Air-and-missile-defense (AMD) systems have performed well in recent conflicts, defending against waves of cruise missiles and drone swarms with a high success rate. But interceptors are being burned through at an alarming rate, and that along with the loss of THAAD/TPY-2 radars have forced the US to scramble to ensure assets in the Middle East are protected.
Refilling current stockpiles is a challenge, and preparing for future needs is an even bigger challenge. Meeting both current and future needs means being able to quickly adapt to changing tactics by adversaries, said Rob Mitrevski, president, Golden Dome strategy and integration, L3Harris.
“As we’ve seen, Iran had a real capability in deploying and launching a multitude of well-stocked multi-domain threats, ranging from several classes of missiles through several classes of UAVs,” said Mitrevski. “We saw a significant number of them deployed concurrently and set to hit their targets within short time frames. The Iranian threat was unique in that it challenged the defender to defeat low-cost threats with low-cost defensive means, and defeat high-cost, more capable threats with more capable effectors.”
When it comes to establishing a roadmap for AMD going forward, there are three primary concerns: cost, effectiveness and industrial base capacity. Managing all three of those concerns will require a concentrated effort from both the Pentagon and industry to ensure AMD is up to the task.
Cost Vs. Value
AMD is, to put it simply, expensive. Radars, launchers and interceptors are all costly and time-consuming to produce, and those systems are often shooting down threats that are much cheaper, especially given the proliferation of low-cost drones that are launched in swarms.
But the sticker price isn’t the only thing that matters. What is being defended plays into the cost consideration, as well, said Tom Karako, director of the Missile Defense Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).
“The value is what you defend,” Karako said. “The cost police are nevertheless correct, as well, and you can’t just hand wave away the cost problem by saying the defended asset is more expensive. Well, that’s true, but what cost do we put on defending the homeland? Does that mean we can spend a trillion dollars a year on missile defense of the homeland because, hey, the homeland is worth many trillions. No, you still have the affordability question.
“Then it comes down to can you afford to be a global superpower and can you afford to project power to the other side of the globe? The costs of the interceptors are meaningful. They are just one of many factors and they are one of many costs.”
The rise of unmanned aerial system (UAS) swarms – mostly Iran’s Shahed, which has a cost per drone measured in the tens of thousands – is quickly changing the calculations around the cost of interception. Combating drone swarms with traditional interceptors may be effective, but the cost imbalance matters. Karako pointed out that there are counter-drone systems that are less expensive and still effective, but the demand signal must change to make them a priority in order to implement them effectively.
“The thing that’s not appreciated is everybody keeps repeating the same tired cliche and headline about you shouldn’t kill a $40,000 drone with a $4,000,000 missile,” he said. “Well, then start buying more of the kind of UAS things that are already available, already fielded and already operational. Just go and turn up the volume dial on that. The drone dominant stuff talks about counter-UAS. Well, then, let’s go. Show me the money and start buying stuff.”
AMD Systems Are Effective, But Must Adapt
Overall, AMD systems have performed admirably in the Iran conflict. But the varied threats that Iran has launched have shown that traditional thinking about AMD – see target, hit target – must quickly adapt to respond to low-flying, highly maneuverable drone swarms, high-speed threats such as hypersonics and ballistic missiles that follow a fixed trajectory that can be predicted.
“Iran’s retaliatory actions have certainly given us real-world confirmation of what we knew about their capabilities,” said Mitrevski. “Regardless of the outcome of this specific conflict, the multi-domain, concurrent attack capability on a diverse set of targets with significant numbers of weapons is the type of scenario we’re going to have to get used to thinking about in the way we protect ourselves.”
The US has proven its AMD capabilities for decades, with one of the prime examples dating back to the first Persian Gulf War when the Patriot system was shooting down Scuds. But threats are changing rapidly, and now AMD systems must be able to combat multiple threats at the same time. To do that, both the Pentagon and industry need to ramp up their efforts to build and deploy the necessary systems to meet these threats.
“It’s not as if we haven’t seen this problem coming,” said Karako. “One of my complaints is that nobody seems to be aware in the popular circles of any air defense below a Patriot. But there’s these whole categories of things called short-range air defense, counter-UAS and all this stuff that has been reinvigorated since about 2017. But the actual funding has been a little anemic in recent years. Now you’re seeing people hit the panic button.”
Industrial Base Capacity
Inconsistent demand signals for AMD systems and components has led to less production over time. Components such as solid-rocket motors for interceptors require a complex manufacturing process. And building a THAAD/TPY-2 radar is an extended, multi-billion-dollar task. All of these factors combined have helped lead to dwindling stockpiles and a need for a rapid increase in industrial base capacity and production to help meet needs. Given not only the need to replenish munitions expended in Iran, but also the administration’s defense spending priorities, the necessary demand signals are in place to spur production and investment from the industrial base.
“When you read not only the NDS but all the executive orders, the reconciliation budget, acquisition reform initiatives and other policy pieces together, there are plenty of demand signals – including the Department of War’s priorities to defend the homeland with next-generation air and missile defense and supercharge the defense industrial base,” said Mitrevski.
Industry and the Pentagon are on the same page about what is needed for AMD, which is critical to ensuring consistency in demand signals that will allow the industrial base to increase production. Developing technologies that can not only meet needs but be produced at scale will be key, as the Iran conflict has shown that the future of AMD may well be defending against swarms of attackers that threaten to overwhelm systems.
Ultimately, both the problem and the solution are known. Now, the industrial base and the Pentagon need to invest in the necessary resources to quickly refill stockpiles and prepare for future threats.
“We needed to do a munitions ramp before we vaporized a couple trillion dollars of interceptors,” said Karako. “Now we need it even worse.”