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Airborne EW: Dominating the spectrum to win battles

It takes a layered defense plan to be survivable, which means jammers to disable, deceive, and disrupt, along with onboard self-protect and off-board decoys.

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The Next Generation Jammer shown here on the EA-18G Growler is in the final stages of operational testing, and is suitable for 4th, 5th, and 6th generation aircraft. (Raytheon photo)
The Next Generation Jammer shown here on the EA-18G Growler is in the final stages of operational testing, and is suitable for 4th, 5th, and 6th generation aircraft. (U.S. Navy photo)

In this Q&A with Raytheon, an RTX business, we talk to Stephanie Edmisten, executive director of Airborne Electronic Attack, and Ernest Winston, head of Non-traditional Electronic Warfare programs, about the need for more power in electronic attack (EA) for greater standoff to protect high-value platforms, and why passive monitoring is more relevant than ever in maintaining situational awareness.

Breaking Defense: The US Navy recently released a cyber strategy noting that non-kinetic effects will likely decide the next war. How will the latest generation of airborne electronic attack (AEA) capabilities fit into that strategy and shape the future battlespace?

Stephanie Edmisten is executive director of Airborne Electronic Attack at Raytheon.
Stephanie Edmisten is executive director of Airborne Electronic Attack at U.S. Navy.

Edmisten: The Navy is moving to an overall cyber strategy that includes not just defense but cyberattack. Historically there’s been a lot of effort put into the self-protective side of electronic warfare, and now we’re also focusing on electronic attack and dominating the spectrum to win the battle.

Winston: Airborne Electronic Attack is a term borrowed from the Navy. You’ll also hear the term ‘offensive electronic attack.’

With self-protect systems, a threat radar sees something like an aircraft and the self-protect systems engage that threat to break or prevent a lock. With airborne electronic attack, we’re not waiting for that lock to happen. We act “left” of the kill chain.

The Growler crews want to jam as much as possible preemptively to get as many trons (i.e. electrons) downrange as possible.

Breaking Defense: As the battlespace evolves, jammers and related systems are being designed with more power and capacity. How does this help pilots and weapons officers address threat scenarios?

Edmisten: Our adversaries are investing in cyber offense and electronic warfare, and we’re seeing the proliferation of kinetic weapons that can be utilized at longer ranges. This is where the high-powered EA capability can address multiple simultaneous threats and at longer ranges than we’ve had to in the past. We’re responding to what we’re seeing in our adversary’s ability to deny, degrade, disrupt, and deceive.

Winston: A big part of the next potential conflict will be long-range ISR, kill chains, and kinetic threats. As Stephanie noted, with the extreme long ranges you’re dealing with, you need a much-higher-power transmitter for the signal to get to where it needs to go to be effective for some of these long-range threats.

Ernest Winston is head of Non-traditional Electronic Warfare Programs at Raytheon.
Ernest Winston is head of Non-traditional Electronic Warfare Programs at U.S. Navy.

The capacity issue is almost as important. There are many more flexible threats with higher instantaneous bandwidth and higher frequency agility that have proliferated. This increase in capacity also means the ability to jam more threats for a longer duration. For example, instead of only jamming to support friendly aircraft as the protected entity, electronic warfare officers will be able to support weapons all the way to impact as well. This will result in higher survivability rates for aircrew but higher mission success rates with fewer bombs and missiles fired as well. We are designing and delivering new systems that are effective against that scenario.

Breaking Defense: You’re looking at the NGJ or AN/ALQ-249, which is now in the final stages of operational testing, as suitable for fourth, fifth, and even sixth-generation Next Generation Air Dominance aircraft. Explain.

Winston: The Growler was modified for electronic warfare a few years back, and we’re upgrading its EA arsenal significantly. That aircraft is here and ready for the mission to protect fourth-gen assets, and it will capably protect fifth-gen and future-gen aircraft for years to come. But the capability isn’t limited to flying on Growlers.

Edmisten: Our next-generation technologies are extending the relevance of the current Growler platform by helping ensure that we can use the electromagnetic spectrum to protect high-value platforms with escort and standoff jamming.

Plus it is a portable system. It is self-contained and generates its own power, so it doesn’t rely substantially on the platform to operate.

Because we’ve designed such a flexible system, we don’t see any limitations on where these jamming capabilities can be applied. That’s why we’re exploring how to add high-powered jamming capabilities to long-range bombers, strike fighters and many other platforms around the world.

We’ve solved the toughest engineering challenges, and now it’s a matter of looking at how the technology can help meet the various mission sets out there.

Winston: Right now, fifth-gen platforms are becoming more prevalent and we’re seeing them deployed. Sixth gen will be here, too.

That’s why it was important that the new systems we’re bringing online must be upgradable and designed to be flexible and adapt to new platforms and new threats.

It’s like a Lego kit. It’s built modular so you can put it in a new form factor for a different platform or hang it on an existing platform.

Edmisten: A lot of these newer platforms are being designed with an open systems architecture, so we’re able to make upgrades quickly from both a hardware and software perspective.

Breaking Defense: We’ve been talking a lot about jammers but there’s a greater totality to AEA.

Winston: Yes, there is no one single electronic warfare solution that can protect everybody in an entire theater.

To gain and maintain superiority in the electromagnetic spectrum, you need a layered defense plan that covers cyber and offensive electronic attacks.

Our newest jammers are designed to be interoperable with other self-protect systems and decoys, and also with Blue Force electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) systems, while at the same time denying Red Force’s use of the EMS.

For long-range kill chains, you need a much-higher-power transmitter for the signal to get to where it needs to go to be effective against long-range threats. (Raytheon photo)
For long-range kill chains, you need a much-higher-power transmitter for the signal to get to where it needs to go to be effective against long-range threats. (U.S. Navy photo)

Breaking Defense: Explain the importance of deconfliction in contested environments and crowded airspace. How does Raytheon approach this challenge?

Winston: Deconfliction in the electromagnetic spectrum ensures that my friends who are flying out in front of me with their air-to-air radars are still protected. I don’t want to accidentally “blind” my teammates. They can still use their radars while we deny a solid air-to-air picture to an adversary. That takes a lot of mission planning, coordination, and systems that are designed to be interoperable. That’s something we excel at.

Edmisten: Our jammers are designed specifically for this challenge. We know how to make all of these complex systems work in concert. And it is not easy. The environments we’re operating in are highly contested and congested.

Near-instantaneous beam switching and steering are new capabilities that make it possible to detect and address multiple ground and air threats at the same time and at extended ranges.

Having the ability to identify and address all these threats simultaneously also takes a workload off the operator, who then can focus on the mission.

Breaking Defense: What’s the role of passive monitoring in the environments in conjunction with AEA?

Edmisten: There’s a very relevant role for passive monitoring in information gathering, detecting, intercepting, identifying, locating, and recording – all of which we use for situational awareness.

Electronic support platforms like our Advanced Radar Detection System, or ARDS, often flown on reconnaissance aircraft and uncrewed systems, are an important technology for gathering data to inform airborne electronic attack. The information helps us identify new threats and countermeasures to address them.

ARDS is a highly capable, lightweight system that’s suitable for UAS and other light aircraft. It works differently than a jammer. It scans the radio frequency spectrum to identify and locate radar emitters and intercept communications.

Winston: In an anticipated, modern, contested environment, you expect an adversary to have a very robust EW capability that could include sensing our own emissions and using it to build an air-to-air or surface picture of where our friendly forces are.

Passive monitoring will always be an important part of any potential conflict. Although we make the most effective jammer in the market, it has to work in conjunction with passive systems to silently monitor, target, and gain situational advantage until you’re ready to engage with active emissions. You don’t want to advertise your position right off the bat. It’s a game of cat and mouse and you want to be as surreptitious as possible.