The Seawolf-class fast-attack submarine USS Connecticut (SSN-22) departs Puget Sound Naval Shipyard for sea trials following a maintenance availability. (U.S. Navy photo by Thiep Van Nguyen II/Released)
WASHINGTON: An American fast-attack submarine that hit an uncharted seamount in the Indo-Pacific last year could have prevented the incident if not for an “accumulation of unit-level errors and omissions in navigation planning; watch team execution; and risk management,” according to a newly released service investigation.
Following the grounding in October 2021, the service was forced to bring the Seawolf-class submarine Connecticut (SSN-22) state-side for repairs and quickly relieved the boat’s command triad.
Since then, the Navy had been tight-lipped on further details about the Connecticut’s grounding, pending the command investigation being completed. The documents published today lay heavy blame upon the boat’s leadership and junior officers for not maintaining Navy standards.
“No single action or inaction caused this mishap, but it was preventable,” according to the investigation. “A grounding at this speed and depth had the potential for more serious injuries, fatalities, and even loss of the ship…
“In addition to addressing the unit-level errors that caused the grounding, the investigation highlighted specific areas for improvement in the deployment training and certification process — and the Navy is urgently implementing these improvements across the submarine force. This investigation delineates 28 corrective actions, of which 14 actions are complete, 13 actions are in progress, and 1 action is enduring,” according to a Navy statement.
The investigating officer was Rear Adm. Christopher Cavanaugh, and the report is endorsed by 7th Fleet Commander Vice Adm. Karl Thomas.
The command investigation is heavily redacted and does not provide meaningful details on what damages the boat suffered or the cost of its repairs, except to say that it will be removed from operations for an extended period of time.
In addition to the boat’s leadership trio — the commanding officer, executive officer and senior enlisted — the report also lays blame on the boat’s navigators, the officer of the deck (OOD) and quartermasters of the watch.
In addition to the errors made during the October 2021 grounding, the Connecticut was apparently involved in a lesser-known incident, an allision, while pier-side in April 2021, a mistake from which the boat’s officers failed to learn, according to the investigation. (In nautical terms, an allision is when a moving object strikes a non-moving object, as opposed to a collision which is when two moving objects strike each other.)
The officers in charge of the boat “missed a significant opportunity for self-reflection and improvement following the errors and omissions by the navigation team, failure of the OOD to take decisive action upon recognizing the danger, and lack of CO involvement,” according to the report.
Shortly after the Navy published its command investigation, some lawmakers on Capitol Hill began sounding off about the findings.
“Importantly, the grounding of the USS Connecticut last year also reminded us of the incredibly narrow margins the Navy must contend with for its maintenance and repair work,” said Rep. Rob Wittman, R-Va. “Dry dock facilities for submarine repairs are not available west of Hawaii. The vessel’s final arrival in Washington State and the ensuing costs of fixing the sub only reiterate the risks of assuming the world will not get a vote in our future operations in the Indo-Pacific—we need the facilities and flexibility to prepare for the unexpected.”
