget cuts may endanger the “core fighting capability of the Army” but he doesn’t have a clue why that “core fighting ability” is needed nor why the taxpayers should support it (except to give the general a job).

    recent headline:
    VCJCS Winnefeld Tells Army: Forget Long Land Wars

    It seems there is some confusion in the pentagonal puzzle palace.

  • ted

    PIERS MORGAN?. I believe he’s a reincarnation of that red coat my gg grandpappy
    shot during the battle of New Orlean’s.Put him on a ship or plane and sent him back home to that dictatorship where he belongs.But i don’t believe they want him either.

  • Waldo

    High tech is the panacea of the elite. Having better Smartphones or tablets than your enemy has limitations. George Custer was more technically advanced than the Souix. His distinct victory proved that 10,000 Souix can’t be wrong.

    • http://www.breakingdefense.com/ Colin Clark

      Tech is not all, as the story makes clear. Numbers, a la the Sioux experience at Little Big Horn, really do matter. But if you cut numbers and technology at the same time you end up with a force worth worrying about. Of course, we also need to have commanders in chief capable of making sound strategic decisions. Deploy with a clear goal. Send the force needed. In the meantime, deter and defend. And make lots of friends…