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Finnish soldiers during the Arrow 22 exercise at the Niinisalo garrison in Kankaanpää, western Finland. (HEIKKI SAUKKOMAA/Lehtikuva/AFP via Getty Images)

Since Finland’s movement towards NATO began in February, the focus has been on whether Helsinki would take the plunge, and then on how quickly they can be officially brought into the NATO fold. But relatively little attention has been paid to what Finland becoming a full member of the alliance would actually look like. In a new analysis, Rasmus Hindrén, head of international relations at the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, lays out some key points. 

From almost the day that Russia invaded Ukraine, Finland has been edging closer to making the jump and joining NATO. On May 18, Helsinki formally filled its paperwork with the alliance, alongside its partner nation Sweden — to the celebration of many who have pushed for decades to see this day.

Understandably, the question of joining or not joining has dominated the policy and media landscape, as have what amount to logistics questions, such as how to handle the potentially tricky transition phase before the Finnish and Swedish membership is ratified by all allies. That appears to have been answered, with several countries having offered assurances to Finland and Sweden. Another key question concerns what kind of capabilities the countries bring to the table. With regard to Finland, the stability of the Finnish democracy, the comprehensive security approach and its status as a security provider have been noted, the long border with Russia notwithstanding. As former Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis has remarked, Finland “shows no signs of complacency” when it comes to security.

But there has been less talk about the specific policy elements that Finland would want to emphasize upon becoming a member of NATO, and how Helsinki may approach melding its NATO-free defense planning into the alliance.

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Already, there are some signs. Minister of Defense of Finland Antti Kaikkonen has stated that Finland is not planning to list any restrictions or caveats in the joining process — including limits on permanent bases or nuclear forces. Relatedly, it has been noted that there are no second-tier NATO members. Each country becomes a full and equal member even if they have their own histories and if they join in a certain political situation.

So how might Finland tackle major issues as part of the alliance? Here are a few themes that may well emerge:

Navigating NATO politics: Finland’s political positioning in the alliance would almost certainly follow the practices solidified during the nearly 30 years of EU membership. Finland’s brand has been to be constructive, pragmatic and active. The first two elements have been easier to accomplish, whereas being active has required political skills and audacity not always present in the Finnish system.

When it comes to multilateral decision-making, as a general rule Finland avoids situations where it is politically isolated or even in a small minority. In multilateral fora that often means a forceful support to an emerging consensus. In substance terms, this would likely include underlining the role of the transatlantic relationship but balancing it with a regional and European approach.

Another natural path would be to focus heavily on cooperation with neighboring countries like Norway and, naturally, Sweden; in fact, with all five Nordic nations in the alliance, a greater NATO focus on the high north would seem likely to emerge.

Multilateralism is likely to stick: Two key strands of Finnish security and defense policy would likely be continued in NATO: a focus on bilateral and minilateral defense cooperation mechanisms and support to the EU’s evolving security and defense policy.

Although it was hesitant until the around the time of the ratification of the Lisbon treaty, Finland has been a strong proponent of the EU defense policy ever since. This has been partially motivated by Finland being outside NATO but, more importantly, by the understanding that the EU is a broad security community with a sizeable toolbox of policies and capabilities. There are longstanding tensions between the EU and NATO on defense issues; as the newest alliance members, and hence high-profile, it is possible Sweden and Finland could play a role in bridging that gap.

NATO Secretary General meets with the ambassadors of Finland and Sweden to NATO

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg receives official letters of application to join NATO from Klaus Korhonen (ambassador of Finland accredited to NATO) and Axel Wernhoff (ambassador of Sweden accredited to NATO). (NATO)

Other defense cooperation structures, like JEF and strategic bilateral partnerships can support interoperability and developing new capabilities, but they might also offer flexible mechanisms for responding to crises where NATO as a whole would be unwilling or unable to act. On the other hand, there might be pressure to downscale some of the other elements of defense cooperation in the fear that they would be too duplicative or forcing Finland to spread its efforts too thin. In the end, Finland would calibrate its network of defense cooperation in the way that adds most value.

One area where bilateral cooperation will not drop off, however, is very clear. Every country in NATO cherishes their bilateral defense cooperation with the US and Finland would not be an exception. Finland would want to continue and deepen that bilateral cooperation, while understanding the longer-term trends of strategic competition will force the United States to focus its gaze more on the Indo-Pacific region.

Defense spending: Despite the announced and likely future increases in European defense spending, the question of burden sharing is likely to stay high on the agenda across the alliance. Measuring by the share of defense spending from the GDP, Finland is pulling its own weight by exceeding the 2% benchmark. In the longer term, the interesting question relates to the extent to which Europe as a whole should carry the burden when compared to the US, particularly with America trying to focus more on China in the future.

NATO’s future and regional focus: It seems safe to say that NATO will in the near term focus on its core task of territorial defense. This is warranted on the basis of Russia’s war in Ukraine and the heightened risk for Russian military adventurism in Europe. On the other hand, the war has been near-catastrophic for Russia’s armed forces, making it all but certain that it is not a blueprint for Russia — or others — to follow.

Assuming that deterring and defending against Russia is at the top of the agenda, it leaves less space for emerging threats. China is likely to receive less attention, as is the more complex overall security environment, with the weaponization of various tools from energy to information, or climate change for that matter.

Finland has an obvious interest in deterring Russia, and the Ukraine invasion is the main reason behind the recent shift in Finnish public opinion on NATO. Yet Finland is also looking beyond Russia and the conventional military means it might use or threaten to use. Finland has a long history of a comprehensive approach to security, which entails a strong integration between the military domain and the rest of the society. There would be a natural inclination for Finland to push NATO to broaden its horizons in these terms, but Finland is also realistic and understands that not everything should become a priority. Moreover, some issues are better dealt by national and international actors with comparative advantages over NATO.

In geographical terms, Finland has a specific interest in the Baltic Sea region and the Arctic and its threat assessment is well aligned with other countries in the region. In defense planning, this would be a natural focus area. In broader policy terms however, Finland’s approach would not be only based on regional outlook or priorities. It would include a strong European as well as a transatlantic flavor.

New issues for Finland: Helsinki will have a lot to learn about alliance politics. One topic that requires specific attention is nuclear policy. Finland has until now ignored nuclear weapons or approached them solely from arms control perspective. Arms control will continue to have its place, but needs to be coupled with a better understanding of nuclear deterrence and nuclear doctrine. In fact, Finland might join NATO just in time to enter the debate about modernizing NATO’s strategic posture.

Joint operational planning is also a relatively new issue in Finland. It has been practiced now for a while with Sweden and that experience will undoubtedly provide useful when undertaking joint planning in the context of an alliance of more than 30 countries. Joint capability development is another area where Finland might need to reconsider its current, rather reluctant, stance. While the obstacles for deeper cooperation in capability development are still substantial, budgetary concerns and mutual trust fostered by cooperation in other areas by might slowly change the equation. The same applies to participating in joint multinational units.

All in all, Finnish NATO membership would build on current practices of defense cooperation but would require certain changes in the operating culture and the mindset. Finns have tended to trust only themselves. Now they need to start trusting others since, in the end, all successful military and other alliances are built on trust.

Rasmus Hindrén is the Head of International Relations at the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats and senior non-resident fellow at the Atlantic Council