President of Russia Vladimir Putin watches a Victory Day military parade on Red Square, marking the 75th anniversary of the victory in World War II, on June 24, 2020 in Moscow, Russia. (Photo by Ramil Sitdikov – Host Photo Agency via Getty Images)
As the annual Association of the United States Army (AUSA) conference picks up speed in the nation’s capital, the larger military’s years-long Pacific “pivot” looms in the background, drawing the eyes of Army leaders and the crosshairs of Army tech. The Lexington Institute’s Dan Goure argues in the commentary below, however, that America’s premier land forces can’t take their eye off the ball — or the bear — in Europe. (Follow Breaking Defense’s AUSA 2021 coverage here.)
It has become almost an article of faith in the Department of Defense that China is rapidly becoming the threat of greatest concern to the US. The combination of China’s economic power, investments in advanced technology, large-scale military buildup and ability to operate in the so called “grey zone” of conflict raise concerns in the Pentagon regarding the ability of US and allied forces in the region to deter Chinese aggression both in the near and far terms.
Some defense officials have even offered the opinion that the balance of military power in the Western Pacific has already shifted to such a degree that the United States could lose to China in a future conflict over Taiwan.
But such a myopia for the Pacific too often overlooks, to America’s peril, Russia and its growing land forces. It can be argued that the threat posed by the former Cold War foe is both more immediate and more stressing than that of China and should be a higher priority to the US’s land-fighting forces in the Army.
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A number of studies and wargames support the case that Russia could conduct a rapid round invasion of the Baltic states while employing its anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) assets to disrupt NATO’s responses. Russia has demonstrated an ability to rapidly concentrate significant ground combat forces on its western borders. Moscow recently announced that it was creating new land combat forces in its Western Military District which abuts NATO’s eastern border.
As the Army’s modernization focuses on forces and weapons systems with the Pacific theater in mind, it cannot forget to ensure that forces in Europe are of sufficient quantity and quality to deter any Russian designs on the continent.
China Alarm Shouldn’t Drown Out Investments In Land Forces
Both China and Russia have invested heavily in an array of A2/AD capabilities designed to counter existing U.S. and allied capabilities and dominate future battlefields. In response to the growing security challenge posed by prospective adversaries, particularly China, the 2018 National Defense Strategy proposed creating a more lethal force emphasizing investments in space, cyber, C4ISR, precision strike, unmanned systems, and agile platforms.
Each the services have put forward new concepts of operations that emphasis on concentration of effects, distribution of forces, mobility, sensor to shooter connectivity across all domains of conflict.
No less a figure than the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Mark Milley, has proposed biasing future defense budgets in favor of heavy spending on sea, air and space-centric platforms.
“So, look, I’m an Army guy. And I love the Army… but the fundamental defense of the United States, and the ability to project power forward [are] going to be naval and air and space power,” he said.
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This statement is particularly concerning when taken in the context of flat or declining defense budgets. It suggests that the Army overall, and ground combat capabilities, in particular, will be the bill payers for investments in ships, planes, satellites, and missiles.
This view puts the Army in a difficult position and has prompted Army leaders to jump into the “me too” game, developing capabilities outside its traditional role.
Recent statements have touted the Army’s ability to operate like the Marine Corps as a “stand-in” force within the adversary’s A2/AD ring, employing small, mobile forces equipped with long-range precision fires, advanced intelligence systems, information operations capabilities, cyber, electronic warfare, and space assets.
Army concept papers have emphasized the potential role of the Army’s new, long-range fire systems as key means for defeating Chinese A2/AD capabilities and holding at risk the Peoples Liberation Army and Navy. The Army has advertised that it is looking at ways of giving its new missiles and long-range artillery an anti-ship capability.
Army leaders also have weighed the pros and cons of prioritizing investments in forces and technology in favor of the Indo-Pacific theater over Europe. In a document prepared for the then-incoming Chief of Staff of the Army, General James McConville, it was proposed that “[i]nstead of focusing on fielding a fully modernized force to [U.S. European Command], an alternative may be to deter Russia with minimal current conventional forces and permit the Army to shift strategic focus for modernization efforts to [U.S. Indo-Pacific Command].”
Although General McConville has not explicitly endorsed this view, his recent Chief of Staff paper Number 1, Army Multi-Domain Transformation, strongly emphasizes the role of the Army in the Indo-Pacific theater [PDF].
Some Systems Will Work In Both Arenas, But Not Enough To Counter Russia
It is easy to see how the Army might be beguiled into thinking that it should emphasize forces and weapons systems particularly suited to the Indo-Pacific theater and, correspondingly, de-emphasize modernized capabilities that would shore up the U.S. ground combat posture in Europe. This would be a mistake. As General McConville observed [PDF] in a recent discussion at the Brookings Institution, “the core of the Army is ground combat.” This is particularly the case in Europe.
It is true that some of the systems being developed as part of the Army’s current modernization effort will be applicable both in the Indo-Pacific and Europe. These include long range precision fires systems such as the Extended Range Cannon Artillery, Precision Strike Missile, Future Attack Reconnaissance Aircraft, Future Long Range Assault Aircraft, mobile air and missile defense and hypersonic missiles.
However, these capabilities will not be sufficient to counter the Russian investments in conventional land power or deny Moscow the ability to rapidly seize and hold territory in eastern Europe.
To counter Moscow’s moves, the Army needs to ensure that its future budgets maintain adequate investments in enhanced capabilities for sustained land combat. These would include the Optionally Fighting Vehicle, a replacement for the Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle, and one of the Army’s 31+4 modernization priorities. Another is the latest upgrade to the Abrams main battle tank, the SEPV3 variant. A third is the Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle, which would be substituted for the obsolescent M-113.
A new capability that would certainly be of value to the Army in a European scenario is a mobile 155mm howitzer. The Army is looking at several non-developmental platforms to replace the towed 155mm M777 howitzers in the Stryker brigades. Truck-mounted 155mm howitzers would be more agile, survivable, and responsive than the existing towed system. They have a “shoot-and-scoot” capability that can enhance survivability against Russia’s demonstrated capability to detect and strike opposing artillery units.
Enhancing NATO’s defense also requires deploying more U.S. ground combat units forward, to the Baltic states and Poland. The concept of stand-in Army forces, based close to the threat, is even more relevant in Europe than in the Indo-Pacific.
As Robert C. O’Brien, the former National Security Advisor to President Trump, wrote in a recent editorial, “The Biden Administration could make its own show of solidarity with Poland and the Baltics by announcing an increased U.S. presence in the region. Stationing an armored combat brigade in Poland would ideally complement the existing alliance forces in country.
The last administration did a lot to improve the disposition of US forces in Europe, moving significant combat capabilities eastward. More should be done.
Dr. Daniel Goure is a Senior Vice President at the Lexington Institute, a public policy research organization in Northern Virginia. Dr. Goure served in the Office of the Secretary of Defense from 1991 to 1993 as Director of the Office of Strategic Competitiveness.
