The National Commission on the Future of the Navy is asking the right question at the right time. As its members wrote recently in Breaking Defense, the United States faces a peer rival capable of contesting sea control and undermining the maritime order that has sustained American security and prosperity since World War II.
Their call for a fundamental reassessment of fleet architecture, shipbuilding, and maritime strategy is both necessary and overdue, but there is a critical omission in how the United States is approaching maritime dominance. It requires the ability to control, secure, and govern maritime space across the full spectrum of competition — from day-to-day law enforcement and presence to high-end naval warfare.
That capability depends not only on the US Navy, but also on the US Coast Guard. And any effort to rebuild American maritime dominance that does not fully integrate the Coast Guard risks creating a fleet designed for war but poorly structured for the strategic competition already underway.
China understands this. Over the past two decades, it has built not only the world’s largest navy, but also the world’s largest coast guard, which routinely patrol contested waters, enforce Beijing’s territorial claims, and challenge foreign ships throughout the South China Sea and beyond. These operations advance China’s strategic objectives without crossing the threshold of armed conflict, allowing China to compete continuously and shaping conditions in its favor without firing a shot.
The United States possesses a similar layered maritime capability in its Navy and Coast Guard. But unlike China, it has not fully integrated Coast Guard forces into maritime strategy, fleet architecture, and shipbuilding plans. Discussions of fleet size and shipbuilding focus almost exclusively on naval combatants while overlooking the Coast Guard’s central role in securing the maritime domain.
This is a strategic gap.
The Coast Guard provides authorities and capabilities the Navy does not possess. Under Title 14 of the US Code, the Coast Guard is both a military service and a federal law enforcement agency. Its personnel have authority to stop, board, search, and seize vessels on the high seas. These authorities enable the United States to enforce sovereignty, counter illicit activity, and uphold international norms without escalating to military confrontation.
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Strategic competition at sea rarely takes the form of fleet engagements. It occurs through persistent presence, enforcement of sovereignty, and the ability to deny adversaries and illicit actors freedom of maneuver. Coast Guard cutters perform these missions globally, strengthening maritime governance and reinforcing stability.
During my command of a Coast Guard cutter, our deployments demonstrated how persistent maritime presence advanced national strategy. Our boarding teams conducted enforcement operations that upheld US sovereignty and denied illicit actors freedom of maneuver. At the same time, our cutter conducted naval diplomacy missions with partner nations throughout the Caribbean and Central America, helping strengthen their maritime security capabilities. Through joint patrols and training, these engagements improved regional stability and reinforced US leadership without requiring the deployment of naval combatants.
The Coast Guard also operates directly in strategic competition environments involving major powers. In one very recent example, the Coast Guard cutter Munro pursued and boarded a Russian-flagged oil tanker in the North Atlantic near Iceland, supported by Department of Defense personnel. The operation demonstrated the Coast Guard’s ability to combine military capability with law enforcement authority in an international security context. Such missions enforce international norms, demonstrate US resolve, and maintain maritime order without escalating to overt military confrontation. They illustrate that Coast Guard forces contribute directly to national sea power and maritime dominance.
The Coast Guard’s role is equally critical in emerging theaters such as the Arctic. As melting ice opens new shipping routes and access to natural resources, Russia and China are expanding their polar presence. The Coast Guard operates the United States’ only icebreakers, enabling access, sovereignty operations, and sustained presence in polar regions. Without these capabilities, the United States cannot effectively compete in the Arctic.
The National Commission on the Future of the Navy is rightly focused on fleet architecture and shipbuilding capacity. But fleet architecture must reflect the full range of maritime missions required to secure US interests. Coast Guard cutters provide persistent presence, law enforcement authority, and operational flexibility that complement naval combat power and expand America’s ability to compete.
Fully integrating Coast Guard capabilities would also help address the operational strain on naval forces. The Navy is routinely tasked with maritime security, presence operations, and partnership missions that Coast Guard forces are uniquely suited to perform. Greater reliance on Coast Guard cutters for these missions would allow naval combatants to focus on deterrence and warfighting.
This integration reflects the long-standing National Fleet concept, which recognizes that Navy and Coast Guard forces together form the nation’s maritime force. Specifically, the commission should treat Coast Guard cutters, icebreakers, and deployable forces as integral components of the nation’s fleet architecture rather than as separate or supporting assets, fully implementing the National Fleet concept that integrates Navy and Coast Guard forces into a unified maritime force capable of competing across the full spectrum of conflict.
Maritime dominance is not solely a naval function. It is a national maritime function requiring integrated naval and Coast Guard capabilities. Maritime dominance simply won’t be complete without the Coast Guard being integrated.
Naval combat power is essential to deterring and defeating adversaries in war. But maritime dominance also depends on persistent presence, law enforcement authority, and the ability to compete below the threshold of armed conflict. The Coast Guard provides these capabilities every day.
Maritime dominance is not achieved through naval combat power alone. If the United States is serious about restoring maritime dominance, it must fully integrate the Coast Guard into its maritime strategy, fleet architecture, and shipbuilding plans.
Bruce Stubbs had assignments on the staffs of the secretary of the Navy and the chief of naval operations from 2009 to 2022 as a member of the US senior executive service. He was a former director of Strategy and Strategic Concepts in the N3N5 and N7 directorates. As a career US Coast Guard officer, he had a posting as the Assistant Commandant for Capability (current title) in Headquarters, served on the staff of the National Security Council, taught at the Naval War College, commanded a major cutter, and served a combat tour with the U.S. Navy in Vietnam during the 1972 Easter Offensive.