Iran Missiles Strike Iraqi Bases; Analysis: ‘War’ Unlikely

UPDATE: IRAN STRIKES TWO US BASES IN IRAQ.

WASHINGTON: Is war with Iran likely in the wake of the killing of Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani?

The answer is still unclear as of Tuesday evening, even after Iran fired 15 missiles at Iraqi bases housing US troops, hitting Al Assad with 10 missiles, one falling near the Irbil airport, and four others failing en route.

Defense Secretary Mark Esper and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Gen. Mark Milley rushed to the White House to brief President Trump, who decided not to speak to the nation tonight. Trump tweeted “All is well!” noting that a damage assessment is underway.

Reached Tuesday evening, recently retired Centcom commander Gen. Jospeh Votel told us he is “not surprised” by the Iranian attack. “Iran has many options and this appears to be the one they choose — perhaps because it was direct and unambiguous…for both internal and external consumption.”

Earlier, we had asked some of Washington’s best informed and smartest people about the likely consequences.

We contacted Tom Countryman, former assistant Secretary of State for international security and nonproliferation; Mark Gunzinger, former deputy assistant secretary of Defense for forces transformation and resources, now at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment; Laura Kennedy, former ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva; and Tom Mahnken, former deputy assistant secretary of Defense for policy planning, who leads CSBA.

We asked four questions:

Will Iran go to war against US?

Kennedy said that Iran is unlikely to declare or wage direct war on the United States, rather to step up its asymmetric attacks and use of proxies: “They are, after all, pretty canny.”

Gunzinger agrees it is “unlikely” Iran will declare all-out war. “Iran would have little to gain and much to lose in a direct conflict with the United States. By much to lose, I mean they would risk a major military loss, as well as the loss of whatever remaining support there might be for a reduction in sanctions. I think it is more likely that Iran will take its time, assess its options carefully, and then choose a course of action that has the greatest probability of furthering its long-term regional interests.”

Countryman dismissed the very idea. “‘Declaring war’ is so Twentieth Century. Neither the US nor Russia nor the regional states in the Middle East ever ‘declare’ war, and rarely even admit that they are in a war. There will certainly be violent action taken by Iran against US interests in the Middle East, whether military or civilian targets. It is unlikely that Iran will use its military directly, but it has a number of allied groups (usually we call them ‘proxies’) who are capable of hitting American targets.”

Mahnken largely agreed with Countryman, noting that “the Iranian government has long seen itself as being in a confrontation with the United States. This represents an escalation in that confrontation, but unlike the United States, Iran does not admit a clear distinction between ‘war’ and ‘peace’.”

UPDATE STARTS. In keeping with the predictions, Iran launched missile attacks late tonight Baghdad-time on two US military bases, in Erbil and Al-Asad. The Pentagon confirmed about a dozen missiles were launched in the attacks. It is unclear whether there were any casualties.

“We are working on initial battle damage assessments,” said top Pentagon spokesman Jonathan Hoffman in a statement tonight.” As we evaluate the situation and our response, we will take all necessary measures to protect and defend U.S. personnel, partners, and allies in the region.” UPDATE ENDS.

How Will America’s global influence be affected?

Countryman was grim. “Donald Trump and Mike Pompeo continue to drive America’s global credibility deeper into the sewer. Like their violation of the JCPOA, the assassination of Soleimani runs directly contrary to the clearly stated policy of every significant partner (other than Israel and Saudi Arabia). The systematic and deliberate alienation of our allies will erode our influence with key partners worldwide.”

Proving that your conclusions can be affected by how you see the world, Gunzinger reached a very different conclusion, saying the Friday killings would have “little impact. Russia and China will continue to voice their concerns over the strike, but they have little interest and even less to gain in the long run by taking positions that would further destabilize the region.”

While Mahnken said it’s just “too soon to say” with any certainty, Kennedy opines that the “overuse of sanctions authority” with regard to Iran may in the long run create “blowback,” with European and other allies seeking other institutions and partners (read China) so they can evade second-hand sanctions they don’t agree with.

How will this affect America’s influence throughout the Middle East?

Gunzinger said that it “is likely that quite a few national leaders in the region are happy that Soleimani is off the chessboard” because “there is little love lost for Iran’s corrupt regime and the revolution its mullahs are desperately trying to export. Frankly, if anything, the attack is an unambiguous signal that the era of tolerating Iranian-sponsored acts of terror against U.S. targets in the hope that negotiations + promises of payoffs will moderate Iran’s behavior is finally over.”

Mahnken believes our influence “will grow and that of Tehran and its surrogates will diminish” if we are perceived as having stood up to Iran and Tehran as having backed down.

Does this make a new nuclear agreement more or less likely? How will this play out?

Kennedy, who spent a considerable part of her career working on issues related to Iran’s nuclear program, believes the JCPOA is dead until or unless America lets a new president. There is good news, she said. Iran has not — “at least not yet” — expelled inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency. “That,” she said, “would be an all-out catastrophe,” because the US and the West would “lose all ability to see what is going on” with Iran’s nuclear program. “I hope they’ll be prudent and continue to allow access to the inspectors.”

Gunzinger agreed with Kennedy that the chances of “a new nuclear agreement with Iran, at least in the near term, can now be characterized as somewhere between very unlikely and ‘not a chance.'”

But in the long run, Kennedy stressed, the only way to deal with Iran’s nuclear ambitions is via a deal. Otherwise, the specter of an unconstrained Iran on a path towards nuclear weapons would cause others in the Middle East — specifically Turkey, Egypt and Saudi Arabia — to “hedge” by building up their own nuclear power capabilities that could then be flipped, if considered necessary to counter Tehran, into a weapons program.

The Upshot

Mahnken says his “suspicion” is that Iraq will continue to use the Quds Force network, “so that would lead me to believe the Iran will work through sleeper agents, networks, and groups. I would expect them to try to make it clear that they are responsible without being overt enough to trigger U.S. retaliation. I like the term (im)plausible deniability.”

Gunzinger believes, “Iran will likely take their time and craft a response that will further their long-term ambitions in the region. Trying a stunt such as attempting to cut off commerce through the Strait of Hormuz or another [course of action] that would require large scale direct use of their military would be broadly condemned and quickly defeated by a coalition of forces. More likely: indirect actions by Kataib Hezbollah and/or other Iranian proxy groups that could further reduce Iraqi support for the U.S. mission in Iraq. I would not be shocked, however, if there were some small-scale cruise missile and drone attacks against some targets located inside and possibly outside Iraq, if they could be accomplished with a degree of surprise and at least plausible—at least in Iran’s opinion—deniability.”

Transparency and publicity may be key tools for the Trump Administration as this version of the great game progresses.

“For the U.S., a key counter-strategy will be to uncover and publicize Iranian activities, much as the government did with the Iranian mining operations in the Gulf (and indeed, as the Reagan administration did with the Iran Ajr’s mining of the Gulf during the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s),” Mahnken says.