Estonia’s defense minister on Ukranian lessons, future investments and Russia’s cyber threat

WASHINGTON — Hanno Pevkur has held a number of ministerial roles for Estonia over his time in government, before becoming defense minister in July — putting him in the driver’s seat for a major military modernization effort in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Now, with the Russian bear occupied to the south, Pevkur described Estonia’s sprint to secure the front “door” that he said protects not only Estonian citizens from Moscow’s aggression, but the rest of northern Europe.

During an October visit to Washington, Pevkur sat down with Breaking Defense at the Estonian embassy for a wide-ranging discussion. The below highlights from that conversation have been lightly edited for length and clarity.

BREAKING DEFENSE: Do you assess that with Russia’s focus on Ukraine, the threat to Estonia and NATO’s border is less than it has been in the past?

PEVKUR: There is a constant threat, and even when the conventional threat at the moment is quite low, that doesn’t mean that in a couple of weeks or months, it cannot be higher and raised. Of course, we are monitoring the situation very closely all the time. But we also have to understand that the threat will be there. And we don’t have the [geographic] depth — what we have to understand that the Estonia doesn’t have the depth, even the depth of what Ukraine has at the moment, from the east towards Kyiv. Our territory from our eastern border to Tallinn is less than 200 kilometers. And all in all, the last piece of Estonia from our eastern border is less than 400 kilometers. So we don’t have the depth, and so we have to be ready from the first second.

And this is exactly why we are increasing rapidly our expenditure to defense for the 2 percent increase, next year to 2.85 percent. We are acquiring a lot of new equipment. We are negotiating with our allies about the possible assets they can bring to Estonia. The Brits have promised in Madrid to allocate [a] brigade to Estonia. We are establishing a divisional headquarters and a divisional structure to manage the three brigades we have, then together with the British brigade.

Everything we do in order to protect Estonia [protects] the Eastern Flank of NATO. And I like drawing this comparison, but from my point of view, I take Eastern Flank of NATO — especially Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania — as the front door of NATO. And when the front door is closed, then your rooms inside of the house are also secure. So when you came into this embassy, the front door was closed until we opened it; all the other doors are open so you can freely move. So this is exactly what we have to consider with regard of NATO, that the front door has to be closed.

When we talk about expenditures and where you’re looking to invest, I’m wondering what are the lessons you’re drawing from the last seven months in Ukraine and how that’s driving priorities. 

Yeah, we are learning all the time. First lesson is that the strategy, or mostly the tactics, from the Russian army hasn’t changed since the Second World War — which means that the Howitzers are very, very important in the war theater, which means that the air defense is extremely important in a war theater, which means that new assets like loitering [munitions] [are] extremely important. This is why we are acquiring the medium-range air defense. We made [a] contract with Poland for the short range air defense, we are buying a lot of anti-tank systems such as Spike. We have self-propelled K9, we will acquire 36 units, a lot for Estonia. And the next step, probably — taking into account the lessons learned from Ukraine — wheeled Howitzers is the next step for us. We are acquiring also anti-ship [weapons], a lot of new ammunition. And this brings us to the point that the expenditure will increase in 2024 to 3.25 percent of the GDP.

There’s a real concern we’ve heard from other European defense ministers, as well as in the US, about munition production levels. Are you confident the weapons you’ve put on order can be delivered in a timely fashion?

We made first contracts already in January, before the war, even before most of the countries started thinking about it. The message I got back from the industry is very simple: that the countries have to make orders and to make contracts in order to push the industry to double their production. We all understand that the industry is privately owned, in many cases, but even when it’s owned by the government, then the question still is that they cannot start producing two times more without having direct orders or direct contracts. Many countries can say that ‘we want to buy more,’ but this is not the contract, this is not the order. So when the orders will be there, I’m more than sure that the market will react accordingly.

But there’s a logistical challenge here, right? You have to have people on the line, make sure the supply chain is secure — we know chips, for instance, on the most advanced munitions could be an issue.

The more sophisticated the ammunition goes [the more] difficult the production is. We all understand that. But we also understand that when there is an [electronic] part of the, let’s say 155mm shell — when there is an [electronic] part involved, then you can also influence somehow or affect it by jamming it. And what we see also in Ukraine one of the lessons learned is that so called dumb bombs or dumb shells are quite effective, because you cannot affect them. So for sure it is a challenge for the industry, for sure. But I also believe that the industry is ready to take this challenge and so is ready to produce more.

In October, 15 nations, including Estonia, signed onto the Sky Shield agreement. It’s gotten a good reception here in Washington, but some have raised concerns about how quickly this can get up to speed and if, ultimately, each nation will just go its own way on air defense. How confident are you that this will be done in a timely manner that can be successful for Estonia’s needs?

Well, first thing is that we will continue our own projects. So we will acquire the MRAD — we have six bidders and we will continue with this process in order to be ready with our medium range air defense [in] 2024, 2025. So this is continuous anyway.

Now, when we take the Sky Shield initiative, then the biggest challenge for us and for all the allies is to set the rules — what we will do, will we use this initiative for acquiring new assets or do we focus at the beginning on interoperability. Theoretically, you can also do both and can acquire new assets and equipment [plus] do interoperability actions — but definitely it will take time. So, we understand that. When we take the different air defense systems, [you can’t] in a couple of days unite or integrate Patriots and then [others], so it’s not like this. Which means that this takes time. And also, the political leadership is much needed, to say that okay, what will be the path and then we can decide on the expert level that, okay what will be the real step or what will be the real steps for implementation.

It sounds like you think interoperability might be the more important focus, rather than getting everyone to buy weapons together.

In the short term, what we can do definitely is that — because when it’s about the change of information and merging the different systems, then the IT people and the wise guys, they can always provide the solution quite fast. The NATO standards are there and we can continue with the interoperability maybe a bit faster, because even when we start to acquire or start to buy something together, then this means that we need to understand all of us, the whole group of countries, what will be the system and as we are doing today, with HIMARs, with MLRS, that we are acquiring this together with Latvia — with the help of the US, and we’re very grateful to US government for that and to the Congress that they approved this package to help acquiring us the HIMARS. But now when we take for instance, air defense: the Finns have NASAMS, I believe, Lithuanians have NASAMS. So at the moment we are acquiring together with Latvians, and we have, as I said six bidders, so we don’t know who will be the winner. So we are still looking for the best price for the best quality, for the best items. So I don’t know will it be NASAMS or not. Whatever the system would be, then it could be the same what Finns and Lithuania are using, could be different. So then that means that you know we have to see how we can integrate these systems.

At the AUSA conference this year, a top US Army general said that he is hearing a lot more from countries who want to train on how to push an invading force out after its crossed the borders. As a result of what we’ve seen in Ukraine. Is that something Estonia is also looking at?

We don’t have the depth of Estonia … for us, the early warning is crucial. So we have to be ready to protect [the border], to defend our country from the first meeting… As they say, if you want to live in peace, prepare for war. So this is our focus that yes, we have the hybrid forces, ourselves. We are ready to stop every enemy from the first meeting. And we have a very good logistical plan and regional plan from the NATO side on, if needed, how the allies will help us.

Ok, let’s talk logistics then. Military mobility has been a major focus in Europe over the last decade. Are you comfortable with where things are on that?

There’s always work to be done, for sure. So we can always exercise more, and train more to be ready. Of course, in that regard, our hope and wishes to see Finland and Sweden in NATO as soon as possible still remains the same… for Estonia and for the logistical point of view, [adding those countries] opens new possibilities, definitely. The Baltic Sea would be a sea of NATO, basically.

Is that the biggest impact from adding Sweden and Finland for Estonia? The ability to have clearer logistics lines?

Well, this is the visible change. But there are many, many things in cooperation we cannot comment on publicly. But we all understand that the possibility to share information between the intel would be much easier than it is today. And then also when we take the, for instance, the air force of Finland, they will acquire 64 F-35s in the near future, so this is this is a heavy force close to Estonia if needed.

You’ve mentioned intel a few times today. Obviously intel is always important, but coming out of what we’ve seen this year, do you think there needs to be a greater emphasis on intel sharing?

For me this is a crucial part of avoiding the war. Because when you don’t have the early warning or when you don’t have the proper intel, you cannot make good decisions. And even take targeting — you cannot use HIMARS properly without having proper intel. All the different options of intelligence information, like what you can acquire — Without that, and also without the sharing [it won’t work]. We all understand that sharing is the most sensitive part. But when we have the common understanding about Article Five, then like the basic information, when you get some information and it affects someone’s freedom or independence or integrity, then I don’t see any other options but to share this information. When my people will get some information which affects Latvians or Lithuanians or Finland, obviously, it’s important to let them know.

Do you feel the intel sharing structures are in place correctly now? Or do you think those need to be opened up or?

Well the systems are there, and they are working. So I don’t see any big problems as far from our point of view. I don’t know how the others are seeing that, [but] at the moment, I don’t see any problems there.

Leading up to the Ukraine conflict, Russia’s cyber capabilities were always seen as a major threat. And yet there has been limited impact from them. Do you think the capabilities were overblown, or is there still a threat there?

The threat is still there, and the capabilities are still there. So this is something you know that — I always say that with cyber attacks, it can cause more problems for societies, for civil societies, [than with] conventional attacks. Because with a cyber attack, you can basically take down the electricity or the energy supply for the whole of Kyiv. With the bombing you can take down maybe a part of the city. So in that sense, the cyber threat is something we cannot avoid and we have to be ready for that.

But I also believe that in tackling the cyber threats, it is very, very crucial and very, very important to make a good cooperation with the civil forces, with the private contractors. And of course, I also believe that every infrastructure company has to be ready to tackle all kinds of cyber threats. Because it’s just unimaginable what you can do with the cyberattack.

Do you think that infrastructure is ready?

More or less. Awareness is very, very important. In Estonia, everyone understands that what the cyber threat is, since 2007 it’s not a question for us. We are testing our own systems and our own companies from the government side. The cyber hygiene has to be there for everyone. And the understanding how or where are the vulnerabilities of yours.