In recent weeks, several editorials and online comments have been traded regarding whether the Army should have its own space forces or whether all space forces should reside within the US Space Force. Emotions run high when military services fight over roles and missions, but it’s important to remember that these fights are part of a longstanding clash between services over capabilities.
The good news is that there is a historical solution we can draw from in order to resolve the question which service should control what spacepower functions and capabilities: A new Key West agreement.
In the late 1940s, then-Secretary of Defense James Forrestal directed that the Joint Chiefs meet in Key West, Florida, to work out the issues between the Navy, Army, and Air Force, or else, as he warned, “I shall have to make my own decisions.” This conference was necessary because the National Security Act of 1947, which had recently become law, created a separate Air Force pulled from the Army — but did not fully sort out whether the Navy’s air arm should be moved over as well.
The Key West conference decided on keeping a naval air arm for fleet-related matters and maritime campaigns, and that the Air Force would lead most every other major airpower function, such as airlift and strategic bombardment. This arrangement, as imperfect as some may find it, has remained for the last seven decades.
When the Space Force was established in 2019, circumstances were somewhat different than 1947. The guidance in law was very broad, the direction from the White House was not much clearer, and the budget and personnel numbers were and still are largely insufficient to organize, train and equip a Space Force as it was conceptualized by the president and a bipartisan group of members of Congress.
Due in part to the compromise position that placed the new service within the Department of the Air Force, rather than in its own separate department, many of those in the Army and Navy who were open to transferring personnel and space systems to the new service changed that stance to one of opposition and protectionism. They perceived that additional funding for the Air Force and its increased influence in the Joint Chiefs meetings and in requirements forums was an existential threat.
Thus, the Army, as one example, began to push for more resources and personnel while transitioning some capabilities to the new service. Now, the Army sees the need to do more with space to ensure it has the spaceborne effects needed for supporting land warfare. On the other hand, the Space Force’s strongest supporters argue that the Army should not be allowed to have any space forces of their own.
To resolve this argument requires a Key West-type conference. And to ensure focus for the discussion, several foundational actions must be accomplished:
First, identify the problems to be solved. Are they doctrinal, legal, policy, or technical? Should the Space Force be responsible for all in-space and from-space warfighting functions such as anti-satellite warfighting, while the Army or other terrestrial services control ground-based counterspace systems? These questions can be subjective to the services and even in sub-groups within the services.
Second, what are the core space capabilities or space-derived effects that the Army, Navy, and Air Force believe are absolutely vital for them to control? The Space Force and its combatant command cousin US Space Command were created to address the threats in the space area of responsibility. As each service wants to have control over everything that touches their operating domain (air, land, sea), would a mixed approach be better than an “all in one basket” approach? Consensus on this question has critical implications for the organizing, training, and equipping functions as well as requirements for the combatant command itself.
Third, what is the political landscape surrounding these topics, especially given that a new administration is coming in. One administration might believe that supporting the other military services should be the sole purpose of the Space Force, while others might believe that achieving space superiority is as vital to the nation as are air superiority and sea control. Knowing the views of the political masters is vital to the service chiefs knowing their boundaries in policy as they address this issue.
Once these questions have been answered, preferably by policy guidance and direction from the White House (and preferably in partnership with Congress), then an agenda can be set to maximize the chances of an organizational construct for space that all of the military services can support.
This issue needs to be resolved soon, and it needs to be hashed out at the highest level of military leadership so that the questions are sorted once and for all. Adversaries are deploying weapon systems that target our critical space infrastructure. We cannot afford to be duplicative or otherwise distracted by inter-service squabbling. We instead must be unified to deter attack in space and to protect our vital critical space infrastructure.
Christopher Stone is senior fellow for space deterrence at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies in Washington DC. He is the former Special Assistant to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy (2018-2019). The thoughts and opinions are those of the author and do not reflect the positions of the Department of Defense.
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