Gates’ tendency to push aside anyone who disagreed with him was a skill honed in his rise to power in the intelligence community.
During his time in the IC, Gates was not believed by many, including Secretary of State George Shultz, to welcome reasoned debate and innovation:
“In January,1981 Casey appoints Gates Deputy Director for the Intelligence Directorate. He promptly informs the analysts under him that he wants their “best estimates,” but begins to keep a “scorecard” of favored analysts that influences promotions. “A little Napoleon,” one analyst calls him. “It was well known among analysts at the time,” wrote former Soviet affairs officer Jennifer Glaudemans, “that we would have a hard time getting Gates to sign off on analyses that did not fit his ideological preconceptions.”
Or as George Schultz commented on the CIA under Gates: “I feel you all have very strong policy views. I feel you try to manipulate me. So you have a very dissatisfied customer. If this were a business, I’d find myself another supplier.”
But Gates went on to find a bigger stage at the Pentagon to play out his approach of molding an institution to be congruent with his own preferences. No wonder his experience was one of constant “wars” in the bureaucracy!
The real legacy that the military will remember from Gates’ time in the Pentagon is that one dare not speak truth to power. If you did, in the words of one senior Air Force officer, “you would get a bullet to the head of your career”.
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Even when a sovereign nation — China — decided to introduce a new weapon system, it is seen as directed against him personally.
Despite President Hu’s desire to have my visit be picture-perfect to pave the way for his state visit to Washington just a little over a week later, in a remarkable display of chutzpah, the PLA nearly wrecked both trips. Just hours before my meeting with Hu, the PLA rolled out for the first time publicly its new J-20 stealth fighter. Photos of the plane hit the Chinese press about two hours before my session with Hu. As one of my China policy experts insightfully expressed it, “This is about as big a ‘fuck you’ as you can get.” There was some talk among my team about canceling the rest of the visit or part of it, or ignoring the insult.
What is the real Gates legacy?
Above all, there is a clear overinvestment in mobilized forces for land wars. The costs of those forces, their retirements, their medical costs and equipment appropriate for Iraq or Afghanistan are huge. What kind of Army does the United States really need going forward? What transition strategy must we forge in Afghanistan, and how is that linked to future engagements? And what type of joint force structure is necessary going forward?
What is certainly clear is that the Army, which has emerged under Gates sponsorship, is not the likely answer to that question.
The overinvestment in a certain type of land war has severely stressed as well the US Air Force lift and airborne tanking assets. These assets were heavily over-used in support of the US Army in Iraq and Afghanistan. Now those lift and tanking assets need to be rebuilt and strengthened at the expense, in part, by cuts in the Army force structure.
Gates himself provided his own epitaph.
Former secretary of the Air Force Mike Wynne, not a member of my fan club, wrote, “I am sure … the Iranians are cringing in their boots about the threat from our stability forces. Our national interests are being reduced to becoming the armed custodians of two nations, Afghanistan and Iraq.”
Editor”s note: Former Secretary Wynne works closely with Robbin Laird on a range of issues. The material in italics above is quoted from the Gates’ memoir.