Chinese aircraft carrier Liaoning arrives in Hong Kong waters on July 7, 2017, less than a week after a high-profile visit by President Xi Jinping. (Photo credit should read ANTHONY WALLACE/AFP via Getty Images)
With the fast approach of the Davidson Window, which sets the date for a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan as soon as 2027, much attention has been focused on Beijing’s aircraft carriers and how they could come into play. In the following analysis, Ben Ho of IISS looks at two prevailing theories about how effective the carriers may be in an invasion, before raising a new way of looking at the issue.
In the past decade, there has been much talk over China’s staggering pace of defense modernization. Of note would be Beijing’s aircraft-carrier program, and this aspect of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has spawned a bustling cottage industry. There have been additions to this conversation in recent months. For instance, in a May Reuters article, various experts maintained that the Chinese carrier force is still embryonic and poses “little threat yet” despite 10 years of development and counting. The story came on the back of the early-spring deployment of the PLAN’s second flattop, the Shandong, into the western Pacific and approaching Guam.
The Reuters piece added that there are questions over the value of Chinese carriers during a Taiwan contingency, at least in the short term (read within the next few years or within the timeframe of the “Davidson window.”), and such doubts are largely due to the limited capabilities of the Liaoning (China’s first flattop) and Shandong. (While China’s third carrier, the Fujian, is much more capable owing to its catapult-assisted takeoff and barrier-arrested recovery, or CATOBAR, flight-deck configuration, the ship will probably be operational only in the late 2020s given the “first-in-class” issues that will invariably surface). In response to the Reuters article, military analyst Rick Fisher warned of underestimating the Chinese carrier threat because of the protective cover of Beijing’s shore-based anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) edifice. The arguments both sides put forth have merit, but need more nuance. What is more, that PLAN carrier airpower could adequately menace Taiwan’s east coast — an argument which seems to be gaining traction — needs to be addressed.
One issue with the Reuters story is that it seems to compare Chinese flattops with American ones on an individual basis, as Fisher rightly noted. In such a setting, the United States CATOBAR supercarrier, with some 70 aircraft onboard, simply outmatches its Chinese counterpart. On paper, the Liaoning and Shandong have relatively meager air wings (about 20-30 strong). In addition, the PLAN’s mainstay carrier-borne fighter, the J-15, has relatively inferior capabilities as it can only operate in the short takeoff and barrier-assisted recovery flight-deck configuration from the Liaoning/Shandong, thereby limiting the aircraft’s performance in areas such as range and payload.
In the real world, however, weapon platforms do not operate in isolation, and this is another area where Fisher was on point. Ditto the analyst quoted in a Global Times (interestingly, as it is seen as an unofficial Chinese mouthpiece) response to the Reuters article, who argued that “the Shandong does not fight alone, but in a comprehensive combat system.” Indeed, during a Taiwan war, Chinese carriers will arguably operate under the protective umbrella of the PLA’s much vaulted “fortress fleet.”
Simply put, this concept would see Beijing employing land-based weaponry, especially long-range missiles, to hold enemy navies at risk, concomitantly protecting PLAN forces. The Reuters piece gave short shrift to this aspect of Chinese strategy, with just a brief mention of Beijing’s flattops “working in tandem with submarines and anti-ship missiles to attempt to control… (the) near seas.” Observers cited in the Reuters story also mentioned that the Chinese carrier fleet has “relied on land-based airfields… for extra air cover and surveillance,” but this is to be expected in a fortress-fleet concept of operations.
On the other hand, Fisher goes too far when arguing that Chinese carriers “will operate within a dome of PLA anti-ship missile superiority” and that they “will be hiding behind a literal phalanx of missiles.” To speak in such absolute terms is probably overstating the case. To be sure, in principle, the fortress fleet should give the PLAN carrier strike group (CSG) a meaningful degree of cover during a Taiwan contingency. In reality, however, Beijing’s idea of “using the land to control the sea” has never been tested in the crucible of war.
Ultimately, the confidence of Chinese planners in the deterrent value and combat viability of their fortress fleet will ultimately influence what mission, if any, PLAN carriers will have against Taiwan.
Chinese Carrier Deployment East of Taiwan?
This brings us to the assumption that these vessels have a role to play, especially in an “eastern front,” should cross-Strait hostilities break out within the next few years. Any such role is likely to be secondary given that the island is within range of even short-ranged aviation from the mainland, and the latter could generate more sorties than one or two small-deck carriers, as the Liaoning and Shandong really are. Afforded cover by the fortress fleet, in theory the Chinese CSG could threaten Taiwan from the Philippine Sea and use its mobility to exert a strategic effect ashore by making Taipei divert forces to protect the east coast. (Operationally, the amount of power the two Chinese flattops could project is rather limited, but strategically, even a feint could tie up substantial enemy forces and complicate Taipei’s defense planning.)
Recent contributions to the Chinese carrier discourse show that there are members in this “Beijing’s flattops are useful against eastern Taiwan” camp. In an April Focus Taiwan report, local experts cited warned of the “serious threat” the Chinese carrier airpower would pose to the island’s east side. A day later, Reuters ran a story on the same issue where it noted that the situation could be perilous should there be an “unfettered, more coordinated attack from the east.” Tellingly (and rightly so), the Reuters story added a caveat: “Beijing could not operate carriers with impunity in that area during a conflict, analysts said, especially if nations friendly to Taiwan were involved, but added that Taiwan would struggle to deal with such a threat on its own.”
Looking at the map, Beijing would probably think twice of using its crown jewels as the centerpiece of any naval operation against eastern Taiwan, should there be external intervention. After all, any Chinese carrier fleet sailing relatively close to that part of the island could find itself boxed in from four directions between unfriendly forces, notwithstanding any cover provided by Beijing’s fortress fleet. Besides dealing with any forces Taiwan sends to reinforce its east coast, to the north and northeast, Japan’s Ryukyus have substantial military assets operating from them and these islands are being fortified apace. To the south, the Bashi Channel chokepoint and the northern Philippines loom with Manila leaning towards the Americans. There is of course the possibility of the US Seventh Fleet steaming in from the eastern Pacific.
Large warships in general, not just aircraft carriers, enjoy greater freedom of maneuver in the open sea to reduce their vulnerability, and this means any Chinese carrier sent to threaten eastern Taiwan would do well to stay further away from the coast. A Catch-22 situation then arises. Deploy nearer Taiwan and the PLAN CSG finds itself more vulnerable to detection and attack. On the other hand, deploy further east into the Philippine Sea to reduce the chances of being boxed in, and Chinese carrier jets could find themselves near or at their operational limits.
It would not be surprising if the concerns outlined above were probably also in Lee Hsi-ming’s mind when the retired Taiwanese admiral and former vice defense minister spoke last month of PLAN flattops not being useful in a cross-Strait war as they “would not be able to withstand attacks by the US military.”
Role Reversal for the Carrier?
The dilemma for the Chinese carrier discussed above could, however, be alleviated should the notional PLAN CSG center its operations around its surface combatants rather than the carrier. In other words, the task force’s cruiser and destroyer force should paradoxically dish out the “Sunday Punch” rather than the flattop they are screening. In a reversal of roles, the carrier will protect its supposed consorts.
Earlier this year, retired US Navy commander Michael Dahm contended —and rightly so given the relative infancy of Chinese carrier aviation— that “the centerpiece of PLAN strategy, especially over the next decade, will likely continue to be the strike capabilities of its surface combatants and submarines.” He added that the carrier’s “fighters provide an air-defense umbrella, leaving power projection and striking capabilities —at least for the near term— to Chinese ships and missile-capable submarines.” The PLAN’s greyhounds for its carrier fleet, the Type 55 cruiser and Type 52D destroyer, are compatible with the CJ-10 land-attack cruise missile. This weapon’s thousand-mile range far exceeds the several hundred miles striking reach of carrier-borne aircraft, providing the Chinese force with more operational vistas should the missile be deployed.
Various observers, including this author, have suggested this heterodox concept of operations for carrier forces in general as the operating environment becomes increasingly non-permissive with the maturation of the reconnaissance-strike complex. And while takeaways from the ongoing Russo-Ukraine war are not totally applicable to a Taiwan scenario, they nevertheless offer glimpses of how a high-intensity contest over the island might pan out. One of the key lessons from the Ukraine war is that even limited (not to mention robust ones) enemy air defenses may reduce the role manned aviation plays and increase the accent on standoff weapons, at least during the opening stages of a conflict.
This is likely to happen too during a Taiwan scenario. In such circumstances, a PLAN “missile strike group,” rather than the traditional CSG, poses a greater threat to the island. With the relevance of even the American supercarrier being questioned in the face of A2/AD challenge, when it fully comes onboard, the more capable Fujian will face similar problems, albeit to a lesser degree, compared to its small-deck predecessors should it operate on the eastern front of a cross-Strait war.
The answers to these issues will involve substantial blood and treasure, so hopefully we will never get to find out.
Ben Ho is an associate editor at the International Institute of Strategic Studies, where he heads editorial projects of the Cyber Power and Future Conflict Programme. He also has research interests in airpower and seapower issues, especially of the Indo-Pacific.
