McCain Launches Goldwater-Nichols Review; How Far Will He Go?

By on March 26, 2015 at 2:37 PM
Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz., chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee

Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz., chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee

UPDATED: With Thornberry Comment Supporting Reform

WASHINGTON: Sen. John McCain plans a long-term review of the law underpinning the modern American military, the Goldwater-Nichols legislation that created the current chain of command from president to defense secretary to combatant commanders.

“The Committee will be conducting a preliminary examination of the structure, roles, and missions of civilian and military organizations within the (Defense) Department. That will set the stage for a broader review of these issues starting after this year’s NDAA (National Defense Authorization Act) and extending into next year, many of which are tied directly to Goldwater-Nichols Act,” a congressional staff member wrote in an email after McCain spoke this morning at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

The staffer responded to an email I sent after McCain hinted at the review during his speech.

Here’s what the chairman said at CSIS:

“At the same time, three decades later, there are real questions about how Goldwater-Nichols has been implemented and what unintended consequences may have resulted. For example:

  • “Are the roles and missions of the Joint Staff, Combatant Commands, Joint Task Forces, and other headquarters elements properly aligned to conduct strategic planning, equip our warfighters, and maximize combat power?
  • “Does the vast enterprise that has become the Office of the Secretary of Defense further our ability to meet present and future military challenges?
  • “Does the constant churn of uniformed officers through joint assignments make them more effective military leaders, or has this exercise become more of a self-justification for a large officer corps?
  • “Is the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act of 1980 still appropriate for the joint force of 2015 and beyond, or is it time to review this law?

“I could go on. I want the Senate Armed Services Committee to conduct real oversight of questions like these during the next two years. It is long overdue, and I think the 30th anniversary of Goldwater-Nichols is a fitting time to start.”

During the latter half of the 1990s a regular topic of debate was how to reform Goldwater-Nichols, especially to increase the efficiency and efficacy of joint forces. For a while, there was serious discussion about creating truly joint forces that eventually resulted in the doomed Joint Forces Command.

Rep. Mac Thornberry HASC chairRep. Mac Thornberry, now chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, played a key role in that debate and kept his commitment to Joint Forces Command, taking an active role in its Transformation Advisory Group until the command was scrapped by former Defense Secretary Robert Gates.

UPDATE “Chairman Thornberry agrees that it is a healthy thing to take a look at the Goldwater-Nichols reforms 30 years after their implementation,” Claude Chafin, spokesman for the House Armed Services Committee said in an email. “At the HASC much of that effort will be rolled into the larger DoD reform efforts he spoke of earlier this week.”

Note McCain’s first focus is “roles and missions of the Joint Staff, Combatant Commands, Joint Task Forces” etc.

The Goldwater-Nichols review will be conducted in a manner akin to the one on acquisition launched by Thornberry: slow first steps, followed by bolder moves.

Given the extraordinary range of threats faced by the United States and the increasing need for integration of acquisition, command and training, everyone who cares about defense will be watching this closely. The Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the four services will be watching especially closely, since it is their authorities and organizations that are most likely to be rejiggered, shifted or stripped.

If you’re out of date on your reading about Goldwater-Nichols and jointness, click here for a useful reading list compiled by the Army War College.

 

 

Comments

  • ycplum

    Personally, I find almost all “reviews”, hearings or studies where elected officials are the ones conducting the study to be a waste of time and money.

    Edit: I should say that such a review may be worth doing, but not by Congress.

    • http://www.breakingdefense.com/ Colin Clark

      This is being done with a view to changing the laws. No one can do that but Congress.

      • ycplum

        Definitely, only Congress can change the law, but that doesn’t mean non-legislators can’t assess the current law and suggest changes.
        I frankly have little confidence of our elected officials knowledge of the laws and their implications. Too often, their main qualification for the job is their ability to raise money and party loyalty.

        • http://www.breakingdefense.com/ Colin Clark

          That’s why you’ve got professional staff and think tanks et al. But the fact McCain identifies this as a crucial focus of his tenure means he’s serious. We’ll have to see what kind of opposition this generates and how hard McCain and Thornberry are willing to push.

          • shipfixr

            Could it be that McCain is concerned about HIS ‘legacy’?

          • http://www.breakingdefense.com/ Colin Clark

            This is it for the old warrior. If he doesn’t use his SASC chairmanship to do something big to shape the long-term structure of the US military, he will be principally remembered for his amazing conduct while a POW in Vietnam and as a failed presidential candidate. As with Barry Goldwater, I think Sen. McCain wishes to make his mark on the military as a lawmaker. Everyone who pays attention to defense knows Goldwater-Nichols. They would also remember McCain-Thornberry — if it happens.

          • ycplum

            As I said earlier, I think the review is a good idea. However, I would rather the Congress commissions a study (say with a think tank) rather than do it themselves. It avoids the introduction of partisan politics.

    • Lazarus

      Goldwater Nichols was one such review, and ended up making great changes. It’s fairly easy for Congress to do these, as no member’s defense $$$/jobs are usually at stake in an organizational review.

      • ycplum

        True, but I would argue that Congress played much nicer then than today.

  • Lazarus

    It’s about time the legislation was reviewed. It has remained largely unaltered since 1986. Few pre-1991 end of the Cold War system can make a similar claim. The 2010 bibliography is out of date as it does not include my 2012 thesis.

    https://etd.ohiolink.edu/ap/10?0::NO:10:P10_ETD_SUBID:62024

    • http://www.breakingdefense.com/ Colin Clark

      Thank you for correcting that deficiency… :–)

      • Lazarus

        Thanks. actually, I am not aware of a more up to date bibliography. Jim Locher stopped doing victory laps on Goldwater Nichols after he published “Victory on the Potomac”.

        I look forward to see what direction Senator McCain intends to take in potential reforms. I am of the opinion that Congress essentially “voted itself off the island” of defense influence when Goldwater Nichols gave so much control over defense issues to SECDEF and made the CJCS a de-facto member of the Presidential adminsitration (just as Maxwell Taylor first suggested in the late 1950’s). It could be argued that since Colin Powell, no CJCS has fully used all the levels of power afforded the office’s incumbent. It would be better to return the CJCS to a position of “first among equals” and thus have 8 senior officers as the “Chiefs” as a more independent defense power center.

      • Robert Kozloski

        Hi Colin,

        Please check out my 2012 NWC article on this topic.

        https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/05f44720-70ce-4e7d-be2b-6cc189fc719f/Building-the-Purple-Ford–An-Affordable-Approach-t.aspx

        The Navy has been resisting unification since 1947 and it is good to see Senator McCain staying the course!

  • Robert Warner

    Adults in Congress are finally in the room. Hopefully, they will not be distracted by the rest of the class.

  • originalone

    Got to hand it to the old guy, he certainly has the background-family-experience. That said, between him-McCain-& Thornberry, perhaps if they don’t get bogged down in the minutia and other time consuming B.S. that bedevils these sorts of adventures in spirit, something just might be achieved! Of course, that’s going to depend on just who the inmates are that do the heavy lifting? Considering the time lag these things engage in, along with the meddling of those who have no business adding their two cents worth into the mix, let’s hope this isn’t just another example of “bloviate”, that the Congress are so expert at doing.

    • shipfixr

      Well said.

  • az

    There should be a review.

    One key area is Combatant Commands. Lessons learn from WWI and relearned in WWII is the need for a CINC. A CINC commands everything in his AOR, regardless of services, stovepipes or “special agencies”. Doing so allows for the synchronization of all resources towards a given objective. Combatant commanders only command what they have been given. Result? 35 multi-billion service contracts within 10 miles of each other doing the same thing; Air Force out going their own thing while infantry goes without support; one command refusing to give
    up badly needed equipment to another command even though they are madly excess (Their answer “We don’t work for Petraeus); Super HET truck companies sitting idle because –we don’t work for the TSC; PEOs running around peddling things no one wants;mission command vs. command – Who is in charge?

    We have more flag officers today than in WWII but today’s armed forces isn’t even close to the 12 million troops we had in that war. Hell, today’s Navy has a flag officer for very ship they own now.

    Thank God we’re not fighting a professional modern army.

  • vincedc

    No problem with a review. Big problem with Congress conducting it. Looks like McCain does not like purple.

  • H. H. GAFFNEY

    It is said above: “Are the roles and missions of the Joint Staff, Combatant Commands, Joint Task Forces, and other headquarters elements properly aligned to conduct strategic planning, equip our warfighters, and maximize combat power?” Bear in mind that the Joint Staff and Combatant Commands do not do “dollars.” They have no idea what a “dollar” is. But the Services do–they have to fit their forces to the top-line guidance on the budget that the Administration issues each year. Then they buy the equipment, personnel, training, facilities, etc. — all of which add up to “readiness” — that the Combatant Commands draw upon for whatever operations the Administration directs them to conduct. Goldwater-Nichols has nothing to do with that main function of the U.S. Department of Defense. I was in OSD when Goldwater-Nichols was passed. The only real change we saw was that the excellent officers from the Services that we civilians in OSD relied upon so heavily would not be punished by their Services for having worked with us or otherwise outside their Services.

    • deemery

      In my observation, both JCS and Combatant Commands certainly do know what a “dollar” is. JCS J8 spends (pun intended) a lot of time worrying about this, and Combatant Commands (at least CENTCOM) get a lot of $ to do things they think the Title X Services can not or will not provide. The problem is that the Combatant Command money is disjoint from the requirements process, and the Title X money.

      A couple interesting topics for this review: Should there be a single joint agency for each of the following? (I take no position, pro or con)
      * Medical/Health
      * Personnel
      * Requirements
      * Contracting
      * Procurement including system development
      * More integration for Logistics possibly leading to removing Logistics from the Title X responsibilities.

    • Lazarus

      That drain of people from service to joint jobs destroyed the carefully crafted strategy cohorts of the services like OP-603. While those folks continued to do strategy work in other places, the demise of service-based strategic training and grooming ensured that we did’t make any more OP-603 all-stars to develop strategy. GWN also made strategy a decentralized art through regionally distributive COCOM’s. That worked reasonably well in the absence of a significant national enemy from 1991-2008/2009, but with the return of Russia, the rise of China and the emergence of strong regional opponents like Iran, the services, or at least the JCS should return to the forefront in strategic doctrine and planning.

  • https://disqus.com/ Mixa

    Crazy starik.Voyna in Vietnam he was not benefited.

  • Ana K

    A review is needed. Combatant Commands are full of “I need”/”I want” and as mentioned in the comments below – they don’t deal with dollars. The Services do. There must be a better structure out there that doesn’t immediately create so much friction between the organizations. Also, there should be some attention to some of those functions all the Services do but with so much duplication like medical and communications. There are efforts already underway to address these areas but something like a new Goldwater-Nichols could give them more traction.

  • Phil Anthony

    How about a look into the increasing outsourcing of military duties (including combat duties) to civilian companies? Or no-bid contracts that deliver substandard goods? Not enough people in the military to support our war-related efforts? Implement a draft or national service requirement. See how many wars get started once everybody has to sacrifice.

    • Gary Church

      Draft is a bad idea. If not for any other reason than the fact that women will probably be included and that means I would soon be arrested on the white house lawn protesting it.
      I would rather get raped in prison than my daughter raped in the Army.

      • disqus_kTAvA46Bu8

        And that is exactly why we need a draft of all young men (woman should never be drafted or in war) so that a big spotlight can shine down of the tens of Millions of people like yourself who can oppose these absurd military decisions on far away wars. (not my son).
        The volunteer army of mostly lower middle class to poor, trying to find a better life… we all turn away when they start to show up in body bags. This would be the only way to break up the profiteers of the Industrial Military Complex when the Citizens in the masses show up on the White House Lawn.