This long-exposure image shows a trail of a group of SpaceX’s Starlink satellites passing over Uruguay as seen from the countryside some 185 km north of Montevideo near Capilla del Sauce, Florida Department, on February 7, 2021. (Photo by Mariana SUAREZ / AFP)
The war in Ukraine has proven how irregular warfare tactics work in the modern era. Part of that involves Russia operating in the “gray zone” when it comes to blocking and impacting satellite systems. In the following op-ed, Dr. John J. Klein of George Washington University warns that we are now in an era of irregular warfare in space — and that the US has to learn how to adjust.
Irregular warfare has never been an irregular occurrence. Throughout history, national and military leaders have used irregular warfare — activities apart from major, conventional military conflicts — to achieve political goals. Irregular styles of warfare and competition often are pursued by either choice or out of necessity.
Likewise, irregular actions in the space domain are ongoing and routine occurrences. The US Space Force and US Space Command must account for irregular approaches by both Russia and China within applicable strategies and plans, lest the US cede space superiority to its rivals. This includes updating applicable strategies and plans, along with making the necessary investments in space capabilities and architectures to counter the irregular methods of competitors.
But to develop the right countermeasures, the threats must first be fully identified. The good news is that US officials have made clear they are aware of the threat, if largely in broad terms. When issuing his initial planning guidance [PDF], Gen. John Raymond, the first US Space Force chief of space operations, observed “Adversaries actively create and exploit ‘gray zones’ in which they achieve political objectives through actions that avoid traditional triggers for conflict where the United States enjoys clear military advantage.”
Among the kind of “gray zone” threats Raymond likely was thinking of are cyberattacks against space services, attacking commercial space capabilities during conflict, and conducting proximity operations to potentially coerce others. All of these provocative actions fall short of the use of regular military force during armed conflict, and so by definition, these activities are irregular in style or form. But in a conflict, they would have a major impact on the battlefield.
It’s not hard to find real world examples of all three types of actions. Let’s start with cyberattacks on space assets.
The cyberattack against US satellite firm Viasat ahead of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is a real-world example of irregular warfare against space architectures. An hour before Russian troops invaded Ukraine, Russian government hackers conducted cyberattacks against the company. The attack caused an immediate and significant loss of communication in the early days of the war for the Ukrainian military, which relied on Viasat’s satellite services for command and control of its armed forces. The cyberattack against the commercial satellite provider is considered typical of Russia’s playbook and propensity for conducting hybrid and irregular warfare.
Lt. Gen. Stephen Whiting, current commander of Space Operations Command, has noted the potential threat of cyberattacks to space architectures when explaining, “Cyberspace is the soft underbelly of our global space networks.” The concern is that cyberattacks can serve as an indirect method for mitigating any military advantage in space capabilities.
The Viasat case leads to the second example: the role of commercial space companies and the use of proxies during conflict, which historically is a common feature of irregular warfare. In May 2022, Russia jammed SpaceX’s broadband internet communications signals coming from its Starlink constellation serving the region of Ukraine. SpaceX founder and chief executive officer Elon Musk stated on Twitter that the Starlink network “has resisted Russian cyberwar jamming and hacking attempts so far, but they’re ramping up their efforts.” Russian military leaders view Starlink’s commercial services as important capabilities used by Ukrainian forces, which need to be denied.
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In noting the importance of commercial capabilities and the success of Starlink to withstand communication jamming, Gen. David Thompson, vice chief of space operations of the Space Force, observed “You may be able to deny a piece of it, but you can’t eliminate the capability writ large.” For Thompson, the resiliency demonstrated by Starlink’s commercial constellation in Ukraine against Russian jamming validates the Space Force’s strategy to use a distributed and proliferated architecture for space communications.
As for conducting proximity operations, let’s leave Russia behind and look at what the Biden administration calls America’s “pacing” threat: China.
Beijing has displayed sophisticated rendezvous and proximity operations (RPO) and inspection capabilities in recent years, causing the national security space community to take note. For example, in 2018 China’s Shijian-17 (SJ-17) satellite performed on-orbit activities with other cooperative Chinese spacecraft in geostationary orbit (GEO), and a Center for Strategic and International Studies space threat assessment report notes “China is no novice in performing RPOs in GEO.” SJ-17 has a documented history of RPO activities with other Chinese satellites in GEO, and in a statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee, Space Command head Gen. James Dickinson stated [PDF] that SJ-17 had a robotic arm onboard, which had not been disclosed previously.
As with the land, maritime, and air domains, proximity operations in space can help achieve political or military objectives short of the actual use of force or armed attack. The transparent and publicly known movement of satellites and space systems in proximity to a rival’s spacecraft can convey an implicit or explicit threat of some potential detrimental action, thereby intimidating or coercing a competitor to decide in favor of something that is not in its best interest.
RELATED: US, China, Russia Test New Space War Tactics: Sats Buzzing, Spoofing, Spying
Irregular warfare in the space domain is shaped by the fundamental nature of all warfare, along with the essential unity of all strategic experience. Consequently, we can look to centuries—if not millennia—of historical experience to think about irregular warfare and competition in space, along with offering preferred methods to counter the irregular efforts of US rivals.
By shedding light on the past and putting today’s space activities in the proper perspective, policymakers and military leaders can better understand the future of irregular warfare and competition in space. The value of using an irregular framework to reflect upon existing space security concerns is that historical experience and strategic understanding can provide solutions to known problems, as well as providing insights into the solutions for problems as yet undiscovered.
Dr. John J. Klein is a Senior Fellow and Strategist at Delta Solutions & Strategies, LLC and faculty at George Washington University’s Space Policy Institute. He is the author of the recently released book Fight for the Final Frontier: Irregular Warfare in Space. The views represented here are the author’s alone and do not necessarily represent those of the US Department of Defense, George Washington University, or Delta Solutions & Strategies.
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