Since 2023, the senior leadership of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has been decimated. The most recent casualty is Zhang Youxia, one of the two vice chairmen of the PLA’s Central Military Commission (CMC), and therefore one of the two most senior uniformed members of the Chinese security establishment.
Zhang’s removal follows the relief of Gen. Li Yuchao of the PLA Rocket Force in 2023, defense minister (Li Shangfu) in 2024, the other vice chairman (He Weidong) and the head of the Political Work Department (Miao Hua) in 2025, and the head of the Joint Staff Department (Liu Zhenli) alongside Zhang in the current cycle. Those roles have yet to be formally filled, leaving only two official members of the CMC: Xi Jinping, as chairman, and Gen. Zhang Shengmin, head of the CMC Commission for Discipline Inspection (CMCCDI) who has also been promoted to vice chairman.
Nor have the removals only been from the CMC. In the October 2025 purges that took down Hua, the Army and Navy political officers were also relieved. So was Gen. Lin Xiangyang, head of the Eastern Theater Command (ETC). Much of the PLA Rocket Force leadership was relieved in an earlier cycle, all on charges of corruption.
But why has this been happening? There are at least three angles to consider: corruption, relationships and bureaucratic politics.
“Corruption” tends to be the default term used in most of these cases. Given the endemic nature of corruption within the PRC and CCP, these accusations are broadly credible. One of the more egregious cases in recent years involved Lt. Gen. Gu Junshan, head of military housing in the then-General Logistics Department who was given a suspended death sentence for corruption in 2015. Gu reportedly had amassed several houses, a variety of art work, and even a solid gold bust of Mao Zedong.
Given that corruption contributed to the failings of the Russian military in its Ukraine invasion, corruption has real implications for the PLA’s performance in event of any major contingency, be it in the Taiwan Straits, the South China Sea, or the Sino-Indian border.
Another consideration, tied to the corruption issue, is that of “guanxi (关系),” or relationship, networks. Like any nation, there are a variety of bureaucratic authorities that allow the PRC to fulfill state functions. But undergirding and cross-cutting the formal line-and-block charts are relationship networks, comprised of familial, educational, career, hometown, provincial, and other ties. This is true across Chinese society, and is not unique to the PLA. In a low-trust society where there is no rule of law and there are few “objective” dispute resolution mechanisms, relationships assume a paramount role in getting work done, positions staffed, and information flowing. Indeed, much of what is termed “corruption” that marks Chinese society is comprised of goods and services that are part of the day-to-day operations of these unofficial networks, whether it is part of seeking entry into a network, or reinforcing already existing relationships.
When Xi acted against former Chongqing Party Secretary Bo Xilai, the resulting dragnet included not only Bo and his family, but both civilian and military officials that were reportedly tied to him in Chongqing and Chengdu province. This included Zhou Yongkang, Minister of Public Security and Politburo member. Gu was reportedly part of a relationship network that included former CMC vice chairman Gen. Xu Caihou, who was literally dragged from his sickbed and put under investigation. Similarly, the removal of defense minister Gen. Li Shangfu, who had previously served in China’s aerospace and rocket forces, was tied to the arrest of a number of senior PLA Rocket Force generals. As important, Li had reportedly been recommended for his position by Zhang Youxia; Li’s fall likely entangled Zhang because of these relationship networks.
The relationship aspect may be a double-edged sword for Xi. In reporting the investigation into Zhang Youxia, one of the other officers also named was Zhong Shaojun — a long-time associate of Xi, reportedly helping draft statements for the Chinese leader when the latter was Zhejiang Party Secretary in the early 2000s. Despite never having served in the military, Zhong became a senior commissioned officer assigned key positions within the CMC internal bureaucracy. By 2024, he was head of the CMC General Office, responsible for managing the CMC schedule, agenda, and overall activities, with the rank of major general. At the time of his investigation, he had been promoted to lieutenant general and become a political officer for the PLA’s National Defense University. Zhong’s fall indicates that Xi is not afraid to turn the investigatory spotlight even on old associates, despite their “guanxi,” but also highlights that members of those networks may nonetheless be unreliable.
PLA officers who are part of any “guanxi” network with any nascent anti-Xi movement are therefore likely to be purged. This is very different from suggesting the military itself is somehow opposing Xi. But because “guanxi” networks span civilian and military communities, ethnic and regional groupings, it is inevitable that military figures will be part of various networks that, in turn, may have become the focus of Xi’s attention.
A third consideration is that of bureaucratic politics. In the context of the ongoing purges, this could take on at least two forms. One is the potential rivalry between the Political Work Department (PWD) and the CMCCDI. Prior to 2015’s massive reorganization, the General Political Department (GPD) was responsible for both enforcing political orthodoxy and overseeing anti-corruption measures. With the reorganization, the GPD was divided into the PWD, which retained responsibility for political warfare, political training, and promotion reviews, and the CMCCDI, responsible for countering corruption. The CMCCDI reports not only to the CMC, but also to the CCP’s Central Commission for Disciplinary Inspection, the entity that polices the broader CCP for corruption.
The promotion of so many officers who have subsequently been found to be corrupt (assuming that the charges are legitimate) suggests that the GPD and now PWD have failed to root out corruption. Similarly, if the problem is with the relationship networks, the PWD has also failed to curtail or control them.
It is notable how many senior political officers have been removed in the various purges. These include not only Adm. Miao Hua, who as head of the PWD was the most senior political commissar in the PLA, but also the political officers for the ground forces, the navy, and the PLA Rocket Force. This suggests that whatever rot is at work in the PLA is as deeply rooted among its political officers as the staff officer corps. It is arguably not an accident that the only surviving uniformed member of the CMC is the head of the CMCCDI.
Another aspect of the bureaucratic politics aspect, however, may be more directly related to the military reforms of the last two decades. The PLA of 2026 is a radically different organization from the one Xi inherited in 2012.
- The CMC has been thoroughly shaken up and radically reorganized. The elevation of the CMCCDI alone, where it now is equivalent to the Joint Staff Department and the PWD, is a major change.
- The PLA’s service structure has been significantly reformed. The PLA is now organized as four services (PLA Ground Force, PLA Navy, PLA Air Force, PLA Rocket Force) and four “arms” (Joint Logistics Support Force, Military Aerospace Force, Cyberspace Force, Information Support Force), with the services and arms responsible for training, equipping, and providing forces, but not, apparently, for warfighting.
- The seven military regions have been replaced with five theater commands. Where the military regions were peacetime organizations, always under de facto ground force leadership, the theater commands are wartime command structures, with several headed by non-ground force officers.
Such massive changes have been accompanied by major doctrinal shifts, as the PLA has pushed for greater joint operations at lower and lower operational levels. The Mao-era focus on mass has been replaced by a recognition of the enormous importance of advanced technology in fighting and winning future wars.
The result has been comprehensive bureaucratic upheaval, whether in terms of funding priorities, bureaucratic clout, or promotion opportunities. In any organization, such a raft of changes would generate bureaucratic push-back, as even clean officers would see promotion opportunities lost, and service chiefs (especially the PLA Ground Forces) have watched their authority wane.
It is notable that both Gen. Zhang Yongxia and Liu Zhenli were accused of “severely trampling and disrupting the Chairman responsibility system,” an accusation not leveled at many of the officers removed in earlier purges. The “Chairman responsibility system,” enshrined in both the PRC state constitution and CCP constitution, makes the CMC chairman (who is also the head of the CCP) the ultimate authority for all military decisions. As the State Council Information Office notes, “The CMC chairperson responsibility system is the institutional arrangement for practicing the Party’s absolute leadership over the military. It represents the top of the military chain of command, a role that combines central direction functions of both the Party and the state.”
This suggests that their fall may be due to professional differences, even resistance to the slew of changes implemented by Xi. From Xi’s perspective, such professional differences could nonetheless pose a challenge to “the Party’s absolute leadership over the military,” requiring the imposition of the severest sanctions.
Consequences?
Despite the removal of so many senior leaders, the broader forces of the PLA appear to be operating normally, rather than pulling back. PLA forces continue to operate around Taiwan, with China’s third aircraft carrier transiting the Taiwan Straits. There is little indication of reduced Chinese cyber or space activities. And despite the various charges of corruption, Chinese military modernization, including major acquisition programs, does not appear to have been affected.
What may be less visible is the impact of these major disruptions on commanders’ discretion. Those in networks under investigation are likely to avoid drawing attention to themselves; that in turn may well mean adhering to the letter of regulations, standards, and norms. Training may be less flexible and decision space more restricted. Ironically, those who are corrupt may well suspend their activities, so that unit readiness in terms of stockpiles, spare part inventories, etc., may well improve.
It is also noteworthy that, with the exception of the Eastern Theater Commander, the purges thus far have not affected too many of the theater commands — the organizations responsible for actually planning and implementing any Chinese use of force under the reorganized structure.
What does this imply for PLA readiness at the war-fighter level? Xi will presumably repopulate the CMC. The wholesale removal of officers creates an opportunity for elevating new thinkers, and, ironically, accessing new networks. Those officers and networks will, in turn, potentially mark another major shift for the PLA.
And how that shakes out, and whether another major purge is due in the future, will only be seen with time.
Dean Cheng is a non-resident fellow with the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies and with the George Washington University’s Space Policy Institute. When not translating Chinese articles, he can often be found feeding quarters into pinball machines.