New Pentagon report censors details on weapons programs’ performance, flaws

WASHINGTON: The Pentagon’s independent weapons tester has eliminated data about the performance of more than 20 weapon programs from the public version of its 2021 report, including major acquisition efforts like the Marine Corps’ CH-53K King Stallion and the Navy’s Ford-class carrier.

On Thursday, the Pentagon’s director of operational test and evaluation published the public version of its annual report, and for the first time ever, a version with “controlled unclassified information” was also made available to Defense Department personnel and Congress — out of sight of taxpayers who foot the bill for the multi-million dollar programs.

In December, Raymond O’Toole, then the acting head of the DOT&E office, explained the decision to release a controlled version of the report, saying that some of the unclassified information “shouldn’t wind up in our adversaries’ hands.” He said the services would ultimately determine what information is considered CUI for each weapons system.

But for the experts at think tanks and journalists who rely on DOT&E’s report for an independent assessment of whether a program is meeting requirements, the 2021 report is missing much of the detail provided in previous years — especially regarding specific technical flaws that could hamper a weapon’s ability to perform in combat.

Dan Grazier, a fellow at the Project on Government Oversight, raised alarms over the current state of the report, saying that the decision to conceal unclassified details in a CUI version has grave implications to the future of independent operational testing.

“It is concerning to see the leaders of DOT&E bending to pressure from the services on their anti-transparency push,” Grazier wrote in a statement to Breaking Defense.

“Congress established DOT&E in 1983 over the furious objections of service and defense industry leaders because members knew they weren’t getting the truth about the performance of new weapons,” he said. “The law clearly states that there should be two versions of the annual testing report, a classified version and an unclassified version. By caving to pressure inside the Pentagon and hiding unclassified information behind a pseudo classification, the current leaders of DOT&E are undermining the effectiveness of their own agency.”

Overall, the DOT&E report notes that information has been redacted from the public version for a total of 22 programs.

For example, the report strips out all information regarding the performance of the CH-53K King Stallion, one of the Marine Corps’ biggest and most troubled programs.

The Marine Corps stood up its first CH-53K squadron this week, but the helicopter — made by Lockheed Martin-Sikorsky — has suffered delays and cost increases as a result of having to fix more than 100 technical flaws. Some of those issues, such as problems with the main gearbox, tail rotor and main rotor, were examined in detail in previous DOT&E reports.

The latest public version of the report makes no such effort, including only a description of the CH-53K and a rundown of testing events.  An interim assessment of the King Stallion’s effectiveness, suitability and survivability — which would contain information whether the helicopter is functioning in an operational environment as expected and whether any technical flaws were discovered — is only available in the CUI version.

That assessment makes “preliminary observations on CH‑53K handling qualities in adverse flying conditions, load capacity, maintainability and reliability status as compared to the CH-53E as well the status of the CH‑53K survivability key performance parameters,” the DOT&E report states.

The section on the Ford-class carrier, which is one of the Pentagon’s most expensive and technologically ambitious programs at $13 billion, contains some details about performance flaws of certain systems, such as the ship’s arresting gear and launch system.

However, all information about the effectiveness of the ship’s combat system have been pushed to the CUI edition, which “details the capability of the combat system to detect, track, engage, and defeat the types of threats for which the system was designed.”

Details about the performance of the CMV-22B tiltrotor aircraft — which the Navy is buying to replace its C-2 Greyhound planes used to transport people and cargo onboard aircraft carriers — have also been left on the cutting room floor, and none of the agency’s recommendations are public.

According to the DOT&E report, the CUI report evaluates the ability of the Bell-Boeing aircraft to “execute carrier onboard delivery, medical evacuation, Naval Special Warfare support, and search and rescue missions,” as well as providing details on over-the-horizon communications and suitability requirements.

And although DOT&E notes that not enough data has been gathered to provide a survivability assessment of the CMV-22B in a contested environment, some preliminary details about the aircraft’s vulnerability to kinetic threats are available in the controlled version.

The report also excises information related to the performance of Army and Air Force weapon systems. For some programs, what was once a robust accounting of vulnerabilities has been turned into a laundry list of test events.

For instance, DOT&E includes no information about the performance of ongoing modifications to the Army’s Stryker family of vehicles, with the assessment of Stryker effectiveness only available in the CUI report.

All details about the “operational effectiveness, suitability and survivability” of the Army’s Electronic Warfare Planning and Management Tool are also relegated to the CUI version of the report. The EWPMT is used by commanders and electronic warfare officers to manage, coordinate and deconflict EW effects. The Army conducted initial operation, test and evaluation of the Raytheon-made system in 2021.

While sections of the report on the Air Force’s KC-46A tanker, MH-139 Grey Wolf helicopter and HH-60W Jolly Green II helicopter contain some details about technical issues, certain information is now only available in the CUI version.

The report notes that the KC-46 “needs to overcome several challenges to meet some of its survivability requirements,” additional details are not publicly available and DOT&E’s recommendation is controlled.

The section on MH-139 notes concerns about the cabin layout and that flight manual restrictions could adversely impact “takeoffs in crosswinds, near obstacles, in degraded visual environments, and austere landings.” But other challenges pertaining to the aircraft’s suitability and survivability are only available in the CUI version.

For the HH-60W, DOT&E notes that “the program will need to mitigate deficiencies in the countermeasures dispenser set and supply operationally representative software and mission data load for the radar warning receiver to enable an adequate HH-60W survivability assessment in a contested environment,” but further details are controlled.

Other Omissions

Here are other programs where the public report notes that information has been moved to the CUI version:

• Navy’s MQ-8C Fire Scout drone: details about delays to LCS shipboard testing are only available in the CUI version
• Navy’s Advanced Anti‑Radiation Guided Missile – Extended Range: All performance details contained in CUI version
• Navy’s Next Generation Jammer: CUI report contains information on challenges to operational suitability
• Navy’s Unmanned Influence Sweep System: Some DOT&E recommendations are controlled
• Marine Corps’ VH-92A: CUI report includes details on operational effectiveness, as well as a comparison of the helicopters capability to legacy platforms
• Air Force’s Massive Ordinance Penetrator: Preliminary analysis of the weapon’s effectiveness and suitability is pushed to CUI version
• Air Force’s F-22 upgrades: Suitability challenges detailed in CUI version
• Air Force’s Air Operations Center: Upgrades are “operationally effective and suitable” but details are CUI
• Air Force’s Family of Advanced Beyond Line-of-Sight Terminals: Updates on FAB-T acquisition and performance in tests and operations are contained solely in the CUI version
• Army’s Integrated Tactical Network: The public version of the report does not include information regarding the system’s suitability
• Army’s Integrated Visual Augmentation System: Performance details are only available in CUI version
• Space Force’s Presidential and National Voice Conferencing: The system description, program updates and operational performance are provided in the CUI report
• Missile Defense Agency’s missile defense system: Additional information and recommendations are included in CUI version
• Joint Cyber Warfighting Architecture: The full list of contractors is only available in CUI version.

The public version of the report also cuts some information about shortfalls in the Pentagon’s test and evaluation infrastructure. Specifically, it notes that further details pertaining to the evaluation of hypersonic missiles and hypersonic missile defense systems, cybersecurity, nuclear modernization, electromagnetic spectrum warfare, space, multi-domain operations and 5G have been transferred to the CUI edition.