Secretary of Defense Hosts Lithuanian Defense Minister

Lithuanian Defense Minister Arvydas Anušauskas signs the guestbook before a bilateral meeting with Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III, at the Pentagon, Washington, D.C., Dec. 15, 2022. (DoD photo by Lisa Ferdinando)

WASHINGTON — In July, the heads of the NATO member states will descend on the Lithuanian capitol of Vilnius for the alliance’s bi-annual summit. As the first such meeting since Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, major changes for NATO’s strategic posture and political stances are on the table.

Lithuanian defense minister Arvydas Anušauskas will be the host for the summit. During a recent visit to Washington, where he held discussions with US officials about the upcoming meeting and pushed to speed up needed acquisitions, he sat down with Breaking Defense.

The following interview, conducted through a translator, has been edited for length and clarity.

You said in a speech recently that you’re hoping to see tangible deliverables come out the NATO summit in July. And two things you listed including more standing forces in the eastern part of the alliance and more prepositioned equipment. Are you optimistic you’ll see real movement on these topics? Because this is something Lithuania has asked for over several years, without major changes.

I am optimistic, because according to the regional defense plans we are going to consider, some of these capabilities have to be in place. And it’s important that the NATO concept or the philosophy of NATO’s defense plans has changed because of the war in Ukraine. In the past, we talked about the slogan that not a single inch of our countries will be conquered. And now we see that this principle has been included in writing in the plans.

There are a lot of NATO plans, and they’re always being updated. Is NATO’s planning process fast enough to reflect the reality of Ukraine and the lessons learned?

I think yes, this process is fast enough. We started the discussions of regional operational defense plans several years ago and these plans are already prepared. We will have the tactical plans next year. So the process is evolving. It’s taking place and I’m happy with the result.

Does Finland’s addition to NATO, and potentially Sweden as well, change Lithuania’s strategic posture or planning?

I believe that the impact will be considerable. The accession of Finland to NATO is already having an impact on our security situation. Everyone is aware that the control over the Baltic Sea stops Russia or prevents Russia from its more aggressive actions. In this case, the membership of these countries in NATO is a very strong deterring factor for Russia.

Does that change what you’re looking to procure or look to reposition forces or think about supply lines?

No, it doesn’t because we see Russia as a threat which will not change or disappear in the near future. That is why we intend to continue developing and modernizing our armed forces and to establish the division level capabilities.

And we should not forget that, de facto, Belarus is part of the Russian military structure and in military terms, it’s part of Russia. Putin and [Belarusian leader Alexander Lukashenko]’s statements that tactical nuclear weapons will be deployed in Belarus is concerning, and it’s concerning because it is already present in Russia (Kaliningrad) which is close to our country and the response of the international community should be more active to this challenge.

Do you think the international community hasn’t taken the threats to put nuclear weapons in Belarus seriously enough?

I believe that monitoring of the use and deployment of nuclear weapons was usual. But their political response was not the one we would have expected. Let’s have an example that, for example, North Korea announces that it’s decided to hand over, to deploy a nuclear weapon to Iran. What would be the reaction then?

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So why do you think the reaction was more muted than you’d like?

I suppose that  this reaction is related to Russia’s war against Ukraine. And probably the international community didn’t want to overreact to the threats made by Russia, because  the threats in relation to nuclear weapon have been used very often in recent years.

Lithuania was one of the first nations to send military aid to Ukraine. How concerned are you that getting those backfilled will be difficult due to production delays?

Lithuania is among the countries which actively supported and are supporting Ukraine and part of this support was taken out from our capabilities, and now we want to compensate these capabilities. Delays exist here, delays exist in Europe as well. War in Ukraine taught us certain lessons and showed us the shortages we have and we’re trying to compensate for these shortages or get to fill in these gaps as soon as possible, because Russia’s threat is still present.

The European Union has said it will work to help do backfill and compensate nations who donate ammunition. But given production issues, in the short term are there concerns you’re going to have a shortfall where you’ve donated to Ukraine, but the EU isn’t able to pay you back for that?

[Deep sigh] I believe that it is a common concern of all the NATO member states which support Ukraine. Lithuania is no exception. And Lithuania has provided military support to Ukraine, which is nearly reached half a billion dollars.

Certain capabilities cannot be replaced fast, cannot be compensated fast. So we decided to replace it with other capabilities. For example, we have handed over all Stingers, but we replaced this capability with other air defense capability.

There have been discussions for years about trying more joint procurement among the three Baltic nations. There have been some efforts, with mixed success.

Laws, planning, and appropriation cycles in our countries are different, and therefore it’s challenging to organize joint procurement projects.  But we can agree on synchronized procurement. This was the case with HIMARS. Jointly we have bought Karl Gustov ammunition from Sweden.

Ok, so do you think there needs to be more joint efforts like that going forward?

Yes I do. And the Baltic states actually is an exception among other NATO member states because we, the ministers of defense of the Baltic states, hold regular meetings. We meet at least two times a year where we discuss all the complex means and measures related to defense.

I would like to emphasize that the armed forces in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia are different in terms of composition and organizational principles. For example, over two thirds of Estonian Armed Forces consists of conscripts. In Latvia they are going to restart this process of calling up conscripts for service in July this year. And in Lithuania, we have had conscription all the time, except a break of only a couple of years. And regular forces — two brigades and one reserve brigade — in Lithuania amount to 80% of forces.

You’re part of Sky Shield, the German-led air defense procurement effort. Are you satisfied with how that is going, both from conversations and in term of speed?

This agreement on the European air defense shield has been signed by 15 European member states only several months ago. Every country has its own priorities in this initiative. Our priority is short range. We already have the NASAMS system and are acquiring additionally, it is a medium range system [so that capability gap is filled]. The signatories to this agreement have their own objectives and priorities.  Estonia and Latvia for example, they are considering the joint procurement of air defense, but it will not necessarily be the German air defense system.

But you are comfortable with how things are progressing?

In principle, yes. Still, the countries in our region came up with another initiative, which is the NATO rotation of air defense model, and we submitted this model for consideration to other states. We are well aware that we do not have enough resources to fully fill in the gaps (especially long range) of air defense in the Baltic region and we need support from our Allies. I’m speaking about the region, not Lithuania only — but of course it’s in our interests that part of this rotational capabilities would be present in Lithuania.

There have been public criticisms that despite pledges of new spending from nations in the wake of Russia’s invasion, there hasn’t actually been much delivered. Do you think those are fair?

Because of the war taking place in Ukraine, everyone wants to do more and to do everything faster. In Lithuania, internal criticism also takes place that the process is not fast enough — Although we have doubled our defense budget we concluded a number of contracts on acquisition of equipment and ammunition, and new training range is being developed and other actions are taken. But the public still wants everything, the broader society so to speak, wants everything to be faster.

Is that a challenge for you in this role, that the public is pushing you to move faster and you have to deal with acquisition realities?

It is a kind of a challenge. That is why we hold talks with our producers about timely delivery of our orders, because it is related to our reputation and the reputation of producers themselves on both sides. And the societies and the countries on the frontline of NATO don’t want excuses, they want to see actual work being done.

Avril Haynes, the DN intelligence head for the US, said it’s her assessment that Russia is unlikely to mount an offensive in Ukraine or elsewhere this year. I’m wondering if you agree with that assessment.

Every offensive needs resources. So this war has been continuing already for 14 months and we can see that, actually Russia carried out several offensives —  but it nearly used all of its resources in terms of ammunition, missiles and so on. So it is no longer capable to launch offensives without Iran’s assistance or terrorize Ukrainian towns without its help.

Russia may have $100 billion euros, it can mobilize half a million or one million people, but it does not have the capability to provide them, to train them and to supply them with the heavy armed equipment that is necessary. So now it may not be capable to launch an offensive, but it does not mean that in five or seven [years] it will not replenish its capabilities if it is not in war. It is capable to replenish its capabilities.

Jens Stoltenberg’s term as NATO chief is set to expire this year. Do you think it’s time for the next NATO Secretary General to come from an Eastern European nation?

I believe that the next Secretary General should have a real assessment of the Russian threat, and I believe that candidates from the eastern flank have a different view and they are closer to this.

That sounds like a yes.

[Laughing] Yes. Yes.