As inflation rises, the Pentagon could be paying more in real dollars for the same weapons systems. (Graphic by Breaking Defense)
Does the US have enough production capacity to fight a true war? The recent conflict in Ukraine has raised doubts, and the recent budget deal can’t be allowed to slow progress down on increasing that capacity, writes Doug Birkey of the Mitchell Institute in this new op-ed.
The passage of the debt ceiling legislation and its defense spending caps portends major road bumps ahead for the US national security enterprise as it strives to meet the challenges posed by China and beyond. This is especially true for the defense aerospace sector. In the wake of the Cold War, the US accepted razor thin production margins that saw production capacity and capability draw dangerously low, while simultaneously deferring new development and terminating recapitalization. This set the course for the smallest and oldest aircraft inventory in Air Force history.
Building out of this crisis is no easy feat, but the threat demands it. The war in Ukraine stands as a stark warning that complex capabilities cannot be manifested in volume with the flip of a switch. It’s a reality that has led Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment Bill LaPlante to champion a new defense imperative, stating “We’ve got to focus on production.”
As LaPlante explained: “Over time, the industrial base has prioritized efficiency over resiliency … We’ve allowed production lines to go cold, watched as parts became obsolete.” He also noted low production rates saw “sub-tier suppliers consolidate or go out of business entirely.”
In other words, Department of Defense leadership tried to emulate commercial industry, forgetting that the “business” of war is far different. In an era defined by peer conflict, America must prioritize the ability to innovate and build at scale. Before the debt ceiling deal, there were reasons for cautious optimism given investment trends. However, amidst the new caps, turning this potential into reality demands navigating an especially prudent course. Three factors stand as imperatives: industrial diversity, production elasticity, and the ability to translate innovative concepts into operational capabilities.
Start with industrial diversity. Bottom line, the nation has very few military aircraft production lines. Three for fighters (F-35, F-15EX and the only-for-exports F-16; the F/A-18 line is now slated for retirement), one for a bomber (B-21), one for a tanker (KC-46A), one for tactical airlift (C-130), and none for heavy airlifters (since the 2015 closure of the C-17 line). The one bright spot is in the UAV sector, where multiple companies are developing new designs. This is a major opportunity where DoD can add resiliency and additive capacity to the defense industrial base.
The rise of the MQ-1 Predator and MQ-9 Reaper saw General Atomics emerge as the first new entrant that succeeded breaking into the ranks of the primes after years of consolidation. This has the potential to continue, with new firms like Kratos and Shield AI also showing tremendous promise. This does not mean the primes do not offer value—they are crucial actors in the ecosystem. However, diversity of thought, added production capacity, and the basics of competition will yield a far healthier, resilient design and production ecosystem. Decisions regarding collaborative combat aircraft (CCA) should seek to harness this new talent. It is a generational opportunity.
Then look at production elasticity, a term that is easy to understand in theory, but hard to execute in reality. It means investing in sufficient industrial base capacity like the physical plants, engineers and manufacturing workforce, and tooling needed to surge production rates on demand. The munitions industry is facing these very challenges as they struggle to meet wartime demand for Ukraine — and if leaders think boosting munitions production is hard, then they need to evaluate the realities tied to building combat aircraft.
Consider the F-35 joint strike fighter. The US Air Force alone was supposed to be buying 110 of these aircraft per year. Orders have never matched that production objective. Last year’s budget request came in at 33 F-35As, with Congress raising it to 44. This year, the requested number was 48. Lockheed Martin, with government acquiescence, took steps to level production at 156 airframes in response to these low buy rates. That was before Russia invaded Ukraine, which served to focus many governments around the world on defense modernization. With the international customer base increasing over the last 18 months, the question is whether this leveled production rate can fulfill international demand and still meet US requirements—not an easy challenge given how many Cold War era fighters are retiring around the world.
Similar questions need to be asked of the B-21. Current estimates suggest a build rate of less than ten per year. That number is far too low given that America’s success in any Pacific fight will depend on the long-range strike capability of the B-21 at scale. Bottom line: we need to grow aircraft production capacity to match warfighting demands. Programs of this kind of complexity suffer from instability. Maintaining consistent production rates is critical to allow for the effective sizing of the physical production space, the creation and training of a skilled workforce, managing the supplier base, and procuring long-lead supplies.
Finally, it is important to discuss manifesting innovation: transitioning technologies from the lab to the flightline. That demands resources sufficient to accept and scale new efforts as they transition from the research and development phases to production at scale.
Nowhere is this more apparent than in the field of military jet engines. Consider where things stood in the late 1970s. The US military was operating over a dozen jet engine types—ranging from the F-4’s J79 to the B-52’s J57. At the same time, industry was innovating the backbone of today’s military propulsion: the F100, F110, F404, and F414. Today, nearly all production is focused on mature engines. Even a “new” aircraft like the F-22 is flying with a jet engine that entered the design process in the 1980s. The F-35’s F135 is incredibly advanced—an amazing piece of technology—but the origins of the design predate the millennium. That is why programs like adaptive engine transition program (AETP) and next generation adaptive propulsion (NGAP) are so important. It is one thing to produce and improve mature engines on the margins, quite another to truly innovate from scratch.
The good news is that the US defense aerospace complex can be rejuvenated along the lines LaPlante advocates. That was the trajectory that was generally in play prior to the passage of the new debt limits. These objectives can still be met, but it will take careful tradeoffs within the DoD budget. Now more than ever, it means focusing resources on core elements of the defense enterprise that involve long lead times, exquisite talent, and a highly complex supplier base. All those factors are core to the aerospace sector.
Tradeoffs will need to be made to prioritize these investments. They should come from areas that are easier to rebuild in shorter periods of time. Certain categories of end strength that can be generated in rapid order are an obvious go-to. It should not be lost upon US defense leaders that China empowered its rapid technical ascent by downsizing its infantry. There is no getting around the need for this focused investment and consistent commitment. LaPlante knows this and that is why he explained: “Their complex production lines simply can’t be turned on or off based on the requirements of the day. Industry rightfully remains reluctant to build additional capacity at risk, until they have a clear, consistent demand signal or business case from the DoD.”
It is time to stop asking what this will cost and instead focus on the price of continued inaction. The risks we see playing out in Ukraine stand as a stern warning. We need to heed LaPlante’s warning to restore mass production capacity before it is too late. The realities of the debt ceiling will make a hard challenge even more difficult, but it can still be accomplished.
Douglas A Birkey is the executive director for the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies.
