Despite conventional wisdom, space arms control verification possible: Aerospace Corporation

WASHINGTON — For decades, US policymakers and diplomats have been extremely skeptical of space arms control, arguing that verification of compliance with such accords would be all but impossible due to the inability to discern weapons from non-weapons and attribute on-orbit violations to the perpetrators.

A new study, released Tuesday by The Aerospace Corporation’s Center for Space Policy and Strategy, begs to differ.

“This study indicates that verification can be a surmountable obstacle thanks to developments in modern technologies, new stakeholders, and more robust information-sharing processes related to space, as well as new approaches for defining the systems and behaviors that could be limited in space arms control,” argues author Mick Gleason, a national security senior projects engineer at Aerospace and a retired US Air Force colonel.

Verification is a diplomatic term of art for determining whether parties to a treaty are complying with its terms or whether they have violated the core limits put on weapon system numbers and/or types, and other constraints included in the treaty.

Called “Charting A Path Through The Space Arms Control Verification Challenge,” the Aerospace study acknowledges that unlike with past arms control treaties covering nuclear weapons and conventional arms — where it is fairly easy to identify specific weapon systems and simply count them — there are numerous and complex obstacles to overcome in creating verification methods for space-related weapons, especially those on orbit.

There are several key technical problems, the study explains, including the difficulty in defining a space weapon given the inherent dual-use nature of most satellite technologies and the gray line between missile defense systems and anti-satellite weapons, especially if either are placed on-orbit.

That said, the study concludes that it is politics, both at the domestic and geopolitical level, rather than the technicalities that have been and remain the true bug-a-boo of space arms control efforts.

“This paper, without passing judgment on whether arms control is the solution to current space security challenges, provides a framework that could help ensure that verification challenges are not used as a convenient excuse for giving up on space arms control as an option,” the paper states.

One way to overcome the verification challenge is to negotiate accords based on the behavior of actors and space systems, the study notes. Under the Biden administration, this has been an increasing focus for space diplomacy, with Pentagon and State Department leadership pushing for the creation of international norms of responsible behavior at various United Nations fora — albeit via voluntary rather than legal agreements.

Further, the study stresses that technological progress over the past decade has actually made it easier to resolve problems of discernment and attribution, including improved and more ubiquitous space situational awareness provided by commercial firms.

The study sums up as follows.

In particular, the challenge of space arms control verification could be addressed through a combination of:

1. Taking advantage of breakthroughs in key technologies relevant to verification of space activities.

2. Leveraging non-governmental SpaceSituational Awareness (SSA) data providers to build broader trust and redundancy around space verification information.

3. Focusing arms control efforts on identifying dangerous behaviors instead of identifying and counting dangerous systems.