White House pushes P-5 agreement on missile launch notification, prods China to talk

WASHINGTON — As bilateral talks sputter with Russia and especially China on strategic security threats from nuclear weapons to space, the Biden administration is turning to multilateral forums as pathways to reducing conflict risks — including seeking a missile launch notification agreement among the five nuclear-armed permanent members of the UN Security Council, White House National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan said today.

“The P-5 provides an opportunity to manage nuclear risk and arms race pressures through a mix of dialogue, transparency, and agreements. For example, formalizing a missile launch notification regime across the P-5 is a straightforward measure. That is simply common sense,” he told the Arms Control Association.

“It’s a small step that will help reduce the risk of misperception and miscalculation in times of crisis, and one that could potentially build more momentum towards further measures to manage nuclear risks and an arms race — from maintaining a human in the loop for command control and deployment of nuclear weapons, to establishing crisis communications channels among the P-5 capitals, to committing to transparency on nuclear policy doctrine and budgeting, to setting up guardrails for managing the interplay between non-nuclear strategic capabilities and nuclear deterrence.”

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The P-5 consists of the United States, Russia, China, France and the United Kingdom. Sullivan explained that among them, there already are a web of bilateral and trilateral agreements on launch notification. Those include the 1988 Ballistic Missile Launch Notification Agreement between the US and Russia, and a similar accord between Russia and China. But no single agreement stretches to all five, complicating information-sharing.

Sullivan’s remarks come in the wake of a State Department announcement Thursday that Washington has taken additional “countermeasures” in response to Russia’s continued violation of the 2010 New START Treaty that caps both sides nuclear arsenals — part of Moscow’s hardline attitude since its invasion of Ukraine last February.

The US said it acted after Russia failed “to fulfill its obligation to provide its biannual data update on March 30,” according to a State Department fact sheet. The US countermeasures include — somewhat counter to Sullivan’s entreaty — withholding its own bilateral exchange data, treaty-required notifications on things like the status of missile launchers, and telemetry about intercontinental and submarine launched ballistic missiles. In addition, the White House is blocking Russian inspection activities, including revoking visas for inspectors.

However, Sullivan stressed that the New START Treaty remains important to US interests, and that both sides continue to see the value in abiding by its basic provisions that limit their nuclear arsenals. He further rejected calls, including from Sen. Tom Cotton, R-Ark., to withdraw from treaty as harmful to US security interests.

“It is in neither of our country’s interest to embark on an open-ended competition in strategic nuclear forces, and we are prepared to stick to the central limits as long as Russia does,” Sullivan said.

Sullivan further invoked P-5 discussions, as well as wider multilateral approaches, as a potential way to bring a recalcitrant China to the table not just for nuclear arms control talks as Beijing continues to increase its ICBM arsenal, but across a wide range of security issues — from the PLA’s activities in the South China Sea to the recent spy balloon incursion to Beijing’s expansion of its military space presence.

For example, US Indo-Pacific Command on May 30 accused the Chinese military of an “unnecessarily aggressive” intercept of a US Air Force RC-135 Rivet Joint reconnaissance aircraft legally flying over the South China Sea on May 26. “The PRC pilot flew directly in front of the nose of the RC-135, forcing the U.S. aircraft to fly through its wake turbulence,” the INDOPACOM statement said.

Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin Thursday expressed serious concern and frustration about the unwillingness of the People’s Liberation Army to engage in military-to-military communications to address each other’s concerns and reduce risks, including a refusal to talk at the Shangri-La Dialogue this week.

“You’ve heard me talk a number of times about the importance of countries with large, with significant capabilities being able to talk to each other so you can manage crises and prevent things from spiraling out of control unnecessarily,” he said at a joint news conference in Tokyo with Japanese Defense Minister Yasukazu Hamada. “And as we take a look at some of the things that China is doing in the international airspace in the region, and the international waterways — you know, the provocative intercepts of our aircraft and also our allies’ aircraft — that’s very concerning, and we would hope that they would alter their actions. But since they haven’t yet, I’m concerned about, at some point, having an incident that could very, very quickly spiral out of control.”

(Austin did approach and shake the hand of his Chinese counterpart at Shangri-La, though the US Defense Department said it was not a “substantive exchange.”)

Sullivan acknowledged that as a sovereign nation, China has to decide for itself whether it is in its interests “to engage in responsible military-military dialogue … necessary to manage competition responsibly and reduce the risks [of conflict].”

The US, for its part, is doing what is “right and responsible and rooted in our national interest — that is, to say we’re available for that kind of dialogue. We’re available for building those military-to military-mechanisms. …  and we’re available for strategic discussions on everything from space to spy and cyberspace to nukes,” he explained.

Washington is neither going to “demand” more transparency from China nor “get down and beg for them to come talk to us,” Sullivan added.

“We just say: We’re ready to talk when you’re ready to talk. And frankly, the rest of the world should look at this question, and say, ‘What does it mean to be responsible, significant power in the world? Doesn’t it mean actually being prepared to engage in military communications, particularly where our militaries are operating in close proximity and where the strategic issues have deep and fundamental stakes for the entire world?’ I think most countries would answer that, yes.”