WASHINGTON — The Space Force needs to more fully support development of dynamic space operations (DSO) in order to increase the resilience and effectiveness of space systems — not just satellites and spacecraft on orbit, but also for ground systems, communications links and the launch architecture, finds a new report from the Mitchell Institute.
“[E]mbracing dynamic space operations … is absolutely critical, because if we fail to change our architecture, it becomes vulnerable and susceptible to attack, putting everything that we do in the military at risk,” Charles Galbreath, senior resident fellow for space studies at the Mitchell Institute’s Space Power Advantage Center of Excellence, said today.
The report, a copy of which was provided to reporters in advance of its release publicly Nov. 6, stresses the need for buy-in from the Space Force, US Space Command (SPACECOM) and Congress to allow for proper funding and long-term support what it characterizes as a necessary overhaul of the US space architecture to stay ahead of China.
“China is striving to supplant the United States as the world’s preeminent space power,” the report asserts. “Moreover, the race for space logistics is here. China is pursuing counterspace weapon systems and is actively engaging in methods to extend the operational life of its space capabilities and therefore the effects it can achieve.”
DSO encompases a wider variety of capabilities than simply on-orbit refueling and repair, which are typically those that come to mind when discussing the issue, Galbreath said. There are plenty of other types of activities that fall under that concept, including reprogrammable software, and in-space assembly of spacecraft structures such as large solar arrays.
Further, he said, while not all DSO capabilities and concepts apply in all orbital regimes — geosynchronous Earth orbit (GEO), medium Earth orbit (MEO), low Earth orbit (LEO), and cislunar and beyond — some apply to each one.
Even for LEO, where refueling doesn’t make a lot of sense due to the short lifespans of satellites stationed there, DSO can offer advantages such as the ability to change “mission capability” by “adding defensive capabilities” or “augmentation capabilities,” or even creating “decoys” to throw off adversary targeting.
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The report makes a series of recommendations for each space segment, as well as for the development of “overarching and enabling” capabilities for DSO.
Orbital Segment
First and foremost, the report calls upon the Space Force to move more rapidly to “design and field an on-orbit logistics infrastructure” — something that will require “defining and distributing a standard set of interfaces and refining doctrine, CONOPS (concepts of operation) and TTPs (tactics, techniques and procedures.)”
The report also recommends that the service’s new requirement that any new constellation to replace the Geosynchronous Space Situational Awareness Program (GSSAP) neighborhood watch satellites sport refueling capabilities, should also incorporate “the capacity to replace or add mission capability.”
For LEO, the report urges the Space Force to develop more systems like the X-37B space plane that can “obfuscate mission capabilities” and employ camouflage, concealment and decoy techniques.
Terrestrial Segment
The report notes that the Space Force is already pursuing some DSO enabling projects — such as the Space Rapid Capabilities Office’s Satellite Communications Augmentation Resource (SCAR) program to field modern, phased-array antennas and the R2C2 satellite command and control software — and calls for their expansion.
Link Segment
“To prevent interception, intrusion and jamming, the Space Force must continue its efforts to field the means to secure the vital link segment,” the report says. These include use of frequency hopping and laser communications, it notes.
Launch Segment
To posture the Space Force’s launch enterprise to support DSO, the report recommends that the service “employ standardized satellite buses and form factors that can be more easily replaced aboard launch vehicles,” as well as “continue to increase launch site and launch vehicle diversification.”
Finally, the report says that as a critical enabler for DSO, the Space Force should establish a program office focused on the creation and sustainment of “an in-space logistics infrastructure.”
While Galbreath acknowledged that up to now the Space Force has not put a high priority on DSO despite years of pressure from SPACECOM, he said that as the service works to finalize its 15-year “future operations plan,” he is seeing signs of positive movement.
“I think the Space Force under its 15-year plan can really make that decision boldly and say we’re going to head down this path,” he said.