FTG-11 – target launch

A threat-representative ICBM target launches from the Ronald Reagan
Ballistic Missile Defense Test Site on Kwajalein Atoll in the Republic of
the Marshall Islands March 25, 2019. It was successfully intercepted by two
long-range Ground-based Interceptors launched from Vandenberg Air Force
Base, Calif., in the first salvo test of GBIs.

With oceans on either side, the American homeland for centuries has had geography as a first line of defense against adversary actions. But in the op-ed below, three former senior NORAD officials say the missile-based threat to the homeland is growing and diversifying by the day, and so must America’s defenses.

In 2022, authors of the Missile Defense Review concluded that America’s “adversaries are developing, fielding, and integrating more advanced air and missile capabilities into their strategies in order to shape the course of a potential crisis or conflict.”

While a valid assessment, the statement sells short the risk faced today by the US. A more accurate assessment would have read, “…developing, fielding, integrating, and employing more advanced air and missile capabilities… .”

The distinction is significant when you consider the air and missile threat challenge is expanding at an accelerated rate.

From Russia using of hypersonic weapons in Ukraine to China testing a suspected fractional orbital bombardment system to North Korea and Iran launching satellites — even to non-state actors like Houthi rebel groups firing cruise missiles at commercial ships in the Red Sea, technological advancements coupled with the employment of air and missile weapons by near peers, rogue nations, and non-state actors are extraordinary and unnerving.

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As such, categorizing our adversaries as “four plus one” is outdated when speaking to the ever-expanding fraternity of air and missile adversaries. An accurate categorization might be “four plus one hundred and one.”

The intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) may be the primary strategic threat to the homeland, but it is no longer the sole threat. An adversary’s asymmetric approach will enable them to conduct an air, as well as a missile attack on the United States. That threat evolution also demands a change in how the US thinks about homeland defense.

The Department of Defense and Congress must accept the homeland is not a sanctuary but a theater of operations and, given today’s air and missile threats, could be a theater of war. It is not homeland defense or theater defense; it is integrated air and missile defense for the homeland and other theaters of operations. The threats presented in each theater should define all of the capabilities required to defend those theaters.

Homeland defense, therefore, requires its own multi-domain air and missile defense sensor network to provide accurate and timely early warning of an imminent attack; a family of common, versatile, and flexible defensive capabilities to deploy and defend critical assets in time of crisis; a command and control architecture and system that enables a rapid and seamless transition from peace to war; and a set of scalable, conventional response options.

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The Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system is designed to counter the North Korean threat, and when its Next Generation Interceptor (NGI) is fielded, GMD will be better postured for that threat. The NGI’s competitive acquisition strategy will hopefully bring two proto-types to a “fly-before-you-buy” test and provide an enhanced interceptor with potential for further improvement.

Investment in NGI certainly improves capability, but 64 NGIs may not be an adequate deterrent and defensive capacity when multiple interceptors are required to be launched on each ICBM to ensure defeat. If GMD misses, we need a second layer of defense to re-engage and ensure the threat missile is destroyed before it impacts a city in the US.

Also, critically, GMD has no capability to counter cruise or air-launched ballistic missiles. This requires an integrated, layered defense, that leverages “theater defense systems” (e.g. Aegis, THAAD, Patriot, NASAMs).

Not every attack on North America will be a strategic nuclear attack. Our adversaries are capable of conducting limited air and missile attacks on critical assets that could impede our ability to project forces and sustain operations in other regions.

Our bifurcation of the air and ballistic missile defense missions creates a budget dilemma, where we fund one or the other vice approaching the challenge as a single mission and seeking solutions that benefit all regions.

The Department of Defense lacks a comprehensive air and missile defense strategy to provide all combatant commanders with the capabilities they require. Congress must consistently and adequately fund a comprehensive strategy to enable competitive development, thorough testing, and sustainable production of air and missile defense sensors, command and control systems, and weapons. The recent report that NGI competition and funding may be cut to serve as a “bill payer” is a prime example of a false choice that could leave our warfighter with a less capable interceptor.

The lessons of Ukraine and the Middle East are clear — the air and missile threat is expanding; the complexity of air and missile attacks are increasing; more adversaries have air forces; no nation has excess air and missile defense capacity; and only an integrated, air and missile defense can keep those threats at bay.

The Department of Defense and Congress need to develop and fund an integrated air and missile defense strategy that provides all combatant commanders the capabilities to defend both the homeland and US forces abroad that integrates seamlessly with our allies and partners.

Retired Gen. Charles H. Jacoby, Jr. is the founder of the Jacoby Group and an adviser for Stellar Solutions, Inc. He previously served as the commander of North American Aerospace Defense Command and US Northern Command and served as the Director for Strategy, Policy, and Plans on the Joint Staff.

Retired Maj. Gen. Francis G. Mahon is an independent aerospace defense contractor and an adviser for Stellar Solutions, Inc. He previously served as Director for Strategy, Policy and Plans at North American Aerospace Defense Command and US Northern Command and Director for Test at the Missile Defense Agency. 

Retired Brig. Gen. Dino Murray is the Senior Director for Innovation, Operations and Exercises for Stellar Solutions, Inc. He previously served as the Deputy Director for Operations at the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD), and as the Chief of Staff for US Air Forces – Central Command.