This is the last opinion piece Mac Thornberry will write as a member of the House of Representatives (at least, that’s what his staff told us!). I’m personally honored he chose us because Rep. Thornberry is one of the relatively few defense lawmakers I have truly respected for his knowledge, his commitment to quality legislation and his willingness to push painful change when needed. From his work to create a true Joint warfighting command before 911, to his push to better protect the territorial United States which led to the bill underpinning the Department of Homeland Security, to his quiet but persistent work on the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Thornberry always seemed to be trying to look ahead and anticipate the defense problems that really needed fixing. He does that once again this piece, with its focus on Buy America legislation. It was no surprise to me that he rose to become chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, though I did expect it to occur earlier. I’m glad to hear Rep. Thornberry plans to remain active on national security issues after he leaves the Hill. Enough of sentiment. What does Thornberry say as he prepares to leave Congress? Read on! The Editor. 

The COVID-19 pandemic has brought even greater scrutiny to the security and reliability of the defense industrial base.  Digging deeper to understand the source of components and subcomponents reveals the fragility of our access to the products and services needed to defend the country. That examination also highlights how few suppliers exist for certain things and how the lack of stable and reliable defense funding from Congress has put many of them in jeopardy.

Before COVID, we learned that Chinese companies have achieved a dominant market position in some key areas, such as telecommunications equipment.  Part of the challenge of asking allied nations — or U.S. telecommunications providers in rural areas — to refuse to buy Chinese-made switches and routers is that few affordable alternatives exist.

Some of my colleagues in Congress argue that, to protect ourselves from China, we should impose stricter Buy America requirements on things we buy.  But China’s efforts to infiltrate our vital industries do not stop at our borders. They actively work to acquire ownership interests in promising U.S. companies, to purchase or otherwise acquire intellectual property in many technologies and processes, and to relentlessly use cyber to steal all kinds of information.

We need to look at our defense industrial base from both a broader and a deeper perspective. We should include defense companies from allied and partner nations who maintain the high standards of security, cyber and otherwise, that we expect from U.S.-based defense companies.  Companies, wherever they are, that do not meet those standards should be avoided.

The COVID pandemic has brought to light the importance of a resilient supply chain. During the early months of the pandemic, U.S. manufacturing slowed substantially because of workforce impacts and raw material shortages. The same was true for imports from Asia. The United States was able to rebound eventually, but that recovery would not have been possible without trusted suppliers from other countries. When crises emerge, whether they be pandemics or conflicts, the United States cannot continue to rely on a limited number of companies concentrated in one geographic region.  We need geographic diversity.

A broader network of trusted suppliers would also provide more competition for defense purchases, benefiting the taxpayers. It would bring in additional sources of innovation, accelerating our development of new technologies and applications to compete with China and other peer competitors.  U.S. security would also benefit from the incentive to allied-based companies not to use telecommunications and other components that are not secure. And foreign markets would be more available to U.S.-produced goods and services.

One of the great advantages that the U.S. has over any of our competitors is our alliances and partnerships all over the world. All recent military operations have included forces from other nations.  If we are to be ready to fight together, we should train together. And we should draw upon the same trusted supply base to equip our troops.

It may sound appealing to limit goods and services needed to defend the country only to U.S.-based companies, but it does not get to the core issue of having a defense industrial base we can depend on.  We need a network of trusted suppliers and the flexibility to use the best solution possible in order to defend the nation.