Over-Classification in Space Programs Presents Too Great a Risk

In mid-August, Breaking Defense revealed a push inside the Pentagon to take a black anti-satellite system, declassify it and make a public demonstration of its capabilities. Surrounding that issue is a long-running debate about how much of its space capabilities the US should keep secret. In this op-ed, Christopher Stone of the Mitchell Institute argues it is time to take a serious look at declassifying capabilities. 

Over-classification of US space systems and capabilities is undermining the ability of the Department of Defense to articulate what it will take to deter hostile action, and if necessary, exercise warfighting options in space. If you cannot explain the tools you need to get the job done, chances are you will not get them. That risks mission failure when a crisis occurs.

It’s time for the Biden administration and Congress to institute results-oriented reforms, including a thorough review of all existing space systems to decide what to keep hidden and what to bring in from the shadows.

Over-classification is not a new concern. Leading space professionals like Gen. John Hyten have frequently spoken about the issue; In 2020, Hyten remarked, “In many cases in the department, we’re just so over classified it’s ridiculous, just unbelievably ridiculous.” Chief of Space Operations Gen. John Raymond also agrees, stating that “if you have everything classified, that really limits your ability to deter conflict.” It’s time to listen to these leaders and work the problem.

At the strategic level, over-classification can create difficulties in developing national strategies and policies governing USSF operations and requirements. For example, when developing a space strategy or a joint campaign plan, some of the key space capabilities can be classified and compartmentalized to the point that many of the key planners and leaders involved in deciding the courses of action are not allowed to have all the information needed to ensure well-coordinated execution.

These challenges also extend to the budget process. As former acting Air Force secretary Matt Donovan explained in a recent Mitchell Institute podcast, “I’ve been in meetings in the Pentagon when competing for funding, where you can’t talk about the capabilities or programs for which you are arguing to get funded because of their stove-piped and compartmentalized nature. As you can imagine, in a room full of decisionmakers deciding budget priorities, you’re not going to be very effective in winning arguments by just saying ‘trust me, this is important.’”

And it’s not just about internal government process. How can we effectively deter China, Russia, and other hostile actors when we do not publicly let them know what we have? Credible deterrence requires three main components: capabilities, political will to use those systems, and the ability to communicate that empowered resolve to adversaries.

In the space arena, this set of deterrence pillars is too muddled. We may have the right tools. We may have sufficient resolve. But clear articulation of those facets is opaque thanks to decades old rules designed to address a different era’s challenges. This is a dangerous position for the US, as it invites adversary adventurism by not clearly defining penalties for crossing certain lines.

It is time for the space community to take a page from how the DoD manages sensitive capabilities in other domains. Consider the B-21 bomber as an example. It is highly classified, but we acknowledge its existence, have discussed broad capability goals, and people generally understand its mission. That’s enough to send the necessary signals to China or Russia. We can do the same for space systems.

To remedy this issue, the Biden administration and Congress must engage with the USSF to develop a disciplined, thorough process to decide what to reveal and what to conceal. This activity must include all stakeholders of the inter-agency, including both the National Security Council and National Space Council, as it goes to the heart of our national security strategy to deter conflict from happening in space. Then, when new technologies lead to future offensive and defensive space systems, the US can decide how best to deploy and articulate the missions the USSF could execute in potential space warfighting operations.

This has been a topic discussed for years. The time for action is now.

Christopher Stone is Senior Fellow for Space Studies at the Spacepower Advantage Research Center at the Mitchell Institute of Aerospace Studies. He is the former Special Assistant to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy in the Pentagon.