‘Out of control’: DoD reviews use of super-secret SAP classification, for space programs and beyond

WASHINGTON — Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks is leading a review of how the Defense Department uses tightly restricted Special Access Program (SAP) classification not just for space programs, but across the department, according to DoD space policy guru John Plumb.

“Inside the department, the deputy secretary has directed kind of a SAP reform effort, and that is hopefully coming to some conclusion soon. I can’t say too much about any of that, obviously, but that’s across all domains,” he told the Mitchell Institute today.

“I think anyone in those systems has understood that the number of SAPs has kind of spiraled out of control,” added Plumb, confirmed last March as DoD’s first-ever assistant secretary for space policy.

Concerns about US government over-classification of all things related to space — and especially the overuse of SAPs that compartmentalize access to information about individual programs to only a few officials — have reached a crescendo over the past year. A who’s-who list of top brass, members of Congress, industry leaders and Pentagon watchdogs for many years have been arguing that over-classification is harming the ability to convey the growing space threats from adversaries to lawmakers, the public and allied/partner nations, and hampered cooperation with industry and foreign partners to mitigate those threats.

Further, many senior military space leaders, such as former Joint Chiefs of Staff vice chair John Hyten, have vociferously argued that it is impossible to deter the hostile use of space with invisible weapons.

Plumb, for his part, has been focused in particular on mitigating over-classification in order to enable the Pentagon to better make use of the “asymmetric advantage” provided by US allies with space capabilities.

He noted that during a December “principals” meeting of the year-old Combined Space Operations (CSpO) initiative in New Zealand where the group worked “on how do we figure out how to be able to do information sharing and operation relevant speeds,” it was very clear that “the thing that limits us is over-classification of information.”

The CSpO comprises the US and six closely allied countries with military space forces and/or ambitions: Australia, Canada, France, Germany, New Zealand and the United Kingdom.

Plumb emphasized that his primary goal is to “bring down” information secrecy levels only far enough “to maximize our ability to be ready to fight” — rather than declassification, which would allow broader congressional oversight and improved public understanding of US policies and space acquisition programs. This could include, he explained, allowing people with clearance to one specific SAP program to also be cleared into other related SAPs, as well as moving to “cross-level” security clearances of allied personnel to US equivalents.

“A lot of folks think of classification: ‘Oh, we’re going to declassify things so that they’re unclassified.’ I’m almost never talking about that,” Plumb stressed.

For example, as Breaking Defense first reported, he reiterated that there will be no declassified version of the Biden administration’s Strategic Space Review issued in November.

He also used carefully parsed language in addressing questions about US policy on how it intends to protect and defend military and Intelligence Community satellites and space systems, and whether/when the military will use offensive space weapons against those of adversaries.

Plumb noted that China, in particular, has had a “massive  buildup of satellites going up every year” and a “wartime architecture” that “is aimed at” the US. As for DoD’s response, he reiterated the standard Pentagon talking points about its three overarching space goals: mission “assurance” and resilience of US space capabilities; “attribution” (i.e. timely detection/identification of adversary interference via space domain awareness); and capabilities to help “protect” the joint force from adversary space systems during a conflict.

“We have to be able to protect the joint force, that’s our service members in harm’s way on the ground or at sea, [from hostile space systems].  And we are going to do that,” he said. “This is where integrated deterrence becomes a more than a bumper sticker. Both to deter, and to fight and win if deterrence fails, we need to leverage options across all operations.”

That said, Plumb noted that DoD is on the hook — via language in the fiscal 2023 National Defense Authorization Act — to provide Congress with a “protect and defend” strategy for military and IC space assets.

“So, we will have something there,” he said.