In six months, the world’s eyes will turn to North America for the 2026 FIFA World Cup. Between June 11 and July 19, sixteen host cities across three nations will welcome millions of spectators to packed stadiums. The scale is unprecedented in American history, like multiple Super Bowls occurring simultaneously across an entire continent.
Unfortunately, the threat is equally unprecedented. These events will be extremely vulnerable to small unmanned aerial systems from state actors probing Western defenses, transnational terrorist networks, or radicalized individuals. A multi-city attack could happen with no more technical sophistication than a 3D-printed drop mechanism and duct tape. Commercial drones capable of carrying improvised explosives are available online with two-day shipping, possibly (and recursively) delivered by drone.
To make sure the World Cup is safe, the US needs to empower existing offices to create an integrated air defense information sharing system that is as off-the-shelf as possible — in effect, the first true test of the concept of a Golden Dome — and do it in the next six months.
That will be no easy task, but also one that should be non-negotiable. There are forty-eight group stage matches in the first two weeks alone; adversaries need only succeed once to sow chaos and fear on a global scale.
Current counter-UAS (CUAS) capabilities are designed for isolated high-value events. The Super Bowl model works when the entire national security apparatus can focus on a single stadium for a single day. That must now stretch across sixteen cities and thirty-nine days.
There is a critical gap, but it’s not because of a lack of resources. The US and its partners have plenty of radars, drone jammers, man-portable anti-aircraft missiles, shotguns, net guns, lasers, trained raptors, and other material solutions.
And there are plenty of offices focused on this: Joint Interagency Task Force 401 was established in August 2025 to coordinate CUAS across federal and state governments for homeland defense. The National Guard and private contractors possess proven CUAS systems deployed at major events for nearly a decade. The Secret Service and FBI bring additional ground capabilities and experience. The Federal Aviation Administration establishes special use airspace around venues, though there are legal issues, as private citizens (and by extension, private security companies) currently cannot shoot down drones.
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But what we lack is an integrated and robust CUAS air defense network across the contiguous United States and allied territory. What does not exist is a system that provides situational awareness to all defenders simultaneously and enables a coordinated response.
Defending the World Cup demands an architecture that provides Space and Missile Defense Command (SMDC) and the FAA with real-time awareness across sixteen host cities while delegating engagement authority to commanders on the ground. The recent realignment of SMDC provides the institutional structure to make this integration possible.
Rather than standing up a new permanent command, the easiest solution is to empower JTF 401 with a NORAD-lite authority that can pass down early warnings, share information, and in the worst case scenario of a synchronized attack, coordinate response — not just to US forces, but to Mexican and Canadian forces as well. Think of 401 empowered as a Joint Task Force with an ops center alongside its existing acquisition and coordination role.
This would require the Pentagon to change the mission focus for 401 and allow it to stand up an operational headquarters alongside its existing acquisitional element. But because it’s new, 401 should be flexible enough to handle the one-time event — almost like a pop-up command center for the event.
The good news is that the technology required is not revolutionary. The Integrated Battle Command System (IBCS) already demonstrates the core concept, although designed for combatant commands, not homeland defense. We have existing defense cooperation agreements with Canada and Mexico. The Missile Defense Agency possesses the systems integration expertise. The military brings equipment and operators. SMDC provides the command structure. The FAA controls the legal framework.
Put 401 in charge, because the pieces are there. Some assembly required.
But this model would have benefits beyond the World Cup. In fact, it could help kickstart a core part of Golden Dome.
President Donald Trump’s order envisions a layered, integrated defense shield protecting the United States. But Golden Dome doesn’t begin and end with ballistic missile defense; it must also defeat drones during national events or over critical national infrastructure.
An integrated counter-UAS network for the World Cup can morph into the foundation for broader homeland air defense integration. Coordination protocols developed with Canadian and Mexican militaries will build trilateral defense cooperation. The operational picture demonstrates data-fusion feasibility for Golden Dome’s more ambitious objectives.
Layering this architecture under Golden Dome’s heading could help free up the authorities and money needed to set it up within the next six months — a rare win-win with government planning.
However, the window is closing rapidly. Systems must be tested, operators trained, and coordination established with our allies months before kickoff. We can either treat the World Cup as isolated events defended by local units, or use the opportunity to build the architecture that Golden Dome requires.
This is a call for shared sensors, a common operating picture, pre-delegated engagement authority, and rehearsed emergency responses. That is achievable if work begins immediately.
The stadiums will fill and the matches will proceed regardless of whether we’re ready. But unlike America’s impending soccer fad, the threat isn’t going away.
JTF 401, SMDC, and MDA should adapt architecture for homeland counter-UAS integration and begin sensor fusion testing by February. The State Department should formalize engagement authorities with Ottawa and Mexico City by April.
We have six months to prove we can defend our own airspace. Let’s avoid an own-goal here. The tournament begins June 11, 2026.
Maj. Peter Mitchell is an air defense expert and U.S. Army officer. He can be followed on X @peternmitchell. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the Department of the Army or Department of Defense.