GPS III satellite, Lockheed Martin image

WASHINGTON: The House Strategic Forces Subcommittee is liberally wielding its power to fence funding to force DoD to comply with its legislative initiatives. That includes spurring the Air Force to develop a prototype receiver capable of using the encrypted GPS military code, or M-Code, at a time when Congress is agitated about the potential interference threat posed by Ligado’s controversial 5G network

In its markup today of the 2021 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), the Strategic Forces Subcommittee also took a swipe at President Donald Trump’s widely reported disinterest in detailed briefings — requiring that a sitting president “participate in at least one nuclear command and control exercise per term.” The text was passed up to the full House Armed Services Committee without any rancor. Indeed ranking Republican member Rep. Mike Turner, in his opening remarks during the hearing noted with satisfaction that more than half the draft’s legislative initiatives were developed by both sides of the aisle.

In particular, the subcommittee found bipartisan consensus on the need to double down on the pressure campaign launched in last year’s NDAA on DoD to contain what it perceives as issues at the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) orchestrated by Mike Griffin’s Research and Engineering office.

Subcommittee Chair Rep. Jim Cooper, in his opening statement, said that the markup is aimed at “acknowledging that missile threats are real, and that the programs to defeat them are significant acquisition efforts that require extensive oversight.”

The subcommittee language, according to a summary, addresses four key areas:

Missile Defense

One bee in the HASC’s collective bonnet has been ensuring that MDA — not the Space Development Agency (SDA) — is developing a new space-based payload, called the “hypersonic and ballistic tracking space sensor (HBTSS),” designed to track hypersonic missiles. The subcommittee would limit SDA’s spending to only 50 percent of its 2021 request until Defense Secretary Mark Esper “provides certification that MDA is responsible for development of the HBTSS sensor payload.”

“The mark continues to mandate and support this space sensor layer that is capable of tracking both advanced ballistic and hypersonic missile threats, despite the Department of Defense’s astonishing lack of focus on this effort over the past four years,” Cooper said.

The subcommittee further mandates that Esper “evaluate the alignment” of MDA under R&E, and a report on “what steps would need to be taken to realign MDA” under Undersecretary for Acquisition and Sustainment Ellen Lord. This echoes language included in the 2020 NDAA. 

It also requires that DoD notify Congress of “any changes to requirements of the Next Generation Interceptor (NGI) program, and a report on addressing an interim solution for the Ground Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system while MDA develops and delivers NGI in the late 2020-timeframe.” That move is another shot at Griffin, with lawmakers still touchy over his surprise cancellation last year of NGI’s predecessor, the multi-billion Redesigned Kill Vehicle (RKV) program.

The subcommittee language also expresses bipartisan concern regarding “efforts to deliver a boost-phase capability, particularly in light of cutting all funding” for MDA’s directed energy programs. Further, members want an Intelligence Community review of the potential for DoD’s nascent effort to repurpose regional missile defense programs for homeland defense under a “layered architecture” might prove to be destabilizing to US allies.

Hypersonics

The subcommittee is particularly concerned with ensuring that DoD and military commanders are cognizant of the risks involved in using hypersonic weapons — which can fly at speeds beyond Mach 5, and thus require extremely reliable targeting information because there is little or no time to redirect them once they are fired. Thus, the subcommittee wants the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Mark Milley, and the DoD Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, a position now held by acting undersecretary James Anderson, to jointly undertake a sweeping study of “operational control, risks of escalation and miscalculation, and how targeting will be determined for strategic hypersonic conventional prompt strike weapons.”

The subcommittee further requires the Navy Secretary Kenneth Braithwaite “to initiate integration efforts for conventional prompt strike on surface-ship platforms to address miscalculation and ambiguity concerns and provides funding to do so,” the summary states.

National Security and Space

The markup puts a heavy emphasis on, as Cooper put it, “increasing the resilience and capability of our space assets.” This includes pressing DoD to ensure that receivers for the Global Positioning System satellites not just are M-Code capable, but also can integrated signals provided by other global navigation satellite systems — such as Europe’s Galileo and China’s Beidou.

As for M-Code receivers, the subcommittee stresses that DoD was charged in the 2020 NDAA to launch a prototype program and failed to do so; thus the move to restrict funding for “Increment 2” GPS user terminals to 80 percent of the budget until Esper certifies the Air Force has done so.

The draft also requires the Space Force “to procure commercial Space Domain Awareness (SDA) services, and fences funding until these commercial services are procured,” according to the summary. Specifically, it requires Air Force Secretary Barbara Barrett to sign off on at least two contracts for commercial providers to deliver surveillance data on objects in Low Earth Orbit (below 2,000 kilometers in altitude) and would limit 2021 spending for the high-priority Enterprise Space Battle Management Command and Control (ESBMC2) to 75 percent of its budget until Esper certifies that this has been done.

The markup registers continued congressional skepticism about the role of SDA, with a focus on its relationship not just to MDA but also to commercial providers.

“The committee is concerned that the SDA is not positioned to execute its mission in an effective manner and is neither equipped to focus on the many priorities it has set, nor has it adequately budgeted across  the Future Years Defense Program, with several programs left unfunded,” the text states, noting that the committee “expects” SDA Director Derek Tournear to provide more frequent updates.

“Furthermore, the committee is aware that the core mission of the SDA initially included plans to procure commercial space services, for example broadband communications capabilities, and is concerned that these plans were dropped, with its focus shifting instead to solely a payload and software development and procurement model,” it continues. Thus, Tournear and Gen. Jay Raymond, head of the Space Force, are required to submit a report by Dec. 1 “containing a detailed plan to procure commercial services, including funding requirements.”

Finally, the markup requires a report on Space Force’s plans for cislunar space capabilities, which Breaking D readers know is an area of increased interest.

Nuclear Deterrence/Non-proliferation

Besides hitting at Trump, the subcommittee would require “an unclassified, independent assessment of foreign nuclear weapons capabilities” by a federally funded research and development organization (FFRDC). Turner, who spearheaded that provision, stressed in his remarks that having open-source information on the seriousness of adversary threats was desperately needed to inform both congressional, and public, debate on the future of US nuclear forces.

“So many times, our debate is hindered because information we receive about our adversaries is in a classified manner,” he said.

The language on nuclear issues also requires DoD to report on “plans in the event of delays to nuclear modernization; and planning for the nuclear complex and enterprise.”