Royal Saudi Air Forces discuss Goodfellow intelligence training

Royal Saudi Air Forces Commodore Al Mutairi Sattam Thaib, Armed Forces Intel and Security Institute commander, speaks with U.S. Air Force Col. Matthew Reilman, 17th Training Wing commander, during a brief at Goodfellow Air Force Base, May 18, 2022. (U.S. Air Force Photo by Senior Airman Michael Bowman)

Though relations between Gulf nations and historical rival Iran appear to be slowly warming, Tehran is still seen the region’s greatest threat to stability in the eyes of some Gulf monarchies and their biggest backer, the US. While shoring up US support through a formal defense agreement could be an attractive option for the likes of Saudi Arabia or the United Arab Emirates, in the op-ed below, Bilal Saab of the DC-based Middle East Institute argues it might not be as simple as it seems.

Periodically through the years, officials from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have floated the idea of a formal treaty alliance with the United States in order to better defend themselves against Iranian aggression. It’s an idea that has never taken serious root in Washington, and it’s certainly unlikely to happen under the Biden administration — but should a new president take office in 2025 who is more friendly to those two Gulf powers, who knows what could happen. Nothing, after all, can be ruled out in politics.

But focusing on “if” ignores a key question: whether Saudi Arabia and/or the UAE would actually want to honor the terms of a defense pact with Washington. Gulf Arab states have focused almost exclusively on what they would get from a formal US defense umbrella, but it’s not at all clear that they have put much thought into what they would have to give Washington in return.

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Defense pacts come with serious, mutual obligations. At their core, the parties that enter into deals agree that they will come to the defense of each other in the event of an armed attack against either. That’s the key difference between an alliance and a partnership, where in the latter no such promises are made.

So if Iran inches closer to obtaining a nuclear weapon, or if it launches a more lethal attack against US interests in the region, leading to a US-Iran military confrontation, under the terms of any US-Gulf pact, the Gulf nation would be legally obligated to militarily support the United States.

Yet given the profound security vulnerabilities of the Gulf Arab states in any kind of conventional conflict scenario in the region, and given the latest Saudi and Emirati diplomatic rapprochement with Tehran, it’s doubtful that any Gulf Arab capital would elect to tangibly aid a US-led war effort against Iran. After all, even when at their most militant towards Iran, the Gulf powers always planned on the US taking on the fight on their behalf, not actively playing a major military role.

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It’s true that the United States is perfectly capable on its own of defending its interests in the event of an Iranian attack, but Washington would have every right to ask, and certainly would expect, its treaty allies to step up and contribute military resources to the fight (and the Gulf Arab states, especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE, have plenty of advanced weapons). A collective war effort could be not only more effective – if commanded and executed the right way – but also more efficient, thus helping US objectives and reducing US costs.

The responsibilities of any Gulf Arab nation that shares a defense pact with Washington wouldn’t be limited to warfighting contingencies. The Gulf side would also have to commit to effective, transparent, and consistent consultation and information-sharing with Washington on various security policies and issues that affect US interests. For example, expanding defense and security relations with China and/or Russia would cross an American red line and jeopardize the alliance.

But Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and others have made it very clear that they don’t want, and can’t afford, to choose between China and the United States. In an increasingly interconnected world and globalized economy, the Gulf Arab states’ national interests are best preserved by maintaining relations with all global powers.

In theory, the Gulf Arabs can separate economics (with China, India, and Brazil being the focus) and national security (with the United States being the priority) and try to compartmentalize relations with outside powers. But in reality the two areas are virtually inseparable. If Riyadh and/or Abu Dhabi further develop their economic and energy ties with Beijing, this cooperation will inevitably spill over into the security space. It’s only a matter of time before China demands a military footprint in the Gulf to secure its long-term energy interests, as an example. And a new agreement with the US would potentially include having to divest economic relationships currently in place that would bump against Washington-led sanctions.

None of these challenges and inherent contradictions in any potential US-Gulf defense pact is new or necessarily bad news. At the end of the day, a defense pact is a means to an end, not an end in itself. If the Gulf Arab states attain security and achieve other strategic objectives through effective diplomacy with Iran and more mature relations with China and other international powers, so be it. Washington should not fault them for, or try to dissuade them from, going in this direction.

But the Gulf Arab states should remember that a defense pact with the United States, if it ever were to be considered by US officials, will always come with serious, collective obligations. Be careful what you wish for.

Bilal Y. Saab is Senior Fellow and Director of the Defense and Security Program at the Middle East Institute (MEI) in Washington, DC.