BEIRUT — The outcome of Tuesday’s US presidential election is unlikely to have much short-term impact on the diplomatic effort to normalize relations between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Israel, as the fallout of Israeli military actions over the last year has made such an agreement untenable politically, experts tell Breaking Defense.
Saudi-Israeli normalization has been a foreign policy priority for the US over the last two administrations. Under the Abraham Accords, the Trump administration helped ink normalization deals between Israel and the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Sudan and Morocco, and had hoped to conclude such a deal with Riyadh. The Biden administration then tried to close the deal before the Oct. 7 Hamas attacks in Israel set off a regional conflagration.
It stands to reason that whomever wins on Nov. 5, either former president Donald Trump or Vice President Kamala Harris would also seek to tie the Saudis and Israelis together. But five experts told Breaking Defense they see no easy way forward for such an agreement, no matter how much a new US president may seek to encourage it — at least until Israel ends its operations in Gaza.
“Regardless of whether Harris or Trump wins this year’s presidential election, I don’t expect Saudi Arabia to normalize relations with Israel at any point in the foreseeable future,” said Giorgio Cafiero, CEO of Gulf State Analytics, a US-based consulting firm.
He added that “any talk of Israeli normalization [is] toxic in the Arab world. Saudi Arabia’s leadership would be taking huge risks if they were to bring Riyadh into the Abraham Accords at a time in which images of death and destruction in Palestine are livestreaming 24/7.”
Mohammed Soliman, strategic adviser at McLarty Associates and director at the Middle East Institute, said that seeking normalization between the two countries is a “bipartisan priority” that should play out regardless of who wins the election. But he, too, is skeptical anything will happen anytime soon.
“The situation in Gaza and its trajectory will play a fundamental role in shaping the prospects for any potential normalization agreement, influencing how it is negotiated, its timelines, and its parameters. Whether this is successful or not is difficult to assess at the moment,” Soliman said.
Mohammed Baharoon, general director of B’huth, a Dubai-based public policy research center, said that one way the US president can influence such an agreement is putting pressure on Israel to “reach a political deal with Palestinian that provides them with a state and end the occupation which has been a major source of instability in the region.”
Ali Bakir, professor at Qatar University and non-resident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative, noted that Saudi Arabia has signaled it has two key requirements it wants to see before moving forward with normalization.
“These include a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and a NATO-like security agreement with the US. Currently, it appears that the conditions are not conducive for Riyadh to advance in this area,” he said.
The US-Saudi security deal, something that seemed extremely close before the Oct. 7 attacks upset the regional balance, is a key lever here, said Abdallah Al Junaid, a Bahraini strategic expert.
“Saudi Arabia is clear on that, no normalization without 1) Addressing the Palestinian Israeli solution, and 2) The Saudis won’t sign a deal that constraints their strategic security options. So if the next president of the USA secures that, the Saudis will,” he told Breaking Defense.
In April, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken announced that a new defense pact between the United States and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is “potentially very close to completion.” Getting that agreement in place could give either a Trump or Harris administration a modicum of power in trying to find peace between Riyadh and Jerusalem.
But summing up the tone of the analysts, Cafiero said, “I don’t see either a Harris or Trump administration having much success in terms of bringing new Arab-Islamic countries into the normalization camp.”
A Change In Arms Sales To Region?
Another tool the US president could employ in the region is a tried and true one: dangling arms sales for policy wins.
The Trump administration put an emphasis on “economic security as national security,” and loosened guidance on arms sales in order to make it easier to sell weapons abroad. In contrast, the Biden administration put an emphasis on human rights when judging potential arms sales, and is seen as less willing to open the armaments chest to the Gulf nations.
How a new administration could handle weapon sales to the region is of great interest, with eyes likely to fall on Trump should he win the presidency, especially as one of the signature moments of the Trump administration was his visit to Riyadh and announcement of a major arms sale package to the Saudis.
“Buyers might perceive Trump as more transactional, potentially leading them to believe that purchasing more weapons would grant them greater influence over him,” said Bakir, the Qatar University expert. But, he warned, “Trump would likely aim to increase arms sales to the Gulf States, possibly pressuring some of them to buy more, even if it’s not in their best interest.”
That could also mean revisiting arms sales announcements from before the Biden administration. Most notable is plans to sell the UAE F-35 Joint Strike Fighters, alongside MQ-9 SeaGuardian UAVs. That deal fell apart over US concerns about UAE’s Chinese 5G wireless technology.
In the intervening time, the UAE seems to have moved on to other plans, meaning it’s no guarantee that the F-35 deal happens if Trump returns.
“Most [Gulf Cooperation Council] air forces have acquired 4.5 generations fighters, the next strategic step is to pool their resources in R&D to develop the smart munitions that their armed forces need,” Al Junaid told Breaking Defense. “Saudi Arabia and the UAE have opted to different strategic approach by partnering [with] others in the development 5th and 6th [generation] solutions rather than acquiring solutions.”
The Saudis have expressed interest in joining the UK-Italy-Japan Global Combat Air Program (GCAP), and a Saudi official previously told Breaking Defense that the Kingdom was “very keen” taking part in this project, although there is reportedly reluctance from Japan to allow that to happen. Meanwhile, the UAE has reportedly shown interest in taking part in South Korean KF-21 fighter jet program.
And of course, each country in the region has slightly different desires when it comes to arms.
“For the UAE, the F-35 deal could be contingent on other issues, such as their potential role in Gaza,” said Bakir. “Israel expects the US to maintain its regional military edge. For Saudi Arabia, the primary goal is to secure a NATO-style agreement with the US, which would obligate the US to protect Saudi Arabia from foreign threats. Qatar, on the other hand, may seek a more robust military-partnership and US military presence in the country.”