If the United States and China go to war over Taiwan, does Washington want the assistance of European allies? It seems like a no-brainer that US leaders should be marshaling all the help they can get for a conflict that many analysts believe could begin as soon as 2027 and last a long time.
However, this is not be what some US allies are reportedly hearing lately. Instead, as media reports, as well as our own research discussions in Europe have revealed, the message from Washington to European allies has essentially amounted to “Thanks, but no thanks.”
The reasons most often cited for telling the Europeans to stay in their backyard is that Europe lacks the will and ability to project power and should instead focus on deterring and defending against Russia, especially if US forces are drawn to the Western Pacific. While that sounds like a tidy division of labor, it’s based on several questionable assumptions — most notably, the unproven idea that Russia would likely use a Taiwan scenario to launch its own conflict in Europe — and ignores that Europe has real capabilities to share.
The reality is this: If the US enters a conflict with China, tapping its European partners is the most sensible thing to do for a number of reasons. However, getting all the European partners America needs on board will require a truly coordinated effort at all levels of government.
Put simply: to combat China, the US needs its allies, even if they aren’t eager to jump in.
European Capabilities
European nations would bring quite a lot to a potential conflict over Taiwan.
First, some European countries have military capabilities that, with some sustainment support, could prove important in a Taiwan contingency. Some experts assess that submarines would likely be Europe’s most useful contribution; China’s anti-submarine capabilities are currently relatively limited, and US attack submarine capabilities are stretched thin. The UK, France, Germany, Italy, Sweden and Türkiye all possess capable attack submarine fleets and the ability to construct more. Additionally, European mine clearing and merchant marine capabilities could also prove beneficial to US efforts to assist Taiwan.
All these naval platforms would likely require sustainment support to operate so far from home ports, and Washington could facilitate this through its regional facilities and those of Indo-Pacific allies like Australia and Japan. Additionally, European air defense and long-range anti-ship capabilities could prove invaluable to protecting Taiwanese, US and allied forces from Chinese bombardment and holding Chinese ships at risk.
Second, a US-China conflict over Taiwan will spill beyond the military realm, incorporating significant political, economic, and information dimensions — areas in which Europe is particularly strong. European countries could clearly communicate they won’t simply sit on the sidelines in the event of any conflict over Taiwan. If that deterrent signaling fails, Europe could issue coordinated condemnation of Chinese aggression, including an unwillingness to view a conflict over Taiwan as solely an internal Chinese matter. Although all European countries officially adhere to the One China Policy, several — especially Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Türkiye and the UK — do not fully subscribe to Beijing’s views on Taiwan. This creates space for coordinated diplomatic moves to condemn and internationalize any Chinese aggression.
Realistically, sweeping economic sanctions against Beijing may be difficult to achieve given strong Europe-China trade ties and because EU sanctions require unanimity. That said, few could have predicted the depth and duration of European sanctions against Russia since 2014, and so much may depend on the severity of Chinese aggression. Additionally, the EU could lower all trade barriers with Taiwan and offer Taipei financial and economic assistance. Finally, Europe’s growing defense industry could be harnessed to sustain the military equipment needs of both the United States and Taiwan.
In the information domain, Europe’s most cyber-capable countries, such as the UK, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany and the Netherlands, could assist Taiwan by offering expertise and support. Moreover, prominent European international broadcasters such as the BBC, Deutsche Welle and TV5Monde could thwart Chinese disinformation campaigns by expanding their programming to reach Taiwanese audiences and promoting accurate reporting. Additionally, the EU’s secure satellite internet constellation modelled after Starlink, known as IRIS², which is expected to be operational by 2027, could be especially useful in providing Taiwanese with access to accurate information.
Getting To ‘Yes’
Of course, it takes two to tango, and the White House is not fully wrong in assuming that not every European nation will jump to aid Taiwan — while some European countries may not take much to convince, given their interests in the region, others will require a push. Research on coalition formation and management can help to identify the most important factors in achieving a broad coalition of willing and capable European partners.
First, legitimacy is a vital determinant of coalition participation and commitment. Legitimacy depends on international endorsement, ideally by the UN Security Council, and is more easily obtained in response to violations of sovereignty than internal conflicts. In lieu of a UN endorsement — given China’s veto there — the blessing of other intergovernmental organizations like NATO can provide legitimacy, at least among its members.
Additionally, convincing potential partner states to join coalitions often requires incentives. Deployment subsidies and political side deals are two of the most common types. Deployment subsidies are given to countries that want to join a military coalition but lack the ability to transport their forces to the front or sustain them there over time. Political side deals are incentives unrelated to the coalition activity but are nonetheless viewed as desirable to the potential coalition member, such as tariff concessions, technology transfer, or diplomatic support on other issues.
Finally, coercion is useful occasionally to spur coalition participation. For example, Washington sometimes uses the threat of aid termination to nudge countries to join a coalition.
Building The Playbook
Overlaying the most important factors influencing coalition participation with the contributions most necessary in a conflict against China suggests a tailored playbook for key European allies.
First, Washington should obtain the legitimizing imprimatur of NATO and build the case for treating Chinese aggression against Taiwan as an attack on a sovereign entity, as opposed to the civil war that Beijing will likely cast it as.
Among European countries, the UK is likely to be the most willing and able to participate in a US-led coalition. The UK has long been strategically aligned with the United States, it is one of two European countries with territory in the Indo-Pacific, and its unfolding ”tilt” towards the Indo-Pacific make it a natural contributor. However, British officials have indicated they are likely to reduce or eliminate permanent UK military presence in the Indo-Pacific region. For this reason, Washington may need to offer deployment subsidies in the form of deepened logistical support through existing agreements or the AUKUS framework, or side payments such as tariff relief in key industries like automobiles or steel.
France — the other European country with territory and citizens in the Indo-Pacific — has extensive naval capabilities, especially its nuclear powered attack submarines, as well as global diplomatic and information domain reach and influence. However, given Paris’s strategic autonomy predilections, Washington may need to provide greater incentives such as easing US tariffs on leading French exports of aerospace products, cosmetics, wine and spirits.
Other European countries are unlikely to be directly threatened — at least militarily — by a Taiwan conflict, and so Washington will need to double down on achieving legitimacy, sweetening the pot with inducements, and perhaps even resorting to arm-twisting. Germany, Italy and Türkiye, which have some of the largest submarine fleets in Europe and which could play vitally important roles in wielding economic and diplomatic power against the PRC, might respond favorably to incentives including technology sharing, logistical support, pre-deployment training assistance, and even a seat in operational planning forums.
An American effort to help Taiwan in the face of Chinese aggression would require extensive support from Washington’s allies. Indo-Pacific partners would be central, but ignoring, dismissing, or even discouraging participation and support from European allies risks making victory against China harder and costlier. In diplomatic, economic, informational, and military terms, Europeans have substantial, useful capabilities that would help to fill gaps in US capabilities and capacity.
However, meaningful European involvement will not occur without intentional, creative, and tailored engagement from Washington. Most European countries are unlikely to involve themselves in an Indo-Pacific conflict, at least initially. But the United States has a strong track record of building coalitions, garnering support from allies and partners beyond initial expectations.
Trying to entice Europeans to assist might not be easy or cheap, but given the scale of China’s challenge, Washington can ill afford to do otherwise.
John R. Deni is a research professor at the US Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute, a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, and a nonresident senior fellow at the NATO Defense College. He is working on a book project regarding the role of Europe in a US-China conflict.
Alexander Lekarev is an undergraduate student majoring in International Relations in the St. Andrews William & Mary Joint Degree Programme. He worked as an intern for the US Army War College during the 2024-25 academic year.
The views expressed are their own.