france

Mali: France’s Version Of Shock And Awe, Add Allies, Crush AQIM

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France has been hailed by the people of Mali for driving al Qaeda-linked thugs from their country. Malians greeted French President Francois Hollande with cheers of Vive la France when he recently visited Timbuktu. But the rebels and al Qaeda are not yet crushed, though they have been forced to cede most inhabited territory. The mix is getting richer now with kidnappings that appear to be in retaliation for the French operations claiming seven French tourists, including three children, in northwest Cameroon and seven foreign workers in Nigeria. Murielle Delaporte, a respected French defense analyst, analyzes just what has made the French operations so successful so far. This article includes an exclusive interview with the commander of French helicopter forces in Mali. The Editor.

The Mali operation was seen as requiring the rapid insertion of force at the moment when the adversary had begun to aggregate force. The French approach is very much about how to intervene and to trigger coalition operations in order to stabilize the situation with regional partners, rather than to simply stay in place for a long time.

It is “shock and awe” to deter the enemy and to trigger space for coalition success, not “shock and awe” for the sake of staying. As part of the support effort, allies – the US and Canada, as well as many European nations such as Britain, Belgium, Denmark and Germany – have been involved as well. [The photo above demonstrates this. It depicts a US Air Force KC-135 refueling a French fighter during the Mali operations. The Editor.]

But the French effort shows the importance of clear command and control as well as national control over force projection and autonomous capabilities. “Never Without Support” was the praise given by British ground troops to helicopter support during their missions in Afghanistan. The 4,000 French forces currently involved in Mali in the fight against Al-Qaeda affiliated insurgents (more forces than in Afghanistan) are applying this principle to the letter – and in all senses of the words – both at the tactical and strategic levels.

Shock and Awe The French way: Joint Tactical Support at Its Best
A rapid and massive offensive was generated to block the insurgents from reaching Bamako who were within several days reach of the capital.

A month later, as the commander of French Army Aviation in Mali explained in a recent interview: “The enemy has been taken by surprise and is now destabilized. Because of the lightning speed of the maneuver by the Serval force, the insurgents are now fleeing and not willing to fight, as they did not expect such concentration and mobility above their heads.”

Even though the war has, of course, not been won yet, the operation of joint air and ground raids to unloose the Gordian knot of AQIM (Al Qaeda In Maghreb), and other insurgents groups, has been crucial. This effort has been possible due to several factors: The first is the speed of the French forces and the ability to react in a matter of hours as far as air operations were concerned.

For example, on the Air Force side, the very first strikes by the Rafale fighters taking off from the FAB Saint Dizier were done thanks to an unprecedented nine hours and thirty five minutes flight involving five air-to-air refueling.

On the Army side, it took only two days for the French Army Air Mobility Group (GAM for Groupe Aéromobile) to be operational and in autonomous operation after a strategic airlift from the South of France to the capital of Mali involving close to 300 men and 20 helos. As a French officer involved in the operation said: “After leaving Bamako for Sevare five hundred kilometers further on January 26th, then leaving again for Gao on February sixth, five hundred kilometers further, I have available the support tools of nearly a full regiment ranging from my air control tower… to spares allowing me to last for months.”

The rapid surge of the Serval force, which should soon count in particular three battalion-sized Task Forces (GTIA or Groupement Tactique Interarmes), has also been facilitated by France’s historic presence and defense commitments in this part of the world (e.g. the Epervier operation in Chad since 1986 and the UN Unicorn operation in Ivory Coast since 2002).

Among the reasons for this fast and effective deployment of forces was France’s ability to leverage national assets based in nearby African countries. Mobility and concentration of forces have also been rendered possible by good command control, bolstered by joint training and experience between the French Air Force (Rafale and Mirage 2000D fighters and N’Djamena-based JFACC), the Navy (with the amphibious assault ship BPC Dixmude bringing ground elements ashore, as well as the Atlantique 2 maritime patrol aircraft crucial to coordinate CAS operations between Army aviation and ground troops) and the Army.

Army helicopters were able to carry out “reconnaissance or raid offensives as well as support operations, such as fire support for the 2e REP (2nd Foreign Legion parachute regiment) in Timbuktu so it could regroup in the best conditions possible,” according to a French military source in Mali. This airborne operation was the first of this size since Kolweizi in 1978. A second airborne operation was successfully conducted on February 7 in northern Mali by French special operation forces as well as French and Chadian conventional forces to secure Tessalit.

Not Fighting Alone: the Need for Speed in Strategic Support
From the beginning, the French intervention was not seen as an isolated event, but as one designed to clear the path for coalition forces to take over the mission. For example, Chadian armed forces indeed amount to 1,800 men and are part of a total African force of 4,100 being currently mobilized to fight along the side of the French troops and gradually take over as early as the end of next month.

A growing number of allied countries’ are offering logistic and support assets to help sustain French and African armed forces’ sustainability in a theater characterized by vast distances and few roads or other basic infrastructure. Transport aircraft and tankers have been sent early on by the United States and European countries, while the Eindhoven-based European Air Transport Command is increasing its involvement with the participation of a Dutch KDC-10 and, soon, it will be joined by a German A310 MRTT tanker.

In other words, France’s goal is to start reversing the balance between supported and supporting forces as early as the end of March in a secure, responsible and coordinated manner to prevent the “Afghanisation” of the conflict feared by many. From this point of view, European military training of local forces, which is also kicking in, will also be a key factor to make sure African ground troops have the best chances to secure the whole land of Mali.

Recent progress in Somalia with the EU training mission (EUTM) now under the command of Brigadier General Gerald Aherne from Ireland (in two years 3,000 Somali troops have been formed in police and anti-terrorist missions) feeds the hope among allies that, after more than a decade of ground entanglements, a long term success of a new type of lighter footprint coalition support is attainable.

Murielle Delaporte is editor of the French magazine Soutien Logistique Défense and co-founder of the US website, Second Line of Defense.

Published February 19, 2013 at 1:15 PM

ASD Mike Sheehan: Yemen, Somalia Are Models For Mali; Afghans Should Watch

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WASHINGTON: French forces have made great strides driving al-Qaeda-linked insurgents out of Mali’s major cities, said the Pentagon’s top counterterrorism official, Michael Sheehan. But any long-term solution requires local forces in the lead — not Westerners. And those recent successes in Yemen and Somalia provide a model for Mali — and for Afghanistan after 2014.

Sheehan, the assistant Secretary of Defense for special perations and low-intensity conflict (ASD SOLIC) spoke to scholars, industry officials, and military officers from two dozen countries this afternoon at the National Defense Industrial Association‘s annual SOLIC conference. Across the Maghreb and down to Nigeria, “an inverted L,” he said, “that area in North Africa is becoming awash with different al-Qaeda groups and affiliates.” Keep reading →

Published January 30, 2013 at 3:35 PM

Can NATO Get Its ACT Together? Alliance’s Only US-Based Command Takes On New Role

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HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED COMMAND TRANSFORMATION, NORFOLK, VIRGINIA: A new era is dawning for NATO — though no one knows quite what it means. Now Allied Command Transformation, the only NATO organization headquartered on US soil, is driving an overhaul of how the alliance trains, strategizes, and shares the burden among its increasingly cash-strapped members in a post-Afghanistan, post-”Pacific pivot” world.

That’s a tough task when NATO must make do with what its 28 member nations choose to contribute, each on its own terms. In Afghanistan, some NATO contingents have fought hard — France has lost 86 troops, Canada 158, Britain 438 — but others have been largely kept out of combat by “caveats” imposed by their home countries. In Libya, a European-led operation helped oust Muammar Gaddafi but struggled with intelligence-sharing and shortages of smart bombs. And back in Europe, the alliance has struggled since 2003 to stand up a 13,000-strong crisis-response unit called the NATO Response Force, NRF. Keep reading →

Published December 14, 2012 at 5:30 AM

BAE-EADS Merger Lives Or Dies On French, Germans Learning To Let Go

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Paris and Berlin are in a bind as British-based BAE and Franco-German giant EADs, the parent company of Airbus, seek approval to merge into the world’s largest aerospace company.

If the French and German governments accept the companies’ current merger terms, their ability to influence the new tri-national behemoth will be sharply diminished and they will possess less power to protect their citizens’ job. If they demand greater influence, however, they may scupper the deal altogether, because both investors and the US government are leery of Franco-German meddling. Keep reading →

Published September 28, 2012 at 4:45 PM

US, Allies Wrestle With Intel Sharing Problems Exposed In Libya Ops

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NATIONAL HARBOR: Last year’s Libya campaign revealed painful shortfalls in NATO, including intelligence sharing so molasses-slow that French pilots gave up on waiting for target data from US Predator drones. That’s something the allies are anxious to correct.

“In Libya we got away with it. We made do, we had work-arounds, [but] we were not fighting a sophisticated enemy,” Air Marshal Andy Pulford, the Royal Air Force’s deputy commander for capability, said at the (US) Air Force Association conference here. The next adversary might more effective than Muammar Qaddafi — not a very high bar. Especially, if that enemy is a single nation-state, “they will not have the baggage, the drag, of coalition and interoperability [concerns],” Pulford warned, “and they very quickly will overcome us if we are struggling to get information out.” Keep reading →

Published September 20, 2012 at 10:45 AM

Iran Nuclear Talks Continue Softly, Softly While Hopes Fade

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UPDATED: Iran Nuclear Talks Continue Softly, Softly While Hopes Fade (July 24 18:21 EDT)

Talks on the Iranian nuclear program continued at a low level Tuesday, even as prospects for a peaceful outcome grow increasingly grim.

Senior-level, US-led negotiations to win guarantees that Iran does not seek nuclear weapons have foundered. Meanwhile, there are disturbing developments. Concern is running high that last week’s suicide bombing attack on Israeli civilians in Bulgaria could signal a significant escalation in the covert war between Israel and Iran. The debacle in Syria may threaten Iran’s umbilical-cord relationship with Hezbollah, something which would have unforeseen consequences in the Middle East.

And yet, with all this going on, and after the senior-level talks broke down in Moscow in June, deputies to the European Union and Iranian negotiators met Tuesday in Istanbul. The EU deputy is Helga Schmid, who works for the Union’s foreign policy representative, Catherine Ashton. Ashton speaks for the six powers negotiating with Iran, the United States, Russia, China, Britain, France and Germany. Ali Bagheri, meanwhile, is the deputy to Iran’s head nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili. Their meeting followed an experts session on July 3, also in Istanbul, which was dedicated to making clear the details of the positions of the two sides. EU officials refused to comment on the Bagheri-Schmid meeting. But they said it would be followed by “contact” between Ashton and Jalili, which means that the two could meet in person or just talk by phone.

After this, there will probably be another experts meeting, rather than talks at a senior foreign ministry level. The experts gathering on July 3 took 13 hours and was judged fruitful enough for diplomats to say that another such experts meeting was likely to take place, although one has not yet been scheduled. “The last round of experts was sufficient to continue the process,” a diplomat close to the talks told me.

Diplomats said the bilateral meetings and experts talks will not be affected by the dramatic developments in Bulgaria and Syria, or even what happens in Vienna where the UN watchdog International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is stymied in its investigation of Iran’s nuclear program.

They said there was a real desire to keep the dual-track going of openness to talks coupled with pressure on Iran to get it to cooperate with the IAEA and to rein in its nuclear work. The ongoing negotiations are the only forum where the Iranians are talking at a political level to the international community about their nuclear ambitions. They are the latest stage in a diplomatic process which began in 2003, after Iran was discovered hiding almost two decades of nuclear work.

Other avenues for peaceful resolution are also foundering. Parallel to the official government contacts is something called Track 2 diplomacy, in which non-governmental groups and former government officials try to establish dialog which can hopefully lead to official give-and-take between the two sides. The virtue of Track 2 is that it is often off-the-record, backdoor diplomacy in which new approaches can be tried. But this important channel seems to have dried up over the past year.

The US tactic at this point is to hang tough, since Washington mistrusts Iran and wants to see concrete progress before making compromises of its own. The United States insists that Iran stop, as a confidence-building measure, enriching uranium to 20 percent enrichment, which is closer to weapon-grade. Iran started last year to enrich to 20 percent to fuel a research reactor which makes medical isotopes. The bulk of Iran’s program, however, is designed to enrich to up to 5 percent to make what can be fuel for civilian power reactors. The US position is that Iran will only get relief from the tough sanctions now in effect when it makes concessions on enrichment in general. The United States wants Iran to honor UN Security Council calls for it to suspend all enrichment work, which the United States fears could be eventually used to refine weapon-grade uranium of over 90 percent enrichment.

Iran however refuses to suspend and insists that its right to enrich be acknowledged as “inalienable” under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. It has raised the possibility of needing to make fuel for a nuclear submarine development program, which could require enrichment of around 60 percent. In any case, Iran calls for sanctions to be lifted as a first step, not a later one. The Islamic Republic says that the IAEA, after years of investigation, has no proof that it seeks nuclear weapons.

It is a stand-off. The political talks have failed at this point because the two sides were no closer to an agreement despite having improved the nature of their dialog by avoiding rants and rhetoric. The experts talks which are continuing are more than a lifeline. They are all that is left after a decade of official and unofficial contacts to defuse a face-off which could lead to war.

Whether they can go further at a low-boil that will allow for secret US-Iranian talks, which many feel is the only way to end this crisis, is unclear. What is certain is that both sides are keeping open a very significant line of communication. It is not a case of the medium being more than the message. The hope is that the medium can become a vehicle for messaging. Whether that can happen amidst growing regional tension, Iran expanding its nuclear work, and with presidential elections this year in the United States and next year in Iran is an open question.

Keep reading →

Published July 23, 2012 at 4:30 PM

Libyan Lessons For Doomed Autocrats and U.S.

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With news of Muammar Gaddhafi’s death, the U.S., NATO, and the Libyan National Transitional Council (NTC) deserve a moment to relish in the successes of the democratic movement in Libya. Yet it’s important to understand that despite this success, the story of Libyan democracy is in its infancy. Now begins the difficult part.

Can the NTC establish rule of law, democratic institutions, security, a stable economy, and a functioning government for the whole of Libya? This is traditionally the most difficult part of any revolution.


At this point, it’s wise to step back for a moment and reflect upon some of the lessons learned, and how those lessons can help guide future U.S. or NATO involvement in future scenarios of intervention. Keep reading →

Published October 26, 2011 at 5:04 AM

Marine Libya Lessons: Short Command-Control Links, STOVL Flexibility

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The French operational experience in and off of Libya has neatly dovetailed with that of the U.S. Marines and suggests a way forward for American thinking about littoral operations.

With the decision of the U.S. national command authority to “lead from behind,” the Marines were almost inadvertently given a leading role. What “lead from behind” meant operationally was that the U.S. was not going to commit significant combat air capabilities to the fight, so the F-22 returned from Middle East exercises and the aircraft carrier in the Mediterranean was sent elsewhere, to support US ground troops in Afghanistan. The U.S. was to provide a C2 package to support the operation, as well as ground attack capabilities such as A-10s and C-130 gunships. Most importantly, the U.S. provided airborne tanking and related air support to the allied operations. Keep reading →

Published October 6, 2011 at 4:10 PM

French Libya Lessons Learned: Better Targeting, Flexible ROEs, Limits to Armed UAVs

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Robbin Laird, international defense consultant, has been in Paris interviewing French military officials about lessons learned in Libya. This is the first of two pieces he’ll do for Breaking Defense on what he’s learned. The Editor.

A main point underscored by the French military was the impact of the political process on military planning. The French President clearly saw the need for the operation and had worked closely with the British Prime Minister to put in place a political process which would facilitate a Libyan support operation for the rebels. But until NATO received the UN Mandate was obtained, no military action could be authorized. This meant that there was little or no planning for military operations with the result that, in the words of one French military officer, “we were forced to craft operations on the fly with little or no pre-planning or pre-coordination. We did some on our own but until the authorization for action was in place, we could not mobilize assets.”

An impact of the slow roll out was that French weapons were not fully available at the start of the operation. Another officer indicated “the elements of French weapons were in various depots. We had to bring those elements together and to assemble them at the initial operational air base.”

The French ran surveillance operations prior to the air operation, but several officers indicated that they were concerned with the quality of the intelligence they had to work with. As an officer commented: “I was reasonably confident with regard to what we knew about the state of Libyan operations, but would have liked greater certainty before launching my aircraft.”

A key aspect of the French operation was the use of virtually the full gamut of their air combat capability — AWACS, tankers, Mirages, Rafales, and various helos. This represented a serious commitment by French leadership.

One key element which emerged from the operation was the strategic significance of multiple basing to conduct operations. The French used multiple bases to operate their air capability. At the beginning of the operation they operated from bases inside France. They then used bases in Corsica (Solenzara was a crucial air base for the operation) as well as in Italy, most notably Sigonella (which is supposed to be closed this year). They used two key sea bases, the aircraft carrier Charles De Gaulle and their helicopter carrier, the Mistral, for combat strike, recce operations and help operations, as well as onboard processing of intelligence from joint French air assets and sending targeting information back to the strike force. They used Souda in Greece to work with the Omanis who were using their Mirage 2000s for the first time in combat, and the French and Omanis worked together, flying 2000s for strike operations.

There were a number of firsts for the French in the operation. This was the first large-scale operation by France working with NATO since rejoining NATO. This was the first use of the Tiger combat helicopter off of the Mistral. This was the first use of a new precision-guided weapon in operations to destroy Libyan armor and other ground equipment (the Air-to-Ground Modular Weapon). And it was the first time the French flew in combat with an Arab partner using an advanced version of the Mirage 2000 for ground strike missions. This was the first use of the new reconnaissance pod on the Rafale, which played a major role in the operations.

Another first involving a key French ally is the use of the Anglo-French cruise missile on the Mirage 2000′s which the UAE brought into the fight. The Black Shaheen is the version of the Anglo-French storm shadow which is integrated to operate on the Mirage 2000s, but not the UAEs F-16s.

The Mistral featured prominently in the operations. This helicopter carrier has proven to be a very versatile asset. Its deck can support six helos operating in combat operations. It has hanger space for 16 helicopters. And the Tiger helicopter operated off of the Mistral in night operations. The helos operated, in the words of one French officer, as “vampires” to lower the capabilities of the Libyan forces.

An aspect of the operation of the helos off of the Mistral is noteworthy as well. The frigate with which it was deployed used its guns to support the helo deployment. The guns provided fire suppression to enhance the security of the insertion of the helos off of the Mistral.
The ship’s C2 is first rate and was part of the link to the air fleet for receiving and processing information to shape an intelligence picture in support of strike operations. This demonstrated that integrating maritime with land-based air can provide a powerful littoral operations capability, one which may prove very relevant to the United States as it rethinks the relationship between the USAF and the USN-USMC team in shaping 21st century operations.

Two additional aspects of operations as they moved forward were highlighted from the French point of view. First, the limitations placed on the operation curtailed the ability to succeed and enhanced the ability of Ghadafito survive. Second, after the initial air operations, dynamic targeting was a central objective, and various problems in executing such targeting became evident.

The limitations were three fold.

First, rules of engagement were being proposed by the partners of France in NATO that were “ridiculous,” to quote one French officer. “We received from NATO sources the directive that there were to be NO civilian casualties from our air strikes. My view was, why not just not do airstrikes. We pushed back and insisted on something sane: ‘No excessive civilian casualties from NATO air strikes.’”

The second limitation was allowing Gaddafi to operate in a sanctuary in Libya. As one officer put it: “We wanted to destroy an airfield being used by Gaddafi to bring in mercenaries. We should have destroyed this airfield.” Finally, the American contribution was much more limited than it needed to be. Another officer said “We had 4-5 areas to cover for the air operation; the Americans provided only two UAVs – Predators – which operated for only part of the day. We need to augment our own capabilities to be sure, but……”

And finally the operation underscored the challenge of “dynamic targeting.” The shift from destroying identifiable military equipment being used by the Libyan forces supporting Gaddafi to engaging forces on the ground countering the rebels required “dynamic targeting.” And this can only be done by situational awareness which allows aircraft to target elements blended with the population and this requires aircraft flying low, with close proximity weapons, with forces on the ground able to identify targets in a fluid situation. As a French officer put it: “We had difficulty getting authorization to fly low, we had limited close proximity weapons and we had severe limitations of forces on the ground able to identify accurate targets.”

For one senior officer the problem was clear: “Going forward we have to augment our capability to do dynamic targeting. If we are going to intervene in situations where we are supporting contested space and need to support either local or our own forces, we need better capabilities to influence the situation on the ground. Air systems can clearly do this, but in coordination with ground targeting elements. And the pilots need to be granted more authority.

We have to stop believing that some far-away command authority has better SA or moral authority than the pilot over the target. And the notion that unmanned systems are going to replace the pilot is ludicrous in a dynamic targeting situation. If we are reluctant to give a guy with SA in the pilot’s seat authority, why are we going to give some guy in Nevada or Paris looking through a soda straw the authority to do dynamic targeting.”

Robbin Laird is a member of the AOL Board of Contributors. An international defense consultant, he has served in and worked with all the US military services.

Published September 23, 2011 at 5:30 AM

French Pilots Over Libya Decline US Intel; Clearance Just Too Slow

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London: French air forces flying strike missions in Libya against Gaddafi’s loyalists are not using detailed imagery and intelligence provided by US airborne surveillance aircraft, according to statements made today by French pilots involved in those sorties.

Since the first day of NATO air strikes in Libya, French combat air crews have been struggling to positively identify ‘what or whom’ they were targeting, a serving French pilot told an audience of defense industry and military aviators attending a London conference. ‘The pilot in the kill box was entirely on his own’. Keep reading →

Published September 21, 2011 at 1:33 PM