All Domain

Russia reportedly wants Finland to leave NATO as part of Ukraine deal. History, geography explain why.

Finland’s historical experience with Russia, shaped by centuries of territorial disputes, war and changing borders, is fundamentally different from that of other nations, for instance, Sweden, which joined NATO only a year after Helsinki did.

TOPSHOT - In this pool photograph distributed by the Russian state agency Sputnik, Russia's President Vladimir Putin meets with Yevgeny Balitsky (not pictured), the Moscow-installed head of the Zaporizhzhia region of Ukraine, at the Kremlin in Moscow on November 18, 2024. (Photo by Vyacheslav PROKOFYEV / POOL / AFP) (Photo by VYACHESLAV PROKOFYEV/POOL/AFP via Getty Images)

MILAN — Last week, European observers were left a mix of outraged and bemused by reports that, as part of Ukraine negotiations Russia was demanding that Finland give up its NATO membership a little over three years after the formerly nonaligned nation joined the alliance.

Officials from Helsinki and elsewhere quickly dismissed the idea as nonsense, but it did raise a question: Why was Russia targeting Finland, instead of Sweden — the most recent NATO member — or the Baltics, whose NATO membership Russia has often cast as an act of aggression?

Analysts who spoke to Breaking Defense pointed to three key factors in the Russian decision to target Finland: geography, history and a typical pattern of Russian negotiations. Or, as analyst Jim Townsend of the Center for a New American Security put it, “there is a history here, and geography too, that makes them more of a special target than the other Nordics.” 

The largest factor is likely geography. Finland shares a 1,340-kilometer (832-mile) border with Russia, Moscow’s longest land border with any European country, which obviously represents a strategic liability in a conflict with NATO.

Townsend, a former Pentagon official, noted that the country’s location “makes it more of a special target than other Nordics” for Russia because of its proximity to St. Petersburg and its access to the Baltic Sea and the Arctic, where key Russian bases housing nuclear arsenals are located.

Robin Häggblom, a senior advisor at the Denmark-based Risk Intelligence company, added that Finland’s membership means “NATO has the ability to plan for a continuous front from northern Norway down to Estonia,” and noted that with Finland as a NATO member, alliance control of communication sea lines in the northern Baltic sea, “including to and from St. Petersburg, becomes much easier.”

Häggblom argues that while the capabilities and readiness of the Finnish Defense Forces may influence how Russia views Finland, they likely matter less than its unique position. 

presented by

“At the same time, it is entirely reasonable that both factors add weight to the Russian demand, which would explain why Russia is not as interested in Norway or Estonia, who both have territory from which the same areas can be held at risk, but whose armed forces are significantly weaker, especially when it comes to long-range fires and conventional massed units,” he said. 

Historical Ties 

Finland’s historical experience with Russia, shaped by centuries of territorial disputes, war and changing borders, is fundamentally different from that of other nations in the region, including Helsinki’s post-World War II non-aligned partner Sweden.

Charly Salonius-Pasternak, a Finnish defense expert, explained that while Russian President Vladimir Putin “likes to develop a certain version of Russian history which ignores others,” it cannot do the same with Helsinki.

Prior to 1809, Finland was part of the Kingdom of Sweden for nearly 600 years. However, that year, the Russian Empire invaded and defeated Sweden in the Finnish War, and turned Finland into an autonomous Grand Duchy within the empire.

Salonius-Pasternak said this made “people view it as having been part of the Russian Empire, which Sweden was not part of, of course.”

Over a century later, in 1939, a made-up border incident provided Soviet Russia the excuse it needed to invade Finland, which gave rise to the Winter War. While Finnish Forces resisted for several months, by March 1940, drained resources partly led them to sign the Treaty of Moscow, which ceded approximately 11 percent of Finland’s territory to the Soviet Union. 

Häggblom pointed out that the general Russian ideas allegedly proposed are not new but rather a recycled version of the draft treaty that Putin tried to push in December 2021. 

The expert said that, at the time, many in Finland perceived it as an important shift in the Kremlin’s tone, “where the country tried to re-establish veto power over, among others, Finnish security policy in the way it had during the Cold War.” Six months later, Finland had decided to join NATO — a decision that would have been unthinkable before Russia’s aggression began.

Negotiating Tactics 

Both Häggblom and Salonius-Pasternak emphasized that Russia has traditionally adopted a pattern of making excessive demands in negotiations. 

“Russia has a tendency to raise outrageous demands at the start of any negotiations. … It might very well be that the real goal they are after is something else, but by starting the bidding they are hoping for a better deal,” Häggblom said. 

Salonius-Pasternak added that by demanding such substantive changes, the Kremlin aims at breaking its adversaries into smaller pieces, in this case “trying to break NATO and European unity in exchange for nothing.” (There had already been some signs of disagreement among the Nordic nations on how much conversation should be had with Moscow.)

He proposed that NATO countries could equally observe their own proposals or counters, as Moscow has shown “it is completely uninterested in an actual peace agreement on Ukraine.” 

“In Europe it is Russia that is causing havoc with its operations or wants to cause this, so it is in fact Russia that should stop doing lots of things, not the rest of us,” Salonius-Pasternak said.


Breaking Defense Video