stinger practice

US Army paratroopers assigned to the 173rd Airborne Brigade practice acquiring a target with a FIM-92 Stinger during an air defense live-fire exercise alongside soldiers with the Croatian Air Defense Regiment. (US Army photo/Staff Sgt. John Yountz)

A nearly forgotten part of America’s arsenal, the Stinger man-portable anti-aircraft weapon is suddenly a hot commodity. But with production extremely limited and demands through the roof, there is a push for a new Stinger replacement, rather than rebooting production on the existing weapon. In this op-ed, Dan Grazier of the Project on Government Oversight warns not to overthink the issue.
When Russia’s invasion of Ukraine began in mid-February, most pundits believed the Russian military would overwhelm Ukraine’s defenders. Those notions were quickly disabused, as the Ukrainians showed that they were made of stronger stuff.

It turns out that you don’t have to have huge fleets of futuristic fighter planes to control the skies. A weapon far simpler than Russia’s fighter jets, the Stinger man-portable air-defense system, has proved so effective that more than 50 days into the war, Russia still hasn’t been able to achieve air superiority.

The humble Stinger entered service in 1981 after being developed by General Dynamics and built by Raytheon Missile Systems. It first gained fame in the 1980s, when Afghan fighters used it to great effect against Soviet forces during the occupation of Afghanistan. Two decades of conflict against an opponent with no air power meant the Stinger has been almost forgotten by US forces, but the stunning success it has had in Ukraine has raised its profile once again — and now the US is scrambling to find ways to replenish stocks as quickly as possible.

But rather than simply trying to re-launch the Stinger production line, the Pentagon appears ready to rush into something it has had little success with in recent years: developing and fielding a brand new system, quickly and cheaply. The US Army issued a request for information to the defense industry on March 28, 2022, to see what proposals companies come up with for a new missile. And history suggests that interested manufacturers will respond with high-tech proposals that will undoubtedly be far more expensive than the current Stinger model.

RELATED: HASC leaders want next-gen Stinger replacement, as stockpile dwindles due to Ukraine

This is a case where Pentagon leaders should not follow their typical pattern of reinventing the wheel. As Ukrainian fighters have proven, the Stinger still works. Its replacement should be an updated version of the original, rather than a whole new system. We know it works, and the focus should be on creating a healthy production line, not funneling money into a brand-new design.

The Stinger is still in limited production, albeit only for an anonymous international customer that is providing otherwise-obsolete parts on its own; the production line includes little automation, with work largely done by hand through a small cadre of trained workers. Some of the Stinger’s components are out of production, but companies can and should replace old components with modern equivalents using available, proven technology, rather than designing a completely new missile.

Some of that work is already under way. During an April 26 investor call, the CEO of Raytheon said the company is in the process of redesigning the electronics used in the seeker head and expects they will be able to complete that work and replenish the stockpile in two years — about as close-in a timeframe as the American defense industry can do these days. Compare that with the Army’s RFI, which has a target delivery date of FY27 — and that’s assuming everything stays on track, which, simply put, has not been the case for recent programs.

RELATED: No easy answer for ramping up Stinger production, Pentagon No. 2 says

The past 20 years have seen numerous weapons programs that should have been relatively straightforward get mired in development as designers tried to do too much. A prime example is the KC-46 aerial refueler. It was designed and built to perform the exact same mission as the aircraft it was commissioned to replace. The new tanker is, at its core, a modified version of the Boeing 767, not some radical new design. Yet because the designers attempted to add as much new technology as possible, the KC-46’s usefulness remains limited more than a decade after development began.

The Stinger has been effective for more than 40 years precisely because it is simple. Several surface-to-air missiles were tried in Afghanistan during the 1980s to shoot down Soviet aircraft. Afghan mujahideen fighters were originally given the Soviet equivalent to the Stinger, the SA-7, but it didn’t work. When the CIA sent Stingers in 1986, Soviet aircraft began falling from the sky — nearly 270 of them. That solid track record is why the Ukrainians want more Stingers now.

An overly complicated new missile will likely not be much of an improvement for US troops. Such an effort could actually be counterproductive in a future situation like the one in Ukraine, as the Stinger’s simplicity is what has made it such an effective weapon in the hands of foreign fighters who don’t receive the same training as US soldiers. An overly complicated design would have only one benefit: lining the pockets of the military industrial complex with taxpayer dollars.

Producing more Stingers is clearly a priority for the department, but let’s not overthink this. Based on recent DoD history, the best bet for both America’s own security and that of its partners and allies is for someone in authority to follow the old KISS principle: Keep it simple, soldier.

Dan Grazier is the Senior Defense Policy Fellow at the Project On Government Oversight. He is a former Marine Corps captain who served tours of duty in Iraq and Afghanistan during the war on terror. His various assignments in uniform included tours with 2nd Tank Battalion in Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, and 1st Tank Battalion in Twentynine Palms, California.