Will strong actions follow words in Biden’s space policy?

With Russia blowing up a satellite, China testing mysterious new orbital hypersonic missiles and the general tragedy that is the space junk problem, the state of space has never been more chaotic, or more relevant to policymakers. In this op-ed, Hannah Dennis and Kaitlyn Johnson of CNAS and CSIS, respectively, argue that President Joe Biden’s recent space policy framework builds on solid ideas — but, they ask, will that be all it is?

The bipartisan nature of space policy has allowed collaboration across the federal government and a continuity between administrations that is rare in the national security world. The new Space Priorities Framework [PDF] released earlier this month by the Biden White House follows in that tradition, reaffirming space priorities that will allow the US government to catch up with the American commercial space sector and protect national interests in an increasingly contested domain.

From that standpoint, the framework scores full marks for continuity in strategic priorities and some improved messaging, but these priorities must be followed by actions and investments. So what do the Biden administration and Congress need to do to walk the space walk?

From setting a strong anti-satellite weapons test policy to engaging in space traffic management, the United States needs to make several key decisions and investments in the coming months to begin following through on these commitments.

In the new framework, consensus priorities include investment in space domain awareness capabilities, which serve important peacetime functions of preventing and resolving non-hostile threats (through space traffic management, or coordination) and deterring hostile acts (through demonstrated capabilities in detection and attribution). In wartime, space domain awareness capabilities help the United States respond to hostile acts when deterrence fails.

Two additional related lines of effort are the pursuit of improved acquisition processes for essential space technologies, investment in more resilient systems and architectures, and increased cooperation with other civil, commercial, or military space actors.

These commitments in the Space Priorities Framework echo the themes of Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin’s “Tenets of Responsible Behavior in Space” (July 2021, PDF) and Chief of Space Operations Jay Raymond’s Planning Guidance (December 2020, PDF), among other similar documents. The Biden administration also seeks to invest in new space priorities, namely using space to help mitigate the climate crisis and foster investment in STEM education.

However, Chinese and Russian actions are requiring a continued focus on military threats in space. For this reason, a document that might have otherwise focused more heavily on civil and commercial space applications emphasized a need to focus on military applications.

Even still, in this document, the Biden administration sheds words like dominance and superiority, shifting in substance and verbiage to a more cooperative, collaborative tone.

“The United States is the world leader in space. A robust space program enables us to expand our alliances and partnerships and underpins our military strength.”

“Leader” or “leadership” is mentioned 10 times within a relatively short document. It is apparent that the Biden administration, like the Trump administration before it, views space as an opportunity to build on the US’ global leadership.

In order to “demonstrate leadership in both the responsible use of space and stewardship of the space environment,” the administration should focus on building consensus and establishing rules of the road amongst allies, partners, and even competitors in the domain. It is important to treat space as a global commons and to develop policies that will enable the use and sustainability of the domain for decades to come.

Here are several possible areas of leadership, in no specific order:

First, the United States should pledge that the US military will not intentionally create debris from destructive, kinetic ASAT (antisatellite) tests.

The US Space Force and the National Reconnaissance Office could reinforce responsible behavior by establishing more transparent practices for how they operate on-orbit inspection satellites that spy on other satellites in space.

Another avenue is decreasing the longevity of inoperable satellites by shortening and better enforcing the 25-year deorbit rule on US government and commercial satellites.

The United States government should also increase its investments in active debris removal, on-orbit servicing, assembly, and manufacturing, and other more sustainable practices such as safer propulsion technology and reusability of space launch.

“Working with industry and international partners, the United States will… establish the foundation for global space traffic coordination.”

The Framework formally introduces space traffic coordination, an alternative terminology to space traffic management which has been used in the past. The language reflects that the Biden administration, much like the previous administration, views the United States as having a coordinating and advising role in space traffic, rather than a role of responsibility or management.

Notably, the Framework does not identify which US civil agency will take on this role. The Trump administration settled on the Department of Commerce, but the Office of Space Commerce never received sufficient funding from Congress to fully take on this mission.

With the glaring lack of designation, the Biden administration appears to be re-evaluating this decision. The continued debate (which began in the Obama administration) is hampering the United States’ ability to lead in space traffic coordination and sustainable practices.

Therefore, a decision should be made sooner rather than later, with support and funding from Congress, in order for the United States to make good on the promises of transparency, sustainability, and leadership in this fundamental arena.

“The United States will defend its national security interests from the growing scope and scale of space and counterspace threats… Conflict in space is not inevitable.”

The Framework establishes that the United States will deter aggression in space by improving resilience in our systems and honing the ability to attribute hostile acts. This amounts to a strategy of deterrence by denial, in which the United States lowers the likelihood that any attack on our space systems would succeed.

While the Framework does mention protecting against “space-enabled threats,” it does not specify the development of counterspace capabilities to do so. Demonstrating counterspace capabilities, like Russia’s recent ASAT test, may deter aggression, but it also introduces destabilizing effects on a critical domain. The Framework clearly prioritizes resiliency and strengthening space systems and missions, rather than building active defenses or offensive counterspace weapons.

With strategies of deterrence, rubber meets the road in investment and communication.

According to the Framework, resilience will come in the form of investment in “the cybersecurity of space systems, …efficient spectrum access, and… the resilience of supply chains.” With the budget delayed and the National Defense Authorization Act not yet finalized, it’s not yet clear if Congress agrees with these investments.

Certainly, the Space Force has asked in its unfunded priorities to “evolve to more resilient architectures” including $50 million to “Fix Space COMSEC, Cyber Defense Platforms, & Space Digital Integrated.” The final defense appropriations bill should include such programs as priorities.

While this Framework sets a promising path for US space policy, the forthcoming NDAA, defense appropriations bill, National Defense Strategy, and FY 2023 budget request will provide a better picture of how Congress and the Biden Administration plan to follow through on these priorities and whether they are willing to do enough.

Hannah Dennis (@hannahddennis) is a Research Assistant at the Center for a New American Security, where she supports the Defense Program and its Gaming Lab. Kaitlyn Johnson (@Kaitlyn_Johns0n) is deputy director and fellow of the Aerospace Security Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Ms. Johnson is an expert in national security space issues, as well as commercial and civil space policy.