Why Nuclear Force Modernization Must Happen: Maj. Gen. Lutton

With Russia and China still posing an existential threat to the United States because of its large nuclear force, and North Korea and Iran eager to become strategic nuclear powers, combined with the increasing age of the US nuclear forces, nuclear modernization is a top item on America’s defense policy and spending agenda.

The man overseeing the ICBM force is taking to our pages to remind Americans of the compelling arguments made by experts from both political parties about why modernized nuclear weapons are needed. Read on! The Editor.

Minuteman III nuclear forces have been a bedrock of U.S. national security for more than five decades.

But as one looks ahead to the next five decades, the question of investing in U.S. nuclear force modernization, to some, seems antiquated and not relevant to many of the future challenges our nation may encounter. Yet, one must confront the world as it is, not as one wishes the world to be.

A 2018 Defense Intelligence Agency report, focused on Russia, China, and North Korea,  cited five themes in foreign nuclear development and proliferation:

• Increasing numbers or capabilities of weapons in existing programs;
• Enduring security threats to weapons and material;
• Countries developing delivery systems with increased capabilities;
• Countries developing nuclear weapons with smaller yields, improved precision, and increased range for military or coercive use on the battlefield;
• Countries developing new nuclear weapons without conducting large-scale nuclear tests.

To counter these trends, U.S. nuclear forces must maintain strategic stability through nuclear deterrence across a world with more states pursuing and building nuclear weapons, or developing the capabilities to strike the United States. To be an effective deterrent force, U.S. nuclear forces must be modernized—the ICBM force, the bomber force, the submarine ballistic missile force and Joint All Domain Command and Control (JADC2) capabilities.

Gen. John Hyten, then the commander of Strategic Command, said it best during a 2017 interview: “If you look at every element of the nuclear enterprise, it has to be modernized. All our stuff is old. It’s still ready, safe, secure, reliable; but it’s old.” 
A modernized U.S. nuclear force will allow a future Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to testify with the same conviction as then-chairman Gen. Joseph Dunford did in March of 2019: “Today, I can assure the committee that the United States military can defend the Homeland, meet our Alliance commitments, deter nuclear attack from any state actor, and effectively respond should deterrence fail.”

Dunford went on to note “we have a competitive advantage against any adversary across all domains. . . but that competitive advantage has eroded.” He went on to say that, with the help of Congress, “we have arrested the erosion of our competitive advantage.”

Even today with strong bipartisan congressional support for U.S. nuclear force modernization, some critics cite this modernization as a harbinger of an arms race. The critics’ arguments don’t line up with the facts. For example, the Congressional Research Service recently reported: “both nations [The United States and Russia] are modernizing their forces because existing systems are aging out; neither is pursuing these programs because the other is modernizing its forces, and neither would likely cancel its programs if the other refrained from its efforts.” CRS also noted “the new types of [Russian] strategic offensive arms introduced recently seem to be more of a response to concerns about U.S. missile defense programs than a response to U.S. offensive modernization.” Conclusion: there is no nuclear arms race.

Some critics cite a growing nuclear stockpile as another indicator of a looming arms race. But the size and age of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile is at the lowest level of warheads since the late 1950s, with the average warhead age being older than at any other time in history. Again, the critics’ arguments don’t line up with the Department of Energy reported facts to Congress.

Since 1992, the United States has reduced its nuclear stockpile. 
U.S. nuclear force modernization isn’t about racing any nation or building an increasing number of nuclear warheads. Simply put, U.S. Nuclear Force modernization is about modern — not more. Modernization is about maintaining a credible deterrent for uncertain times ahead. A credible deterrent provides not only an advantage to the joint force but also to our diplomats. 
Just as one must not approach uncertain times without a modernized nuclear force, uncertain times ahead also require unwavering commitment to nuclear non-proliferation, and counter proliferation — all underpinned by treaties delivering strategic stability through transparency and compliance. Without nuclear force modernization, however, U.S. nuclear forces will not effectively be positioned in the decades ahead to deter our nation’s potential adversaries thus eroding, not just a competitive advantage, but the bedrock of our security.

Maj. Gen. Michael Lutton is commander of the Twentieth Air Force, responsible for the entire nuclear ICBM force. It’s got a storied history. Twentieth Air Force bombers, Enola Gay and Bockscar, helped drive Japan to surrender after they dropped the first atomic bombs there.